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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
For all economic agents, from the consumer to the multinational, information is crucial
to make good decisions. A consumer who, for instance, wants to buy a new camera seeks
information on the characteristics of the cameras that are available on the market, needs
to know which shops sell the type of camera he is interested in and wants to know the
prices and the conditions of sale to find the best deal. On the other side of the market,
firms seek information on for instance competitor strategies and market conditions to
optimize their own strategies. Moreover, if a firm decides on a major strategy change it
is very useful if one or more members of the management board have inside information
on and experience with the new strategy.
Information, however, is costly to obtain. For a consumer it takes time and effort to
find out which of the available cameras best suits his taste and where he can buy this
camera at the lowest price and under the best conditions of sale. Firms likewise need to
invest time and money in gaining market knowledge, probably hiring an external consul-
tant to obtain information and to implement changes. Every economic actor therefore
has to balance the costs and the benefits of obtaining (additional) information. This con-
sideration is the main theme in this thesis.
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part uses theoretical models to investigate
how the search for information by consumers affects the strategy of retail shops. In this
part of the thesis, information flows from shops to consumers. Consumers incur costs when
searching for this information and shops can help the consumers by providing information
or by reducing the consumers’ search costs. The shops need to balance the benefits and
costs of information provision, while the consumers need to balance the benefits and costs
of searching for information. The next section of this introduction will discuss this part
of the thesis in more depth.
The second part of this thesis empirically investigates the information flows between
large firms brought about by director ties. A director with multiple board memberships
generally brings more information and more experience to the board, but this information
is costly since a director with multiple board memberships is also more busy. The final
effect on firm performance is therefore uncertain. Section 3 of this introduction discusses
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this part of the thesis in more depth.
1.2 Part I. Consumer search
The notion of consumer search dates back to Stiglers 1961 seminal paper on the economics
of information. Before Stigler, economists mostly assumed that consumers have perfect
knowledge of all prices and varieties in the market. As Stigler stated it, ’knowledge
occupies a slum dwelling in the town of economics’ (p. 213). In his paper, he notes that
in real life, information plays an important role in consumer markets and that partly
informed consumers have a profound effect on the pricing strategy of shops. The famous
paper by Bertrand (1883) had shown that when all shops sell homogenous goods and all
consumers are fully informed of the prices, price competition drives all the prices down
to marginal costs. But, as Stigler argues, when consumers are incompletely informed the
price competition between shops is softened and this leads to both above cost pricing and
price dispersion.
Stigler points to two distinct mechanisms that help to bridge the information gap
between shops and consumers: consumer search and (informative) advertising. After
Stigler’s seminal work, both mechanisms have been analyzed extensively. In the consumer
search literature some seminal papers are Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983) and
Stahl (1989). In the informative advertising literature seminal papers are for instance
Butters (1977) and Stahl (1994). As in the paper by Stigler, most of these papers analyze
search and advertising in isolation. Consumer search and advertising, however, also inter-
act with each other in providing information to the consumers. The search by consumers
will have an effect on the advertising strategy of shops and advertisements sent by the
shops will, in turn, affect the search strategy of consumers. In such a setting several ques-
tions arise. For instance, who will take the main burden of information provision? Will
the shops invest in advertising such that the consumers are provided with free information
and do not need to search, will the consumers search so much that shops do not need
to advertise, or will there be some balance with both consumer search and advertising?
And what will be the final effect on the prices? Will there be sufficient information in the
market to drive prices down to production costs? Butters (1977) makes a first attempt to
analyze these questions, but, due to ’certain unpalatable complications’, in his model con-
sumers do not choose an optimal search strategy. The only other paper jointly analyzing
consumer search and (informative) advertising is Robert and Stahl (1993). In Chapters
2 and 3 of this thesis I add to this literature by once again analyzing the interaction
between search, informative advertising and pricing. Whereas Robert and Stahl assume
that advertising does not lower the search costs of consumers, in Chapter 2 I assume that
advertising reduces the search costs to zero. This seemingly small change in assumptions
has a large influence on the results. To analyze this in more detail, in Chapter 3 I consider
a model where the reduction of search costs by advertising is endogenously determined,
reinforcing some of the results of Chapter 2.
Advertising is not the only way in which shops can influence the search costs of con-
sumers. Chapter 4 of this thesis considers firms’ location choice, where firms can either
choose to locate in a mall with no direct competitors or in a mall with existing direct
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competitors such that consumers’ costs of searching the firm and its rivals are reduced.
As with advertising, the search strategy of consumers will influence the location choice
of shops and the location choice of shops will, in turn, affect the search strategy of con-
sumers. Because of this interaction, questions arise on the final division of information
provision and the ultimate pricing and locating strategy. For instance, could locating close
to a competitor be profitable? And if there is a cluster of competitors located closely to-
gether, will then all consumers prefer to go to that cluster? And will prices in a shopping
mall be lower than the price in an isolated shop? These questions have been analyzed
before, see e.g. Wolinsky (1983), Dudey (1990) and Fischer and Harrington (1996). The
model in Chapter 4 is, however, the first to explicitly analyze the role of prices in a model
combining consumer search and location choice.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 together form Part I of this thesis. These chapters and their
contribution to the literature will now be discussed in more detail.
In Chapter 2, which is based on Janssen and Non (2008), a homogenous good duopoly
is considered where consumers search sequentially and advertising decreases the costs to
search the advertising shop to zero. For many consumer goods the search behavior of
consumers is best described by sequential search, where after each search the consumer
decides whether to search another shop or to stop searching. The threat of continued
search that is present in a sequential search model has a huge impact on the pricing
behavior of shops. The amount of advertising, in turn, depends on the prices that can
be asked. The analysis shows that when the search costs are low, and consequently the
threat of continued search is important, the prices are so low that advertising is not
profitable. When the search costs are relatively high, however, advertising is profitable.
The combination of search and advertising in general does not lead to fully informed
consumers. As a consequence, as long as both the search costs and the advertising costs
are strictly positive, prices are always above marginal costs.
The combination of sequential search and advertising leads to three new conclusions.
First, Chapter 2 shows that advertising and search are substitutes to each other. For
low enough search costs or high enough advertising costs consumers search and shops do
not advertise while for high enough search costs shops advertise but consumers do not
search at all. For intermediate search costs shops advertise and consumers search. In this
case search and advertising are substitutes in the sense that when the advertising inten-
sity decreases because of, say, increasing advertising costs, the search intensity increases.
Moreover, when the search intensity decreases because of, say, increasing search costs, the
advertising intensity increases. It does not come as a surprise that advertising and search
are substitutes since they are both aimed at bridging the information gap between shops
and consumers. The model in Chapter 2 of this thesis is, however, the first that finds this
relation between search and advertising.
Second, prices become non-monotonic in search costs. Without advertising, prices
increase in search costs since higher search costs make consumers less willing to continue
search. When shops, however, have the possibility to advertise, an increase in search costs
not only makes consumers less willing to continue search but also increases the advertising
intensity. Search and advertising therefore have opposite effects on prices, and the final
effect can go both ways.
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Third, advertised prices can be higher than non-advertised prices. This is caused by
the assumption that advertising lowers the search costs of the consumers and can best
be explained by an example. Suppose a shop advertises a price of 10 euros, while its
competitor does not advertise and sets a price of 9 euros. At first sight, a consumer could
best visit the non-advertising shop, since there the price is lower. But once a consumer
incurs at least one euro of search costs when visiting the non-advertising shop, he is bet-
ter off when visiting the advertising shop at no search costs. As this example suggests,
an advertising shop can set a higher price than a non-advertising shop and still attract
consumers.
The result that advertised prices can be higher than non-advertised prices is further
examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis, which is based on Janssen and Non (forthcom-
ing). In Chapter 2 the result on advertised prices was obtained by exogenously imposing
that advertising lowers the search costs. In Chapter 3 this assumption is endogenized by
adding an initial phase in the model in which shops decide on whether or not to shelve
the product the consumer wants to buy. Shops who do not shelve the product will never
invest in advertising, and so once a consumer has received an advertisement he is certain
that the shop sells the product. When visiting a shop that has not advertised, there is a
probability that the shop does not sell the product at all. The costs of visiting a shop are
always the same, independent of whether the shop has advertised or not. When not all
shops shelve the product, however, the expected costs of finding a shop that shelves the
product are lower when an advertising shop is visited than when a non-advertising shop is
visited. The difference in expected costs depends on the probability that a non-advertising
shop has shelved the product. If this probability is low the difference in expected costs
is large and an advertising shop could ask a higher price than a non-advertising shop.
In this chapter it is shown that indeed the search, advertising and shelving costs can be
chosen in such a way that the probability that a shop shelves the product is low and high
advertised prices are a unique equilibrium outcome.
Chapter 4 of this thesis combines sequential consumer search with the location choice
of homogenous shops. The main question in this chapter is why shopping malls exist.
Shopping malls are a widespread phenomenon, but everyday experience also suggests
that malls reduce the search costs of consumers. One consequence of these lower search
costs is that the competition between shops in a mall is increased and prices are lower.
The model in this thesis captures this feature of shopping malls, but nevertheless shows
that shops can have an incentive to form a shopping mall.
To capture the effect of shopping malls on search costs, the search costs in the model
consist of two different elements. First, consumers incur costs when entering a shop.
These costs can be interpreted as the costs of walking through the shop to find the right
product, finding the price of the product and the conditions of sale, possibly waiting for a
shop assistant to help, etc. Second, consumers incur travel costs when travelling between
different malls or isolated shops. This cost structure ensures that visiting two or more
shops in the same mall comes at less search costs than visiting the same number of isolated
shops.
As mentioned before, one of the main findings is that shops can have an incentive to
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locate together and form a shopping mall. The main reason for this is that a shopping
mall not only increases competition and decreases prices, but also increases the sales of
mall shops. The analysis of the model shows that there are two distinct mechanisms
behind the increase in sales. First, the lower prices make consumers active who otherwise
would have stayed at home. And, second, shops in a mall attract more consumers than
isolated shops. Simulations show that the final effect of the lower prices and higher sales
on profits can be positive, making the formation of a mall a dominant strategy.
The finding that locating together in a shopping mall can be a dominant strategy is
not new. Previous papers combining consumer search and location choice in a pricing
model, however, all assume heterogenous goods, while the model in Chapter 4 assumes
homogenous goods. In a model with heterogenous goods consumers have an additional
reason to visit a shopping mall. When visiting a mall, a consumer has a larger probability
of finding a product that closely matches his taste. This has a large effect on the sales
of a mall shop. Chapter 4 shows that this additional effect is not necessary to obtain
an equilibrium with a shopping mall. The uneven distribution of consumers over mall
shops and isolated shops and the increase in active consumers together increase the sales
enough to offset the decrease in prices. Moreover, most of the previous research on
consumer search and location choice mentions only the uneven distribution of consumers
or mentions only the increase in active consumers. Chapter 4 of this thesis is the first
paper to rigorously investigate both effects.
The analysis also gives a striking result on the pricing strategy of isolated shops when
there also is a mall. In that case an isolated shop will either set a price strictly above the
highest mall price or will set a price below the lowest mall price. This can be interpreted
as an isolated shop generally pricing above the mall prices, but sometimes offering a
large discount. Such a type of price distribution is seldom found in models where shops
compete in prices. The result is driven mostly by the travel costs of the consumers. Once
a consumer is in an isolated shop he has to incur travel costs to leave this shop and this
makes the consumer willing to pay a somewhat higher price once he is at the isolated
shop. To ensure that some consumers visit an isolated shop in the first place, these shops
sometimes offer a discount. This will attract consumers to the isolated shops who hope
to be lucky and find a discounted price.
1.3 Part II. Director ties
Director ties, or interlocks, occur when a director has board positions in two or more firms.
Interlocks have a long history, and have sparked public interest ever since they exist, until
the present day. A common concern among the public is the conflict of interests when
a director sits in the boards of competing firms. Moreover, many people are concerned
about a possible concentration of power in the hands of only a small group of directors.
These general concerns are reflected in several laws and regulations, for instance in Section
8 of the 1914 U.S. Clayton Antitrust Act. The Clayton Act prohibited several practices
that were deemed anticompetitive and interlocks between competing corporations were
one of those practices. A more recent example of a regulation of interlocks is the Dutch
2004 corporate governance code of good conduct, the so called code Tabaksblat, that
6 Introduction
limits the number of board positions a director might have.
Although the public concerns mentioned above are interesting in their own right, most
economic and business research on interlocks has concentrated on the effects of interlocks
on firm performance. The fact that virtually all large firms are interlocked suggests that
the existence of interlocks is not just a coincidence and that there is some reason why firms
choose to interlock with each other. Many researchers have suggested that interlocks have
a positive influence on firm performance and several reasons have been proposed why this
could be so. Mizruchi (1996) provides an overview. Most of this research presumes that
interlocking directors have more experience and information than directors who have only
one directorship, and interlocking therefore will help firms to coopt and monitor each
other. In a sense, interlocking directors provide a network between firms along which
information can flow. In this Introduction I will refer to this effect as the network effect.
One strong example of this is provided by Davis (1991). In his paper, Davis examines
the adoption of the poison pill, or ”shareholder rights plan”, a (by that time) new type
of takeover defense that makes a hostile takeover more difficult by greatly increasing the
costs a potential acquirer would have to pay. His research shows that the adoption of
the poison pill indeed follows the interlock network, with more central firms adopting the
poison pill earlier. Moreover, firms also adopt the poison pill earlier if they have ties with
other firms that have already adopted the poison pill.
Recently, economists have started to investigate a possible negative side effect of in-
terlocks: busyness. As Ferris et al. (2003) state it, directors with multiple directorships
can be ’too busy to mind the business’. This effect counters the potential network effect
of interlocks. Another negative side effect of interlocks that is sometimes mentioned in
the literature (see, e.g., Useem (1984)) but has not yet been investigated empirically, is
upper class cohesion. Interlocking directors often have the same background and work
experience, making the board of directors a cohesive group, potentially suffering from
groupthink and a lack of diversity.
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, which is based on Non and Franses (2007), I empirically
investigate the effect of interlocks on firm performance in The Netherlands. As mentioned
before, the main theme of this thesis is the balance between benefits and costs of informa-
tion. In the case of interlocks, benefits are provided by the network effect and costs are
provided by the busyness and cohesive group effects. The total effect of interlocks on firm
performance is determined by all three effects. Untangling these effects is complicated,
but the total effect of interlocks on firm performance will show which of the effects is
strongest.
For the analysis, I use a panel data set on 101 Dutch listed firms in the period 1994-
2004. This data set is unique in two respects. First, even though Dutch firms since a long
time have formed a dense interlocking network, empirical research on The Netherlands is
scarce. Second, most empirical research on the influence of interlocks on firm performance
uses cross-sectional data. Cross-sectional data leads to a causality problem: a positive
(negative) relation between number of interlocks and performance could exist because
interlocks influence performance, but could also exist because a good (bad) performance
attracts more interlocks. A panel data set helps to solve this problem, because it allows
an investigation of the long term effects of interlocks.
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The analysis in Chapter 5 uses five different measures of firm performance. The first
part of the analysis addresses the question whether the number of interlocks of a firm has
a predominantly positive or predominantly negative effect on performance. We find that
for two of the performance measures the estimated effect is negative and significant, while
the other three performance measures do not give significant results. This negative effect
is not unexpected. Dutch directors meet each other regularly outside the boardroom in
selective informal meetings and therefore the interlock network is not expected to provide
much new information to a firm. Busyness and a lack of diversity, however, are serious
concerns in The Netherlands.
Given this weak evidence of a negative relationship, the second part of the analysis
concerns the effects of busyness and group cohesion. Since we only have data on board
composition and firm performance, it is not easy to find good measures for these variables.
Based on the advice in the Code Tabaksblat, which limits the number of directorships to
five, we define a director as busy when he has four or more directorships. The reason to
deviate slightly from the advice in the Code Tabaksblat is that this code counts a chair
position twice while we count it once. Moreover, we only have data on listed firms, while a
director could also have a board position in non-listed firms or government organizations.
We define a director as upper-class if he has at least two directorships. This definition is
not based on any scientific evidence, but several books and articles in the Dutch media
suggest that directors with two or more directorships can be seen as member of a cohesive
group of upper-class directors, see, e.g., Van Hezewijk (1986, 1988).
We measure the busyness of the board of the firm by the percentage of busy directors
in the board. Regressions show that all performance measures are negatively affected
by busyness of the board, but for only two of the performance measures the estimates
are significant. Similarly, the cohesiveness of the board is measured by the percentage of
upper-class directors in the board. The most likely effect of this variable on performance
is an inverse u-shape. Having one or two upper-class directors on the board should help
to increase performance, while the board still is diverse enough to prevent groupthink.
When the number of upper-class directors however grows too large, the board is likely to
turn into a cohesive group and performance should be affected negatively. The data show
limited support for this hypothesis. For two of the performance measures the estimates
are significant and take the hypothesized signs, but the other performance measures the
estimates are nonsignificant and sometimes take the wrong sign as well.
Concluding, we do not find any evidence that in The Netherlands interlocks influence
firm performance positively. This, however, does not necessarily imply that there is no
positive network effect. The analysis in Chapter 5 only shows that the possible network
effect is outweighed by busyness and upper class cohesion. In fact, the results on upper
class cohesion do suggest that there is some network effect: there is weak evidence that
having a small number of experienced directors on the board increases performance.

Part I
Consumer search

Chapter 2
Advertising and consumer search in
a duopoly model
2.1 Introduction
Consumers and firms do not find each other costlessly in the marketplace. Consumers
spend time, money and effort searching to find firms that offer the price and quality that
best suits their tastes. Firms, on the other hand, spend money on trying to attract (new)
consumers. There is a considerable amount of economic literature on both advertising
(see, e.g., the seminal paper by Butters (1977)) and search (see, e.g., seminal papers by
Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Stahl (1989)) separately, but very little
on the interaction between advertising and search activities.
In this chapter we study a homogeneous goods duopoly model where firms choose
an advertising intensity and a price they charge for their product. We consider a linear
advertising technology where the cost of reaching an additional consumer is independent
of the fraction of consumers already reached. This allows us to get closed-form solutions.
After (not) having observed firms’ advertisements, consumers decide whether or not to
search for (more) prices in a sequential way, i.e., they first choose whether or not to
obtain one price quotation and after having seen the result of this price search they
decide whether to continue searching or not. As some consumers want to search despite
the fact that they are already informed about one firm’s price, we allow consumers to be
heterogeneous in their search costs: one group of consumers has a positive search cost,
whereas another group has zero search cost either because they enjoy shopping or have a
negligibly small opportunity cost of time or because they use search engines.
In the context where one allows for both search and advertising, the interpretation
of the search cost parameter deserves some attention. In general, search costs consist
of (at least) two components: the cost of visiting a shop knowing that the shop carries
the product the consumer wants to buy and the cost of finding or searching for a shop
that carries the product. A firm’s advertisement not only informs a consumer of the
price the firm charges, it also informs the consumer that the firm carries the product,
i.e., it (importantly) eliminates the second component of search costs. As this general
formulation is difficult to analyze in detail, we consider the extreme situation, where the
costs of visiting a shop are negligibly small compared to the costs of finding a shop that
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sells the product. The role of advertising is to inform consumers that the shop sells the
product and at which price.
We arrive at the following results. First, there is no consistent relationship between
advertised and non-advertised prices. In particular, contrary to conventional wisdom
advertised prices may be higher than non-advertised prices. The intuition for this result
may be understood as follows. In our model, receiving an ad means that a consumer does
not have to pay search costs, and so advertised prices can be fairly high. Furthermore,
the existence of shoppers is relatively more important for non-advertising firms than
for advertising firms as advertising firms reach out for many more consumers, whereas
non-advertising firms only receive those consumers that actively search themselves. As
shoppers create competitive pressure, this creates a tendency for non-advertised prices to
be lower.
Second, in our model advertising and search are ’substitutes’ meaning that, roughly
speaking, if for a certain parameter constellation the equilibrium has firms advertising a
lot, then consumers search relatively little, and vice versa. This result is quite intuitive as
the main goal of search and of advertising is the same, namely to overcome the problem
that without information, there cannot be any beneficial form of exchange. If one side of
the market is willing to pay for overcoming the information gap, then the other side of
the market can free ride.
Third, expected prices are non-monotonic in changes in the search cost parameter,
but when search costs approach zero, equilibrium prices converge to the competitive price
level. To understand the reason why expected prices are non-monotonic, it is important
to understand the reason why there is price dispersion in this model. Price dispersion
arises from the fact that in equilibrium there are different types of consumers: those that
are informed of all prices (or at least more than one firm’s price) and those that have only
observed one price (either through advertisement or through search). Over the last group
of consumers, firms have monopoly power, but there is competition for the first group
of consumers. Price dispersion is the way firms balance these two forces. When search
cost decline, it is natural for consumers to search more ceteris paribus. This forces firms
to lower their prices. On the other hand, when consumers search more, and with lower
prices, firms have an incentive to lower their advertising intensity and thereby to increase
prices (as ceteris paribus there are fewer consumers who make price comparisons). In some
cases, the first tendency is larger than the second; in other cases, the second tendency is
larger.
Bakos (1997) argues that firms have an incentive to raise search costs since this will
lead to higher prices and profits. The result above shows that this need not be the case if
one takes advertising into account. The underlying mechanism of two contrasting forces,
less search and more advertising, has some similarity to the literature on switching costs.
Initially, one would argue that higher switching costs give firms more market power and
so raise prices. Firms, however, also have an incentive to compete for market shares, since
consumers who are ’locked in’ can be profitably exploited. The result of these competing
forces can go both ways: switching costs can lead to both higher and lower prices. See
e.g. Klemperer (1987) and Dube et al. (2006).
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Robert and Stahl (1993) is the first1 paper analyzing the interaction between search
and advertising incentives. Their model differs in two important ways. First, all con-
sumers are ex ante identical even with respect to their search costs. Second, Robert and
Stahl interpret the search cost parameter as the cost of visiting a firm. In their model
therefore consumers also have to pay search costs when buying from a firm they got an
advertisement from, neglecting the fact that receiving an ad reduces the cost of finding a
shop that carries the product. In their case, the role of advertising is to inform consumers
of the price only.2 There are also many important qualitative differences in results ob-
tained. For example, in Robert and Stahl’s model search and advertising turn out to be
complements to each other in the sense that for those parameter values for which firms
do not advertise, consumers do not search either (autarky). Moreover, whenever firms
do advertise, consumers also are engaged in search activities. Above, we explained why
we think it is more natural to (partly) think of search and advertising as substitutes for
each other. Second, lower prices are unambiguously more heavily advertised than higher
prices in Robert and Stahl (1993). Finally, our model shows that perfect competition is a
limiting case when search cost approach zero. Robert and Stahl arrive at the surprising
conclusion that pricing behavior does not converge to competitive pricing when search
cost vanish.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model
and Section 2.3 gives a full characterization of the equilibrium configurations possible.
The most important comparative static results are presented in Section 2.4 and Section
2.5 concludes. Some proofs are given in the appendix to this chapter; the remaining proofs
are given in Janssen and Non (2005).
2.2 Model
Our model deals with a homogeneous good market with two active firms. The production
costs of the good are constant and equal across firms. We will normalize the production
costs to 0. There are no capacity constraints. Firms have the possibility to advertise. The
per consumer advertising costs are A. Advertising is an ’all-or-nothing’ decision, that is,
a firm either does not advertise or it advertises to the complete market. In an ad the firm
informs the consumers that it exists and sells the product and it mentions the price it
charges. It is assumed firms have to stick to the price they announce in their ad, that is,
ads never lie, and that they have to set a single price to all consumers.
At the demand side of the market there is a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer
demands a single unit of the good and has valuation θ > 0 for the good. We will con-
1Although Butters (1977) considers a combination of search and advertising, in his model search is
not optimal. The only other theoretical paper is Stahl (2000). This paper builds on the model by
Robert and Stahl (1993) and analyzes some specific cases. Recently, Cason and Datta (2006) reported
on an experimental study of the Robert and Stahl model with a fixed advertising intensity. Overall, the
experiment supports the predictions of the (modified) Robert and Stahl model.
2Other differences are that Robert and Stahl (1993) consider the general oligopoly case with convex
advertising technology, i.e., it requires more and more money to reach one more consumer. This level of
generality implies that they cannot get a closed-form solution for the equilibrium strategies.
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centrate on the case of θ > A, otherwise it is clear firms will not advertise. A fraction γ,
with 0 < γ < 0.53, of the consumers is called shoppers. These consumers are assumed to
know the prices charged by both firms and they will buy at the firm with the lowest price
(provided this price is lower than θ). The other 1 − γ consumers a priori do not know
the prices charged by the two firms. Sometimes they will get an ad from one or both
firms, depending on the advertising strategy of the firms. Consumers can also decide to
search one or both firms for prices. This search is costly: each search action costs c, where
c < θ. Consumers have perfect memory; they know which firms they already searched
and also remember which price they found there. Furthermore consumers receive all ad-
vertisements that are sent by the firms before they start to search. In our model search
is sequential: after each search action the consumer decides whether or not to continue
searching.
The timing of the game is as follows. First the firms simultaneously decide on their
advertising and pricing strategies. With probability αj a firm j advertises and chooses
a price from price distribution F j1 (p), where F
j
1 (p) denotes the probability that a price
smaller than or equal to p is chosen. With probability 1 − αj a firm does not advertise
and chooses a price from price distribution F j0 (p). So a firm j’s strategy is given by
{αj, F j0 (p), F j1 (p)}.
After the firms have decided on their strategy, advertisements are realized according
to αj and prices are drawn from F j0 (p) or F
j
1 (p). We will denote by p
j
0 and p
j
1 the up-
per bounds of the supports of price distributions F j0 (p) and F
j
1 (p) respectively. In the
same way, pj
0
and pj
1
denote the respective lower bounds. The shoppers now buy at the
lowest-priced firm (provided the price is lower than θ). The non-shoppers first see the
advertisements and then decide on their search strategy. If they decide not to search, they
buy at the firm with the lowest advertised price lower than θ (or, if there are no ads, they
do not buy at all). If they decide to search they pick a non-advertising firm at random
and obtain a price quotation from that firm and decide whether to search further or to
stop searching. If they decide to stop searching, the product is bought from the firm with
the lowest price lower than θ in the set of already obtained price quotations.
We analyze the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game described above.
In the remainder we will therefore drop the index j. The profit pi0(p) denotes the profit
when a firm does not advertise and charges price p and pi1(p) denotes the expected profit
when advertising and charging price p. We define pi0 = pi0(p) for all p in the support of
F0(p) and pi1 = pi1(p) for all p in the support of F1(p), Whenever α > 0, pi0 = pi1.
The assumption made above that advertising is an ’all-or-nothing’ decision may seem
somewhat unrealistic. Other models incorporating advertising (eg. Butters (1977), Stahl
3The equilibrium analysis is dependent on whether γ is smaller than or larger than 0.5. Denote by
µ the probability that a consumer searches. One of our equilibria needs µ > 2γ, which is impossible for
γ > 0.5. Therefore, for γ > 0.5 this equilibrium disappears. On the other hand, one of our equilibria
needs µ < 2γ. This restriction holds automatically for γ > 0.5. We decided to analyze the case of γ < 0.5,
since Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (forthcoming) estimate the fraction of shoppers to be clearly
below 0.5, but significantly above 0.
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(1994), Robert and Stahl (1993)) assume that firms choose an advertising intensity, indi-
cating the fraction of consumers who are informed by an advertisement. This advertising
intensity generally depends on the price chosen, and so a firm’s strategy in this context can
be denoted by a price distribution F (p), indicating the probability that the price chosen
by the firm is below p and an advertising function κ(p), indicating the advertising intensity
conditional on a price p. When the advertising costs are linear and given by Aκ(p) it can
be shown4 that the two formulations are equivalent, meaning that if in the ’all-or-nothing’
model α, F0(p) and F1(p) are part of an equilibrium, then F (p) = (1− α)F0(p) + αF1(p)
and κ(p) = αf1(p)
(1−α)f0(p)+αf1(p) form an equilibrium in the ’advertising reach’ model. On the
other hand, when F (p) and κ(p) are part of an equilibrium in the ’advertising reach’
model then α =
∫ p
p
κ(p)dF (p), F0(p) =
R p
p 1−κ(p)dF (p)
1−α and F1(p) =
R p
p κ(p)dF (p)
α
form an
equilibrium in the ’all-or-nothing’ model. Since the two formulations are equivalent and
the ’all-or-nothing’ model is easier to analyze, we will use this formulation throughout the
Chapter.
2.3 Equilibria
Before focussing on equilibrium behavior, we discuss optimal search behavior and optimal
firm behavior. By doing so, we use the fact that firms will never set a price equal to 0 or
above θ as this yields nonpositive profits, while setting a positive price below θ and not
advertising always yields strictly positive profits.
Consumer behavior
As in all sequential search models, the optimal search behavior is characterized by
a reservation price r0. To define the reservation price assume the lowest price already
observed is given by pˆ. The expected gain from searching once more is then given by
∫ pˆ
p
0
(pˆ− p)dF0(p). (2.1)
This expression shows that the expected gain arises when the price found is below pˆ.
Note that F0(p) is used: only non-advertising firms are searched.
The above expression can be integrated in parts and simplifies to
∫ pˆ
p
0
F0(p)dp.
This defines r0 as
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c. One can easily see it is profitable to search if
observed prices are above r0.
We implicitly assumed that the consumer already observed a price quotation. If this
is not the case, consumers will search for sure if r0 < θ. If r0 = θ they will search with
4Details can be found in the appendix to this chapter.
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probability µ ≤ 1, and if r0 > θ they will not search at all. To see this, note that the
expected gain from searching when no price has yet been obtained is given by expression
(2.1) where pˆ is replaced by θ. This implies that searching is profitable if and only if
θ > r0. Hence, µ = 1 when r0 < θ, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 when r0 = θ and µ = 0 when r0 > θ.
Firm behavior
In this part we will derive some general results on firm behavior that will be helpful
in the next part where we derive the equilibria of our model.
Lemma 2.3.1 In a symmetric equilibrium, α < 1.
The main idea behind this lemma can be explained as follows. If both firms advertise
for sure, all consumers will be aware of all prices in the market. Price will therefore be
driven down to 0 (Bertrand outcome). The firms obtain negative payoffs −A and so have
an incentive not to advertise.
A second observation is that like many search papers, but unlike the paper by Robert
and Stahl (1993), the price distributions are atomless. Also, prices that are chosen will
never be larger than the reservation price of non-shoppers. A third observation is that for
all prices between p
0
and p0 it should be that pi0(p) = pi0. The same holds for p1, p1 and
pi1(p). This implies that whether the price distributions have a gap or not, pi0(p) = pi1(p)
in the region [max{p
0
, p
1
},min{p0, p1}]. We will use this in the derivation of our equilibria.
Lemma 2.3.2 F0(p) and F1(p) are atomless and F0(r0) = F1(r0) = 1. Furthermore, for
p
0
≤ p ≤ p0 pi0(p) = pi0 and for p1 ≤ p ≤ p1 pi1(p) = pi1.
Characterization of Equilibria
The model has four exogenous parameters: θ, c, A and γ. It can be shown that if θ,
c and A are all multiplied by a scalar x 6= 1 the equilibria do not change except that all
prices (and r0) and profits are multiplied by x. For convenience, we can thus normalize
with respect to θ, and set θ = 1.
We first provide a classification of the different types of equilibria that may arise in
our model and then characterize the equilibrium strategies of firms and consumers in each
of these cases. The following theorem shows that three types of equilibria may arise in
our model.
Theorem 2.3.1 Each symmetric equilibrium can be classified in one of three different
types. Type I has firms not advertising at all (α = 0). Type II has firms advertising with
strictly positive probability (0 < α < 1) and overlapping supports of the price distributions
with p0 = p1. Type III has firms advertising with strictly positive probability (0 < α < 1)
and price distributions that do not overlap. In particular, p0 = p1 and so advertised prices
are higher than non-advertised prices.
Note that in type III equilibria, advertised prices are always higher than non-advertised
prices. The reverse, advertised prices always being below non-advertised prices, cannot
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arise in equilibrium. In the appendix to this chapter we show that if advertised prices are
always lower than non-advertised prices, an advertising firm has an incentive to deviate
and advertise the highest non-advertised price. This leads to somewhat less sales, but at
a much higher price.
Each of the three types of equilibria has a corresponding parameter region where the
equilibrium exists. These regions will be expressed in terms of A and c, taking γ constant.
The derivation of the equilibria and corresponding parameter regions will show that each
parameter set [A, c, γ] has a unique corresponding symmetric equilibrium. Each symmet-
ric equilibrium of a certain type can be further classified in one of two cases, dependent on
the value of µ, the probability that uninformed consumers search. Case a has 0 < µ < 1
and case b has µ equal to 1 (for type I and II) or 0 (for type III); see Janssen and Non
(2005) for more details. For each of the three types of equilibrium, we will now derive
case a. The derivation of case b is very similar in nature.
Equilibrium type I: no advertising (α = 0).
As indicated above when characterizing optimal search behavior, 0 < µ < 1 implies
r0 = 1. As the no advertising case is identical to the search model of Janssen et al. (2005),
we can use the same arguments to show that
F0(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)12µ(1− γ)
γp
.
Since r0 = 1,
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c is an expression in γ, c and µ. This expression provides
an implicit definition of µ:
µ ln
µ(1− γ)
2γ + µ(1− γ) = (c− 1)
2γ
1− γ . (2.2)
Note that µ ln µ(1−γ)
2γ+µ(1−γ) is strictly decreasing from 0 to ln
1−γ
1+γ
for 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 so that µ
is uniquely defined.
For α = 0 to hold, advertising should not be profitable. The expected profit from
advertising a price p is given by p[(1−γ)+γ(1−F0(p))]−A = (1−γ)(p+ 12µr0− 12pµ)−A.
This expected profit is maximized for p = r0, giving profit r0(1− γ)− A. Advertising is
not profitable when r0(1 − γ) − A < r0(1 − γ)12µ. Rearranging terms and using r0 = 1
gives
µ > 2(1− A
1− γ ).
The two assumptions 0 < µ < 1 and α = 0 together hold when
max{0, 2(1− A
1− γ )} < µ < 1.
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Using the definition of µ given by (2.2) and the fact that µ ln µ(1−γ)
2γ+µ(1−γ) is strictly
decreasing for 0 < µ < 1, this gives rise to the following parameter restrictions:
β1 ≡ 1 + 1− γ
2γ
ln
1− γ
1 + γ
< c < min{1, 1 + 1− γ − A
γ
ln
1− γ − A
1− A }. (2.3)
As 0 < β1 < 1, it is clear that this type of equilibrium exists whenever
1−γ
2
< A.
The above discussion, and the derivation of equilibrium Ib can be summarized as
follows.
Proposition 2.3.1 An equilibrium with α = 0 has
F0(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)12µ(1− γ)
γp
.
If (2.3) holds, r0 = 1 and µ is implicitly defined by (2.2). If c < min{β1, 2Aβ11−γ }, µ = 1
and r0 =
c
β1
.
Equilibrium type II: some advertising (0 < α < 1) and partially overlapping price
distributions (p0 = p1).
First note that since 0 < µ < 1 the reservation price for non-shoppers should be equal to
the consumers’ valuation in this case, i.e., r0 = 1. Furthermore, the profit equations in
the case of non-advertising and advertising are equal to
pi0(p) = p[γα(1− F1(p)) + γ(1− α)(1− F0(p)) + (1− γ)(1− α)1
2
µ],
respectively,
pi1(p) = p[α(1− F1(p)) + γ(1− α)(1− F0(p)) + (1− γ)(1− α)]− A.
These equations can be interpreted as follows. A firm only attracts all shoppers if it
has the lowest price taking into account that the competitor may charge different prices
depending on whether or not it advertises. In case the firm does not advertise, it attracts
only half of the non-shoppers that do search themselves and only when the competitor does
not advertise. The advertising firm attracts more consumers, namely all non-shoppers, if
the competitor does not advertise or if the competitor advertises a higher price, but has
to pay the advertising cost A.
Whenever the upper bounds of the two price distributions are equal we can use stan-
dard arguments to show that the upper bound then has to be equal to the reservation
price, i.e., p0 = p1 = r0, and therefore pi0(r0) has to be equal to pi1(r0), which gives the
condition
r0(1− γ)(1− α)(1− 1
2
µ) = A. (2.4)
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For all prices larger than max{p
0
, p
1
}, we can use pi0(p) = pi1(p) (see lemma 3.2) to
derive
F1(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)(1− α)(1− 12µ)
αp
. (2.5)
Using pi0(p) = pi0(r0) and the above expression for F1(p) we can also derive that
F0(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)(12µ− γ)
γp
. (2.6)
We stress that these price distributions only hold for prices larger than or equal to
max{p
0
, p
1
}. Thus, we distinguish two cases: (i), p
0
< p
1
and (ii), p
0
> p
1
.
In case (i) we can use pi0(p) = pi0(r0) to get the price distribution
F0(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)(1− γ)(1− α)12µ− pγα
pγ(1− α) , (2.7)
for all p < p
1
. Similarly, in case (ii) we get that for all p < p
0
F1(p) = 1− r0(1− γ)(1− α)− p(1− α)
αp
. (2.8)
To check under which conditions an equilibrium of type IIa exists, we first note
that µ should be between 0 and 1. Furthermore, α as defined by (2.4) should also be
between 0 and 1. This gives rise to condition µ < 2 − 2A
1−γ . Finally, it should be that
µ > 2γ, since otherwise F0(p) is decreasing in p. Thus, we have that µ should satisfy
2γ < µ < min{1, 2− 2A/(1− γ)}.
For equilibrium IIai,
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c and r0 = 1 gives
f(µ,A, γ) ≡ 1 + 1− γ
2γ
µ ln
1
2
µA
1
2
µA+ (1− 1
2
µ)γ
−(1− 1
2
µ) ln
A(1− 1
2
µ)
(1− γ)(1− 1
2
µ)− A1
2
µ
= c, (2.9)
which implicitly defines µ as a function ofA, c and γ. For equilibrium IIaii,
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp =
c and r0 = 1 gives
g(µ, γ) ≡ 1− γ −
1
2
µ
γ
ln
µ− 2γ
µ
= c, (2.10)
again implicitly defining µ as function of c and γ. The L.H.S. of expressions (2.9) and
(2.10) are both decreasing in µ and so 2γ < µ < min{1, 2− 2A/(1− γ)} can be rewritten
as
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max{f(1, A, γ), f(2− 2A
1− γ ,A, γ)} < c < f(2γ,A, γ) (2.11)
for case (i), and
max{g(1, γ), g(2− 2A
1− γ , γ)} < c < g(2γ, γ) (2.12)
for case (ii). For equilibrium type IIa to hold either restriction (2.11) or restriction
(2.12) should hold. However, note that for restriction (2.11) to be relevant, p
0
should be
smaller than p
1
, while for restriction (2.12), p
0
should be larger than p
1
. It can be shown
that the resulting conditions can be simplified to the ones mentioned in Proposition 2.3.2.
Proposition 2.3.2 An equilibrium with 0 < α < 1 and p0 = p1 has α = 1− Ar0(1−γ)(1− 12µ)
and F0(p) and F1(p) being defined by (2.6) and (2.5) respectively in the common support
[max{p
0
, p
1
}, r0] and (2.7) and (2.8) respectively for p < p1 and p < p0.
If either A > 1−2γ
2
and (2.11) hold or A < 1−2γ
2
and g(1, γ) < c < f(2γ,A, γ) hold,
where f(µ,A, γ) and g(µ, γ) are as defined in (2.9) and (2.10), then 0 < µ < 1, r0 = 1
and µ is defined by equations (2.9) for the case where p
0
< p
1
and by (2.10) for the case
where p
1
< p
0
.
If A < 1−2γ
2
and 2Aβ1
1−γ < c < β2 or A >
1−2γ
2
and 2Aβ1
1−γ < c < f(2 − 2A1−γ , A, γ), µ = 1
and r0 is implicitly defined by r0f(1,
A
r0
, γ) = c for the case where p
0
< p
1
and by r0 =
c
β2
for the case where p
0
> p
1
.
Equilibrium type III : some advertising (0 < α < 1) and price distributions that do
not overlap (p0 = p1) .
Finally, we will turn to the last type of equilibrium, namely the one where firms spend
some money on advertising and when they do advertise, they set consistently higher prices
than when they don’t advertise, i.e., p0 = p1. Using standard arguments, we first observe
that p1 = r0 = 1. Profits in case of advertising are now given by the following expression
pi1(p) = pα(1− F1(p)) + p(1− α)(1− γ)− A.
This expression can be understood as follows. When a firm advertises, it knows it
gets all consumers when its competitor also advertises and sets a higher price. When
the competitor does not advertise, he always asks a lower price and so shoppers will buy
from him. Non-shoppers however do not search after receiving an ad and buy from the
advertising firm. In order to derive the equilibrium price distribution in case of advertising,
we equate this expression with the profits the firm gets when advertising the reservation
price: pi1(1) = (1− α)(1− γ)− A. This yields the following expression
F1(p) = 1− (1− p)(1− α)(1− γ)
pα
, (2.13)
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The profits a firm gets from not advertising are given by
pi0(p) = pγα+ pγ(1− α)(1− F0(p)) + p(1− γ)(1− α)1
2
µ.
A non-advertising firm in this case gets shoppers if, and only if, the other firm adver-
tises or the other firm does not advertise and sets a higher price. Non-shoppers will come
to the shop only when the competitor also does not advertise and in that case, both firms
receive half of the non-shoppers. It is easy to see that setting the highest non-advertised
price yields a profit equal to pi0(p0) = p0γα + p0(1 − γ)(1 − α)12µ. Equating pi0(p) and
pi0(p0) gives
F0(p) = 1−
(p0 − p)(γα + (1− γ)(1− α)12µ)
pγ(1− α) . (2.14)
It is easy to see that advertising a price below p
1
is never profitable.5 It also should
not be profitable to refrain from advertising and charge a price above p0. Note that for
p ≥ p0, pi0(p) = p(γα(1−F1(p))+(1−α)(1−γ)12µ). Substituting the expression for F1(p)
given in (2.13) yields an expression that is decreasing in p whenever µ < 2γ. Hence, this
is a necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist.
For the above equilibrium to hold, there are some other parameter restrictions as well.
First, 0 < α < 1 requires pi0 = pi1, which gives
α2
1
2
µ(1− γ) + α((1− γ)(1− µ) + γ
1− γA) + A− (1− γ)(1−
1
2
µ) = 0. (2.15)
Furthermore, 0 < µ < 1 gives
∫ 1
p
0
F0(p)dp = c. Substituting F0(p) gives
1 +
(1− α)(1− γ)− A
γ(1− α) ln
γα + (1− α)(1− γ)1
2
µ
γ + (1− α)(1− γ)1
2
µ
= c. (2.16)
Equations (2.15) and (2.16) together define α and µ as equations of c, A and γ. For
the equilibrium to hold, 0 < α < 1 and 0 < µ < 2γ.
Note that equation (2.15) is an increasing function of α, that reaches A−(1−γ)(1− 1
2
µ)
for α = 0 and A
1−γ for α = 1. The restriction 0 < α < 1 therefore reduces to A − (1 −
γ)(1− 1
2
µ) < 0, which gives µ < 2− 2A
1−γ .
It can be shown that expression (2.16) is decreasing in µ and so the restrictions 0 <
µ < min{2γ, 2− 2A
1−γ} can be written as
max{1 + (1− γ) ln (1− γ)
2 − Aγ
(1− γ)2 + A(1− γ) , 1 +
(1− γ)− A
γ
ln
(1− γ)− A
1− A } <
5To see this, write down pi1(p) for p ≤ p1 using the above expression for F0(p) and note that pi1(p) is
increasing in p.
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Figure 2.1: The parameter regions in terms of A and c where the different equilibria exist,
assuming γ = 0.1.
c < 1 + ((1− γ)− A) ln (1− γ)
2 − A(1− γ)
(1− γ)2 + Aγ ≡ β3. (2.17)
We summarize as follows:
Proposition 2.3.3 Equilibria with 0 < α < 1 and p0 = p1 have F1(p) as defined in
(2.13) and F0(p) as defined in (2.14) with p0 =
(1−α)(1−γ)
α+(1−α)(1−γ) . If (2.17) holds we have
0 < µ < 1 and α and µ are implicitly defined by (2.15) and (2.16). If c > β3, with β3 as
defined in (2.17), µ = 0 and α is given by (1−γ)
2−A(1−γ)
(1−γ)2+Aγ .
Discussion
We will now take a closer look at the parameter regions in which the different types
of equilibria exist. Figure 2.3 depicts for the case where γ = 0.1 for each equilibrium the
region where it exists in terms of A and c. We note that the regions do not overlap and
that they together fill the complete parameter space. Equilibria IIa and IIb are both
divided by a dotted line. Left of this line, p
1
< p
0
, while right of this line p
0
< p
1
.
We note that for the equilibria with no advertising (equilibrium type I) to exist, the
search costs c should be low or the advertising costs A should be high. The intuition
is fairly simple: for high A advertising is too expensive to be profitable. For low search
cost, firms can not ask high prices since otherwise the consumers will search on and so
advertising is too expensive relative to the prices that can be asked.
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The equilibria with full consumer search (equilibrium types Ib and IIb where µ = 1)
are in a region with low search costs, whereas their counterparts with partial consumer
search (0 < µ < 1) are in a region with higher search cost. The equilibrium with no
consumer search (equilibrium type IIIb) only exists for c relatively high and A not too
low or high. It is clear that higher search cost lead to less search. The intuition for the
restriction on A is as follows. For high A it is not profitable to advertise and so firms only
sell to the shoppers and searching consumers. Note that if consumers do not search at all,
prices and profits will be driven to 0, giving consumers an incentive to search. For low A
firms have a large incentive to advertise, which drives prices down. This leads to a higher
payoff from search and therefore to some consumer search even if the search costs are large.
We note that if firms do not advertise (α = 0), the non-shoppers search with strictly
positive probability as long as the search cost c are below the valuation for the product
(see also Janssen et al. (2005)). On the other hand, if the non-shoppers do not search
(µ = 0), the firms advertise with strictly positive probability as long as the advertising
costs are below 1 − γ. Thus, certainly in these regions advertising and search act as
substitutes for each other.
2.4 Comparative Statics
In this section we will give some asymptotic and comparative static results. We are
interested in the impact of changes in c and A on the variables that are of main interest
such as prices, profits and welfare. We start the discussion with some limiting results.
Theorem 2.4.1 a When c becomes arbitrarily small, firms do not advertise and there is
full consumer search (µ = 1). The maximum price charged approaches 0.
b When A becomes arbitrarily small, the advertising intensity α converges to 1 and the
expected advertised price Ep1 converges to 0.
These results can be understood as follows. When the search costs approach 0, the
Bertrand result arises. This asymptotic result also occurs in the pure search models of
Stahl (1989) and Janssen et al. (2005). The intuition is simple: if the search costs are very
low, consumers are almost always willing to search and to prevent further search, firms
lower their prices, in that way preventing advertising. This Bertrand-like result however
does not arise in Robert and Stahl’s model. In their model, when search costs approach
zero, advertising diminishes, but the minimum price is strictly above zero. Without
shoppers, Robert and Stahl obtain a Diamond type of result, namely that when c vanishes,
the equilibrium price distribution converges to a degenerate distribution where all firms
charge one particular, strictly positive, price for sure. A fraction of shoppers, however
small, causes a breakdown of this result and the traditional Bertrand-type result emerges.
When the advertising costs approach 0 we get the intuitive result that the advertising
probability rises to 1 and advertised prices decrease to 0.
We next proceed to some comparative statics results. The analysis provides an assess-
ment of the impact of a change in exogenous parameter values on the economic variables
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Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
α 0 0 + + + 0
µ - 0 - 0 - 0
Ep0 - + - +/- - 0
Ep1 -
∗ + - 0
pi - + - 0 - 0
Welfare - - - - -∗ 0
Table 2.1: Local comparative statics results with respect to changes in c.
of interest α, µ, the expected non-advertised price Ep0, the expected advertised price Ep1,
the profit pi and welfare conditional on a certain type of equilibrium to be present in the
economy. We define expected welfare as the value of all transactions taking place minus
the search and advertising costs that have been incurred, i.e, expected welfare equals
1− (1− γ)(1− µ)(1− α)2 − 2αA− (1− γ)µ(1− α)2c.
In Figures 2.4 and 2.4 we give a description of how for example, expected price depends
on search cost across equilibria for specific values of the other exogenous parameters.
Tables 2.1 and 2.22 provide an overview of the local comparative statics.
We will first discuss the comparative statics results with respect to changes in search
costs. The local comparative statics are given in Table 2.1.6
We note that the primary effect of a change in search costs is twofold. In equilibria
with full consumer search, the reservation price increases in the search costs, while in equi-
libria with partial consumer search (0 < µ < 1) the primary effect of a change in search
costs is in reducing the amount of search. In the equilibrium with no search there is no
effect of a change in search costs. This comes back in Table 2.1 as the comparative statics
results in equilibria Ia, IIa and IIIa are clearly different from the results in equilibria Ib
and IIb. In equilibria of type a, the decreasing search intensity makes not-advertising less
attractive (a non-advertising firm only attracts those non-shoppers that are searching)
and so firms advertise more. It is intuitively clear that more advertising leads to lower
prices. In equilibria b, the reservation price increases in a reaction to increasing search
costs. This leads to more advertising. The effect on prices is twofold: a higher reservation
price means higher prices can be asked, but on the other hand there is more competition
and so a decreasing effect on prices. These opposite effects are nicely illustrated by the
’+/-’ for Ep0 in equilibrium IIb.
An overview of these results is given in Figure 2.4, where we depict α, µ, Ep0, Ep1, pi
and welfare as a function of c, taking γ and A fixed. The figures are drawn for γ =
6A ′+′ in these tables denotes a positive impact, a ′−′ a negative impact, ′0′ no impact and ′ + /−′
denotes that the impact can be positive as well as negative, depending on specific parameter values. In
some cases we have been unable to analytically evaluate the sign. In these cases we resort to a numerical
analysis and evaluate the impact by taking γ fixed to 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, and so on. These cases are
marked by a ∗.
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(a) Plots of α (left) and µ (right) as a function of c.
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(b) Plots of Ep0 (left) and Ep1 (right) as a function of c.
0.2
0.6
0.15
0.4
0.1
0.05
0.2
0
0 10.8 0.60.40.20
1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
10.8
(c) Plots of pi (left) and welfare (right) as a function of c.
Figure 2.2: Plots of several variables as a function of c. The figures are drawn for γ = 0.2
and A = 0.2.
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(c) Plots of Ep0 as a function of A.
Figure 2.3: Plots of several variables as a function of A. The left figures are drawn for
γ = 0.2 and c = 0.1, the right figures are drawn for γ = 0.2 and c = 0.7.
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(e) Plots of pi as a function of A.
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(f) Plots of welfare as a function of A.
Figure 2.3: (continued) Plots of several variables as a function of A. The left figures are
drawn for γ = 0.2 and c = 0.1, the right figures are drawn for γ = 0.2 and c = 0.7.
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Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
α 0 0 -∗ - -∗ -
µ 0 0 0/- 0 +/- 0
Ep0 0 0 0 +/0 0 +/-
Ep1 +
∗ + +∗ +
pi 0 0 +/- + +/- +/-
Welfare 0 0 +/- +/- +/- -
Table 2.2: Local comparative statics results with respect to changes in A.
0.2 and A = 0.2. Letting c increase from 0 to 1 means that equilibria Ib, IIbi, IIbii,
IIaii, IIai, IIIa and IIIb hold in this order. The figure clearly shows how the monotonic-
ity of both α and µ with respect to changes in c may give rise to non-monotonic behavior
of both the expected advertised and non-advertised price with respect to c. The figures
also show that the profits are non-monotonic with respect to c, which is quite intuitive
given the behavior of prices and advertising.
It is also possible to look at the effects of a change in advertising costs A. The impact of
a change in advertising costs on the economy is through a change in advertising intensity:
higher advertising costs leads to less advertising and therefore to higher advertised prices.
An overview of the results is depicted in Figure 2.4, where α, µ, Ep0, Ep1, pi and welfare
are represented as a function of A, taking γ and c fixed. In the left graphs, we take γ = 0.2
and c = 0.1, while in the right graphs γ = 0.2 and c = 0.7. When c = 0.1, letting A
increase from 0 to 1 means that equilibria IIbii, IIbi and Ib hold in this order. For
c = 0.7 equilibria IIaii, IIai, IIIa, IIIb, IIIa and Ia hold in this order. Note that for
c = 0.1 we plot Ep1 only for A < 0.21. For higher values of A Ep1 is not defined. The
figures show that although Ep0 is non-monotonic in A, the expected non-advertised price
has only little variation. This is in contrast with the expected advertised price, which
monotonically increases from 0 to 0.5 - 1.
Profits and welfare can both both increase and decrease in the advertising costs. The
effect on profits can be explained by the fact that an increase in advertising costs implies
on one hand less competition and therefore higher advertised prices, but on the other
hand also leads to more expenditure on advertising if firms decide to advertise.
2.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter we have analyzed the interaction between two information transferring
technologies: advertising and search. In particular we have focused on the interaction
between the incentives for firms to advertise and for consumers to search in relation to
the parameters underlying the search and advertising technology.
We reach three important conclusions. First, if the cost of one of these technologies be-
comes arbitrary small, the model’s outcome get very close to the fully competitive outcome
where price equals marginal cost. The fully competitive outcome occurs when consumers
are somehow fully informed of all prices. This will necessarily happen if one of the tech-
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nologies becomes arbitrarily cheap. Second, there are important non-monotonicities in
the relations between expected prices on one hand and search and advertising cost on the
other hand. An important part of the explanation for this phenomenon to occur is that
search and advertising are ’substitutes’ over an important domain of the model’s parame-
ters in the sense that if consumers (initially) start searching more (because of a decrease
in search cost) firms will advertise less. In the aggregate this may mean that consumers
actually are less informed about prices when search cost are lower and this gives firms an
incentive to raise prices. Third, advertising firms have an advantage since consumers who
receive an advertisement do not have to pay search costs. Therefore, advertised prices
may actually be higher than non-advertised prices.
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2.A Proofs
2.A.1 Proof that two specifications of advertising are equivalent
In this section we will show that the ’all-or-nothing’ advertising specification and the ’advertising
reach with linear advertising costs’ specification are equivalent. We will prove this for the case of
two identical firms, i and j. The general case of n firms can be proven using the same arguments
but at the cost of a more complicated notation.
The proof is given for the case where the equilibrium price distributions are atomless. The
same line of thought as outlined in the proofs below can be used to prove equivalence in the
case of distributions with atoms, but again at the cost of a more complicated notation.
In the proof we will regularly use the expression ’support of F (p)’, where F (p) is the cdf of
a price distribution. With this expression we mean all prices p where the derivative of F (p) is
strictly positive, so all prices that occur with a strictly positive probability.
The proof is for a slightly more advanced model, that is used in Chapter 3. The proof can
easily be rewritten to the model used in this chapter.
In model I (’all-or-nothing’) firms have to make three decisions: they have to decide on
whether or not to be active, given that a firm decides to be active it has to decide on whether
or not to advertise to the complete market and conditional on the advertising decision it has to
decide on its price.
Before we specify the profit functions of model I we will introduce some general notation.
We will use pi(pi, ai|pj , aj) to denote the expected profits that firm i can make from a single ran-
domly chosen consumer given that firm j is active. Here ai ∈ 0, 1 and aj ∈ 0, 1 denote whether
the consumer sees an advertisement from firm i (if so ai = 1, else ai = 0) and whether the
consumer sees an advertisement from firm j. The expected profits also depend on the prices of
the firms: pi and pj . In the expected profits pi(pi, ai|pj , aj) all costs, like shelving and production
costs, are incorporated, except advertising costs. Since these form one of the differences between
the two models we will explicitly take these into account. We will use pi(pi, ai|0) to denote the
expected profits that firm i can make from a single randomly chosen consumer when firm j is
not active. Again ai denotes whether the consumer sees an advertisement from firm i and pi is
the price firm i sets. And again, in pi(pi, ai|0) all costs are incorporated, except advertising costs.
Using this notation we note that in model I the expected profits per consumer for firm i of
being active, not advertising and asking a price pi are
piI(pi, 0) = (1− αj)βj
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 0)dF0j(p) + αjβj
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 1)dF1j(p)+
(1− βj)pi(pi, 0|0)
where βj denotes the probability that the competitor, firm j is active, αj denotes the proba-
bility that firm j advertises given that it is active, F0j(p) is the price distribution firm j chooses
its price from when it does not advertise and F1j(p) is the price distribution firm j chooses its
price from when it advertises. Note that with this notation αj is the probability that aj = 1.
We also note that in model I the expected profits of firm i per consumer of being active,
advertising and asking a price pi are
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piI(pi, 1) = (1− αj)βj
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)dF0j(p) + αjβj
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 1)dF1j(p)+
(1− βj)pi(pi, 1|0)−A
where A denotes the costs of advertising to the complete market. Without loss of generality
we will set the profits of being inactive equal to 0.
In model II firms also first decide on whether or not to be active. An active firm however then
decides on its price and conditional on its price it decides on the advertising reach, which can be
anything between 0 (reaching no consumers) and 1 (reaching all consumers). The advertising
costs are linear in the reach, with the costs of reaching no consumers being 0 and the costs of
reaching all consumers being A. In this model the expected profits of firm i per consumer of
being active, setting a price pi and choosing a reach αi(pi) are
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = βj [(1− αi(pi))
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 0)(1− αj(p))dFj(p) +
(1− αi(pi))
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 1)αj(p)dFj(p) +
αi(pi)
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)(1− αj(p))dFj(p) +
αi(pi)
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 1)αj(p)dFj(p)] +
(1− βj)[(1− αi(pi))pi(pi, 0|0) + αi(pi)pi(pi, 1|0)]− αi(pi)A.
In the expression above βj denotes the probability that the competitor, firm j is active, αj(p)
denotes the advertising reach of an active competitor that asks price p and Fj(p) is the price
distribution the competitor chooses its price from. As in model I, without loss of generality we
set the profits of an inactive firm equal to 0.
In both models we will look for a symmetric equilibrium, where both firms are active with
probability β and choose identical price distributions and advertising strategies. This means
that in an equilibrium situation we will drop the subscripts i and j. We will show that if in
model I β, α, F0(p) and F1(p) form an equilibrium then β, F (p) = (1 − α)F0(p) + αF1(p) and
α(p) = αf1(p)(1−α)f0(p)+αf1(p) form an equilibrium in model II. On the other hand, when β, F (p) and
α(p) form an equilibrium in model II then β, α =
∫ 1
0 α(p)dF (p), F0(p) =
R p
p (1−α(p∗))f(p∗)dp∗
1−α and
F1(p) =
R p
p α(p
∗)f(p∗)dp∗
α form an equilibrium in model II.
We will first give a sequence of theorems on the conversion from model I to model II.
Theorem 2.A.1 Suppose that in model I it is an equilibrium to have β = 0, so all firms are
inactive. Then in model II β = 0 also is an equilibrium.
Proof
Since β = 0 in model I it should be that for all pi piI(pi, 0) = pi(pi, 0|0) < 0 and piI(pi, 1) =
32 Advertising and consumer search in a duopoly model
pi(pi, 1|0) − A < 0. Now suppose that firm j in model II sets βj = 0. If firm i is active it has
profits piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1−αi(pi))pi(pi, 0|0)+αi(pi)(pi(pi, 1|0)−A) < 0. Since these profits are
negative this firm also chooses to be inactive and therefore β = 0 is an equilibrium strategy in
model II as well.
2
Theorem 2.A.2 Suppose that in model I it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α = 0 and F0(p).
Then in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α(p) = 0 = αf1(p)αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p) for all p in the
support of F (p) and F (p) = F0(p) = αF1(p) + (1− α)F0(p).
Proof
If β = 1 and α = 0 is an equilibrium in model I, we have that
piI(pi, 0) =
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 0)dF0(p)
and
piI(pi, 1) =
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)dF0(p)−A.
We also know that piI(pi, 0) = pi > 0 for all pi in the support of F0(p). For all other pi,
piI(pi, 0) ≤ pi. And for all pi, piI(pi, 1) ≤ pi.
Now look at a firm deciding on (β, F (p), α(p)) and suppose firm j chooses βj = 1, αj(p) = 0
for all p in the support of Fj(p) and Fj(p) = F0(p). In that case
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1− αi(pi))
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 0)dF0(p)+
αi(pi)(
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)dF0(p)−A).
Note that piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1 − αi(pi))piI(pi, 0) + αi(pi)piI(pi, 1). So for all pi outside the
support of F0(p), pi(pi, αi(pi)) ≤ pi. Furthermore, for all pi inside the support of F0(p) with
αi(pi) > 0, pi(pi, αi(pi)) ≤ pi. And lastly, for all pi inside the support of F0(p) with αi(pi) = 0,
pi(pi, αi(pi)) = pi > 0. This shows that in case II, it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α(p) = 0
for all p in the support of F (p), and to have F (p) = F0(p).
2
Theorem 2.A.3 Suppose that in model I it is an equilibrium to have 0 < βI < 1, α = 0 and
F0(p). Then in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = βI , α(p) = 0 =
αf1(p)
αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p) for all
p in the support of F (p) and F (p) = F0(p) = αF1(p) + (1− α)F0(p).
Proof
If β = βI and α = 0 is an equilibrium in model I, we know that piI(pi, 0) = 0 for all pi in the
support of F0(p). For all other pi, piI(pi, 0) ≤ 0. And for all pi, piI(pi, 1) ≤ 0.
Now look at a firm deciding on (β, F (p), α(p)) and suppose firm j chooses βj = 1, αj(p) = 0
for all p in the support of Fj(p) and Fj(p) = F0(p). In that case one can easily show that
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piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1 − αi(pi))piI(pi, 0) + αi(pi)piI(pi, 1). So for all pi outside the support of
F0(p), pi(pi, αi(pi)) ≤ 0. Furthermore, for all pi inside the support of F0(p) with αi(pi) > 0,
pi(pi, αi(pi)) ≤ 0. And lastly, for all pi inside the support of F0(p) with αi(pi) = 0, pi(pi, αi(pi)) =
0. This shows that in case II, it is an equilibrium to have β = βI , α(p) = 0 for all p in the
support of F (p), and to have F (p) = F0(p).
2
Theorem 2.A.4 Suppose that in model I it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α = 1 and F1(p).
Then in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α(p) = 1 = αf1(p)αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p) for all p in the
support of F (p) and F (p) = F1(p) = αF1(p) + (1− α)F0(p).
Proof
If β = 1 and α = 1 is an equilibrium in model I, we know that piI(pi, 1) = pi > 0 for all pi in the
support of F1(p). For all other pi, piI(pi, 1) ≤ pi. And for all pi, piI(pi, 0) ≤ pi.
Now look at a firm deciding on (β, F (p), α(p)) and suppose firm j chooses βj = 1, αj(p) = 1
for all p in the support of Fj(p) and Fj(p) = F1(p). In that case it is easy to show that
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1 − αi(pi))piI(pi, 0) + αi(pi)piI(pi, 1). So for all pi outside the support of
F1(p), pi(pi, αi(pi)) ≤ pi. Furthermore, for all pi inside the support of F1(p) with αi(pi) < 1,
pi(pi, αi(pi)) ≤ pi. And lastly, for all pi inside the support of F1(p) with αi(pi) = 1, pi(pi, αi(pi)) =
pi > 0. This shows that in case II, it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α(p) = 1 for all p in the
support of F (p), and to have F (p) = F1(p).
2
Theorem 2.A.5 Suppose that in model I it is an equilibrium to have 0 < βI < 1, α = 1 and
F1(p). Then in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = βI , α(p) = 1 =
αf1(p)
αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p) for all
p in the support of F (p) and F (p) = F1(p) = αF1(p) + (1− α)F0(p).
Proof
The proof is the same as for Theorem 4, except that now pi = 0 and in model II firm j chooses
βj = βI , equilibrium profits are 0 and therefore 0 < β < 1 is an optimal strategy.
2
Theorem 2.A.6 Suppose that in model I it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, 0 < α < 1 and
F0(p) and F1(p). Then in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = 1,α(p) =
αf1(p)
αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p)
for p in the support of F (p) and F (p) = αF1(p) + (1− α)F0(p).
Proof
If 0 < α < 1 and β = 1 is an equilibrium in model I we have that
piI(pi, 0) = (1− α)
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 0)dF0(p) + α
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 1)dF1(p)
and
piI(pi, 1) = (1− α)
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)dF0(p) + αj
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 1)dF1(p)−A.
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We also know that piI(pi, 0) = pi > 0 for all pi in the support of F0(p). For all other pi,
piI(pi, 0) ≤ pi. Furthermore, piI(pi, 1) = pi for all pi in the support of F1(p). For all other pi,
piI(pi, 1) ≤ pi.
Now look at a firm deciding on (β, F (p), α(p)) and suppose firm j chooses βj = 1,αj(p) =
αf1(p)
αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p) and Fj(p) = αF1(p) + (1− α)F0(p). We then have that
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1− αi(pi))
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 0)(1− α)dF0(p) +
(1− αi(pi))
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 1)αdF1(p) +
αi(pi)
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)(1− α)dF0(p) +
αi(pi)
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 1)αdF1(p)− αi(pi)A.
Note that piII(pi, αi(pi)) = αi(pi)piI(pi, 1) + (1− αi(pi))piI(pi, 0).
For pi in the support of both F0(p) and F1(p), piII(pi, αi(pi)) = αi(pi)pi + (1− αi(pi))pi and
so the firm is indifferent about αi(pi). Assume it chooses αi(pi) =
αf1(pi)
αf1(pi)+(1−α)f0(pi) .
For pi in the support of F0(p) but not in the support of F1(p), piI(pi, 1) ≤ piI(pi, 0) = pi and
so αi(pi) = 0 =
αf1(pi)
αf1(pi)+(1−α)f0(pi) since f1(pi) = 0. Furthermore, pi
II(pi, αi(pi)) = pi.
For pi in the support of F1(p) but not in the support of F0(p), piI(pi, 0) ≤ piI(pi, 1) = pi and
so αi(pi) = 1 =
αf1(pi)
αf1(pi)+(1−α)f0(pi) since f0(pi) = 0. Furthermore, pi
II(pi, αi(pi)) = pi.
For pi not in the support of F0(p) and not in the support of F1(p), piI(pi, 0) ≤ pi and
piI(pi, 1) ≤ pi, and so piII(pi, αi(pi)) ≤ pi.
Combining these observations we conclude that prices in the support of F (p) = (1−α)F0(p)+
αF1(p) earn pi > 0 while other prices earn an amount ≤ pi. Furthermore, for pi in the support
of F (p) the optimal advertising reach is αi(pi) =
αf1(pi)
αf1(pi)+(1−α)f0(pi) . We conclude that (β =
1, α(p) = αf1(p)αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p) , F (p) = (1− α)F0(p) + αF1(p)) is an equilibrium strategy.
2
Theorem 2.A.7 Suppose that in model I it is an equilibrium to have 0 < βI < 1, 0 < α < 1 and
F0(p) and F1(p). Then in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = βI ,α(p) =
αf1(p)
αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p)
for p in the support of F (p) and F (p) = αF1(p) + (1− α)F0(p).
Proof
The proof is identical to the proof of theorem 6 with two modifications. First, the expres-
sions for piI(pi, 0), piI(pi, 1) and piII(pi, α(pi)) are slightly different, but the central equality
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1 − αi(pi))piI(pi, 0) + αi(pi)piI(pi, 1) still holds. And, second, pi = 0 and in
model I firm j chooses β = βII , equilibrium profits are 0 and therefore 0 < β < 1 is an optimal
strategy.
2
The seven theorems above show that every equilibrium in model I can be translated into an
equilibrium in model II. We will now show that every equilibrium in model II can be translated
into an equilibrium in model I.
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Theorem 2.A.8 Suppose that in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = 0. Then in model I
β = 0 also is an equilibrium.
Proof
If β = 0 is an equilibrium in model II we have that
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1− αi(pi))pi(pi, 0|0) + αi(pi)(pi(pi, 1|0)−A).
For β = 0 to be an equilibrium it should be that for all possible prices pi and advertising
reaches αi(pi) piII(pi, αi(pi)) < 0, implying that pi(pi, 0|0) < 0 and pi(pi, 1|0)−A < 0.
Now suppose that in model I firm j chooses βj = 0. Then piI(pi, 0) = pi(pi, 0|0) < 0 and
piI(pi, 1) = pi(pi, 1|0)−A < 0, implying that also for firm i being inactive is the optimal strategy.
2
Theorem 2.A.9 Suppose that in model II it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α(p) and F (p).
Then in model I it is an equilibrium to have β = 1, α =
∫ p
p α(p)dF (p), F0(p) =
R p
p (1−α(p))dF (p)
1−α
and F1(p) =
R p
p α(p)dF (p)
α .
Proof
We have that in model II
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1− αi(pi))[
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 0)(1− α(p))dF (p) +∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 1)α(p)dF (p)] +
αi(pi)[
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)(1− α(p))dF (p) +∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 1)α(p)dF (p)−A].
We will denote the equilibrium profits in model II by pi, with pi > 0 since β = 1.
Now look at model I and suppose firm j chooses βj = 1, αj =
∫ p
p α(p)dF (p), F0j(p) =
R p
p (1−α(p))dF (p)
1−αj and F1j(p) =
R p
p α(p)dF (p)
αj
. Note that the cdf’s F0j(p) and F1j(p) can be differ-
entiated to give f0j(p) =
(1−α(p))f(p)
1−αj and f1j(p) =
α(p)f(p)
αj
. This gives that
∫ 1
0 g(p)dF0j(p) =∫ 1
0 g(p)
1−α(p)
1−αj dF (p) and
∫ 1
0 g(p)dF1j(p) =
∫ 1
0 g(p)
α(p)
αj
dF (p), where g(p) is an arbitrary function
of p. Using this information we find that
piI(pi, 0) = int10pi(pi, 0|p, 0)(1− α(p))dF (p) +
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 0|p, 1)α(p)dF (p)
and
piI(pi, 1) =
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 0)(1− α(p))dF (p) +
∫ 1
0
pi(pi, 1|p, 1)α(p)dF (p)−A.
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Note that piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1−αi(pi))piI(pi, 0) +αi(pi)piI(pi, 1). This leads to the following
observations:
If pi is not in the support of F (p), piI(pi, 0) ≤ pi and piI(pi, 1) ≤ pi.
If pi is in the support of F (p) and α(pi) = 0, piI(pi, 0) = pi ≥ piI(pi, 1).
If pi is in the support of F (p) and α(pi) = 1, piI(pi, 1) = pi ≥ piI(pi, 0).
If pi is in the support of F (p) and 0 < α(pi) < 1, piI(pi, 0) = piI(pi, 1) = pi.
Now suppose in model II it is an equilibrium that α(p) = 0 for all p in the support of F (p).
Then for all pi in the support of F (p) pi = piI(pi, 0) ≥ piI(pi, 1), while for all pi not in the support
of F (p) piI(pi, 0) ≤ pi and piI(pi, 1) ≤ pi. Consequently, it is an equilibrium in model I to have
β = 1, α = 0 and F0(p) = F (p).
The case that it is an equilibrium in model II to have α(p) = 1 for all p in the support of
F (p) can be analyzed similarly and gives that it is an equilibrium in model I to have β = 1,
α = 1 and F1(p) = F (p).
Lastly, suppose that in model II it is an equilibrium to have both α(p) < 1 for some p in
the support of F (p) and α(p) > 0 for some p in the support of F (p). Now look at model I and
suppose firm i decides to advertise. When he chooses a price pi such that pi is in the support
of F (p) and α(pi) > 0 he obtains profits piI(pi, 1) = pi while for all other pi piI(pi, 1) ≤ pi. This
implies that for pi in the support of F1(p) =
R p
p α(p)dF (p)
α advertising pi gives profits of pi while
for other prices profits are smaller than or equal to pi.
Now suppose firm i decides not to advertise. When he chooses a price pi such that pi is
in the support of F (p) and α(pi) < 1 he obtains profits piI(pi, 0) = pi while for all other pi
piI(pi, 0) ≤ pi. This implies that for pi in the support of F0(p) =
R p
p (1−α(p))dF (p)
1−α not advertising
pi gives profits of pi while for other prices profits are smaller than or equal to pi.
Since both advertising and not advertising lead to profits pi > 0 it is optimal for firm i
to choose β = 1 and firm i is indifferent between advertising and not advertising, making
α =
∫ p
p α(p)dF (p) part of an optimal strategy. This shows that the strategy given in the
theorem is indeed optimal for firm i and therefore is an equilibrium in model I.
2
Theorem 2.A.10 Suppose that in model II it is an equilibrium to have 0 < βII < 1, α(p)
and F (p). Then in model I it is an equilibrium to have β = βII , α =
∫ p
p α(p)dF (p), F0(p) =
R p
p (1−α(p))dF (p)
1−α and F1(p) =
R p
p α(p)dF (p)
α .
Proof
The proof is identical to the proof of theorem 9 with two modifications. First, the expres-
sions for piI(pi, 0), piI(pi, 1) and piII(pi, α(pi)) are slightly different, but the central equality
piII(pi, αi(pi)) = (1 − αi(pi))piI(pi, 0) + αi(pi)piI(pi, 1) still holds. And, second, pi = 0 and in
model I firm j chooses β = βII , equilibrium profits are 0 and therefore 0 < β < 1 is an optimal
strategy.
2
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These theorems show that both formulations are equivalent.
2.A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
There are three possible types of equilibria not mentioned in the theorem. We will show that
each of these possibilities cannot be part of an equilibrium.
(i) 0 < α < 1 and p0 > p1. Using standard techniques, we note that in this case F0(p) =
1 − (p0−p)
1
2
µ(1−γ)
pγ for p ≥ p1. Whenever p ≥ p1, the profit for an advertising firm equals
pi1(p) = p[γ(1 − α)(1 − F0(p)) + (1 − γ)(1 − α)] − A. Using the expression for F0(p) it can be
shown that
pi1(p) = (1− α)12µ(1− γ)(p0 − p) + (1− γ)(1− α)p−A,
which is increasing in p for p1 ≤ p ≤ p0, showing that advertising firms have an incentive to
deviate.
(ii) 0 < α < 1 and p
1
< p0 < p1. In this case, using pi0(p) = pi1(p) in the price region
[max{p
0
, p
1
}, p0], yields the following expression for F1(p):
F1(p) = 1−
A− (1− 12µ)p(1− α)(1− γ)
α(1− γ)p .
Moreover, using this and pi0(p0) = pi0(p) we get F0(p) = 1− (p0−p)(
1
2
µ−γ)
pγ on [max{p0, p1}, p0]. To
make sure F0(p) is below 1, 12µ−γ should be positive. We furthermore can derive an expression
for F1(p) for p ≥ p0 by using pi1(p) = pi1(p0). This gives for p ≥ p0,
1− F1(p) = αp0[(1− F1(p0)]− (1− α)(1− γ)(p− p0)
αp
Plugging this expression into pi0(p) for p ≥ p0 gives pi0(p) = γp1(1 − α)(1 − γ) + p(1 − α)(1 −
γ)(12µ − γ), which is increasing in p since 12µ − γ is positive. This shows that non-advertising
firms have an incentive to deviate.
(iii) 0 < α < 1 and p0 < p1. In this case, pi0(p) = p(αγ + (1− α)(1− γ)12µ) for p0 ≤ p ≤ p1,
which is increasing in p and so non-advertising firms have an incentive to deviate.
2
2.A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.4.1
a. Observe that when c→ 0, the equilibrium is in region Ib with α = 0 and µ = 1. Furthermore,
the maximum price r0 = cβ1 → 0.
2
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b. Observe that when A → 0, either equilibrium IIaii or equilibrium IIbii holds. In
equilibrium IIaii, µ does not depend on A, and as A → 0, α = 1 − A
(1−γ)(1− 1
2
µ)
→ 1 and
Ep1 = A(
1
2
µ−γ
α(1−γ)(1− 1
2
µ)
ln µ−2γµ +
1
α(1− 1
2
µ)
ln 1−
1
2
µ
A )→ 0.
In equilibrium IIbii, α = 1− 2A(1−γ)r0 and Ep1 = A 2α ln
(1−2γ)r0
2A − A(1−γ)α ln(1− 2γ), while r0
does not depend on A. As A→ 0, this yields α→ 1 and Ep1 → 0.
2
Chapter 3
Going where the ad leads you: on
high advertised prices and searching
where to buy
3.1 Introduction
Imagine yourself attending a conference in a foreign country. You sit with your laptop in a
hotel room and realize that when your battery expires you cannot charge it because of the
different electricity outlet system. You decide to go out in town to search for an electricity
converter and enter a first electronics shop where the charming sales representative tells
you that they unfortunately do not carry such an item in their store. The same story
repeats in a number of stores, after which you disappointingly go back to the hotel. In
a last desperate attempt you ask at the hotel lobby whether they, by any chance, would
know a shop where they carry the item you are looking for. Triumphantly, the clerk at
the desk tells you that a firm has left an advertisement behind informing people that
they carry all different types of electronic converters one may ever wish to use (possibly
with the prices at which they sell). You are very happy for this piece of information,
immediately go to the shop and are prepared to buy at any (somewhat reasonable) price.
This story contains an element that we believe is important in many markets, not just
when hanging around in far away destinations: namely that part of the search activities of
people is not about ”searching for firms with the lowest price”, but rather about ”searching
for firms that sell the product”. This distinction has not been made before. The typical
search model only considers situations where all firms in the market carry the product and
the only reason for consumers to search (further) is to look for a price-quality combination
that better fits the individual’s preferences. That is, the literature on consumer search is
not about the ”real” search activity of consumers when they are uncertain about which
firms carry the product.
Another important aspect of the story above is that a potentially important role of
advertising is simply to inform consumers about the fact that the advertising firm carries
the product, thereby helping the consumer to save on expected search costs. If the un-
certainty about which firm carries the product is very large, then the reduction in ”real”
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search costs may be quite significant. This, so this Chapter argues, may lead to advertised
prices being higher than non-advertised prices. This is contrary to conventional wisdom
expressed in the literature on informative advertising, according to which informative
price advertising leads to better-informed consumers and therefore to more competition
and lower prices (see, e.g., Farris and Albion (1980) and Tirole (1998, Section 7.3)). Thus,
this Chapter contributes to the strategic literature on advertising by arguing that in the
presence of uncertainty about which firms sell the product, informative price advertising
may lead to higher prices compared to the non-advertised prices. This insight is also im-
portant in empirical work on advertising. It shows that one should be careful to conclude
from an observed positive correlation between advertising and prices that advertising is
persuasive, see e.g. Boulding et al. (1994) and Clark (2005).
The mechanism we uncover is potentially also important in understanding emerging
markets that use multimedia technologies. A first issue in such markets concerns discus-
sions one can find in the popular press and in online discussion groups on personalized
advertising.1 Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt has claimed that over the next few years he
wants to be able to send personalized ads on GPS-based in-car communication systems
to consumers to help them find the shops they are looking for. One interpretation of this
would be that personalized advertising helps consumers to get products that are really
close to their tastes, i.e., in a world where product heterogeneity is important. Another
interpretation of personalized advertising is one where these ads help consumers to econ-
omize on their search costs by directing their search activities on the firm(s) from which
they received an ad. This second interpretation comes very close to what we analyze in
this Chapter.
A second aspect of these markets relates to the commercial advertisements one sees
when using websites, like http://www.allbookstores.com/, where book prices of different
online bookshops are quoted. These websites offer the option to search for the lowest
price or to buy directly at one particular online bookseller. Apparently, this bookseller
is willing to pay for this link suggesting that a significant fraction of consumers does not
continue the search, but simply buys immediately at the firm where they know they can
buy the book. Something similar happens at well-known search engines like Google and
Yahoo, where firms pay to get their firm’s website listed, knowing that (a fraction of)
consumers are likely to click on one of the first-listed sites first.2 Firms may exploit this
search behavior by charging higher prices to compensate for the advertising expenditures.3
This Chapter studies ”searching for the product” and ”high prices through informative
advertising” in relation to each other. To this end, we develop a simple three-stage
1See, e.g., http://blogs.zdnet.com/micro-markets/index.php?p=131.
2In this sense, this Chapter is related to the modeling of page views on the internet (see, e.g., Danaher
(2007)).
3The main difference between this example and the model in this Chapter is that prices are typically
not mentioned in these advertisements. Without price advertisement it is, however, easier to see that
advertising firms may set higher prices (see Section 3.6 for more details on this) and the model in this
Chapter basically makes the additional point that even if prices were advertised, they still can be higher
and attract consumers.
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model.4 In the first stage, firms decide whether or not they want to allocate shelf-space
to a particular type of product. Doing so has an opportunity cost of not using that
space for having some other commodity on display. We call all firms who decide to carry
the product ”active firms”. In the second stage, active firms decide on their price and
on whether they will advertise the fact that they carry the product (and the price at
which they sell it) by sending an advertisement to consumers. In the third stage, after
potentially having received some ads, consumers decide on whether or not to search for a
firm that carries the product, with a potentially lower price than the firms that advertised.
However, if the firm has not advertised, the consumer does not know whether or not the
firm carries the product in the first place.
The simplest search model we can imagine that makes the point that advertised prices
can be higher than non-advertised prices, even under informative price advertisement, has
two types of consumers: low-valuation consumers having low search costs cL and high-
valuation consumers having higher search costs cH . For simplicity, we normalize cL to be
equal to 0. One may think of the high-demand consumers as having high income from
demanding jobs to justify the positive correlation between the size of consumers’ search
cost and their willingness to pay. In previous literature this positive relation between a
consumer’s willingness to pay and her search costs has been used by, e.g., Iyer (1998) and
Coughlan and Soberman (2005).
In such a model, there may be many different types of equilibria, depending on the
parameter configurations. We focus on equilibria where advertised prices are higher than
non-advertised prices.5 The simplest such equilibrium has the following structure. Low-
valuation consumers search all firms and then buy at the lowest-priced firm. As soon
as high-valuation consumers receive an advertisement, they buy at the advertising firm.
High-demand consumers who get no advertisements do not search for an active firm as they
find the probability that these firms do not carry the product too high compared to the
search costs they have to make. Non-advertising firms therefore completely concentrate
on the low-valuation consumers, whereas advertising firms concentrate on high-valuation
consumers. The probability that firms are active and the intensity with which active firms
advertise are determined endogenously in such a way that firms are indifferent between
being inactive, advertising a high price and not-advertising a low price. We show for
which parameter values such an equilibrium exists and, in addition, we show for which
subset of these parameter values the equilibrium is unique. The main result is thus best
interpreted as a screening result: high-valuation consumers buy at the advertising firms
(if any) at high prices and the low-valuation consumers buy at the non-advertising firms
(if any) at low prices.
This Chapter is, of course, related to the large literature on consumer search and
4The model we develop abstracts from some of the features that are relevant to the examples mentioned
above. For example, we abstract from product heterogeneity (that probably is important even in the
book example when we consider that the book sale comes with a certain level of additional services) and
also from nonprice advertisement (see also the concluding remarks).
5In this context, this Chapter may contribute to an understanding of performance regimes (as in
Pauwels and Hanssens (2007)) or the implications of different advertising themes (cf., Bass et al. (2007))
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advertising (see, e.g., the seminal papers by Stigler (1961), Diamond (1971), Stahl (1989,
1994) and Butters (1977)). The main difference with the consumer search literature is,
as we mentioned, the uncertainty consumers face of not finding the product at a shop
they visit. As Diamond (1971) has shown, the price uncertainty in search models can
lead to monopoly prices. Rao and Syam (2001) obtain the same type of result in an
advertising model. Here uncertain prices in the sense of unadvertised prices are above
advertised prices. Our results are exactly the reverse: known, advertised prices are higher
than unknown, unadvertised prices. One of the reasons why the Diamond effect does not
play a role in our model is that there is a fraction of consumers with zero search costs.
In the advertising literature the main distinction is between persuasive and informa-
tive advertising. As indicated above, the main role of advertising in our model is to
inform consumers of the availability of the product at the firm. In this way, advertising
creates value to consumers and this value is evaluated differently by different consumers.
The value that is created is different from that studied in the literature on persuasive
advertising (see, e.g., Dixit and Norman (1978)), however. This persuasive advertising
literature basically argues that advertising changes the preferences of individuals and the
demand effect that emerges is mainly dependent on psychological factors (exogenous to
the model) determining how much people’s preferences have been affected. In this Chap-
ter, preferences of individuals are unaffected and the only effect of advertising, namely
the reduction in expected search costs, is endogenously determined.
In the informative advertising literature (see Meurer and Stahl (1994) and Soberman
(2004)), price differentiation sometimes arises from horizontal product differentiation.
Informative advertising plays two roles in this context. First, it creates awareness of
products so that consumers know what best fits their tastes. This strengthens the product
differentiation aspect, giving firms an incentive to raise prices. On the other hand, it also
leads to more consumers with full information giving firms an incentive to reduce prices.
When product differentiation is important enough, the first aspect dominates the second
so that advertising can lead to price increases. In our model, however, all firms are ex
ante identical and any form of differentiation is thus endogenously created.
The literature that combines consumer search and advertising is much more limited.6
Robert and Stahl (1993) is the first paper where consumers’ ignorance about prices can
be resolved by consumers searching optimally for prices or by firms informing consumers
about the prices they charge through advertising. Following on their work, Stahl (2000)
and Chapter 2 of this thesis check the robustness of the model by investigating the prop-
erties of different modeling assumptions. Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that in some equi-
libria advertised prices may be higher than non-advertised prices. This result is driven
by the assumption that less-informed consumers can buy at firms that advertise without
6Apart from the literature mentioned here, there is also a recent paper by Stivers and Tremblay (2005).
Their model is, however, very different from the standard search models as they model search costs as the
wedge between producer prices and consumer prices, very much like the analysis in traditional tax studies.
Moreover, they assume that advertising lowers the search costs of consumers. In such a world, they show
that it is possible that advertising raises the price the firms ask, while at the same time decreasing the
price (including search costs) that consumers have to pay.
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incurring search cost, giving advertising firms an advantage above non-advertising firms
that have to be searched for. In this Chapter we formally explain how this difference in
search cost to buy from an advertising and a non-advertising firm can emerge out of the
uncertainty consumers face when they visit a shop that did not advertise.
Finally, this version of the Chapter - with the assumption of low valuation consumers
having zero search cost - is close in spirit to papers understanding the nature of online
price competition, modeling the importance of shopbots and search engines (see, e.g.
Chen and Sudhir (2004), Iyer and Pazgal (2003) and Janssen et al. (2007), and most
notably He and Chen (2006)). He and Chen (2006) analyze behavior of e-marketplaces
where consumers have the possibility to use the embedded search engine or they can
shop directly at a featured store. They show that prices at the featured stores can be
higher, but that consumers with relatively high search cost may still want to shop there
as by doing so they economize on their time. Insofar as advertising is similar in nature
to featuring, the results of this Chapter reinforce the insight obtained by He and Chen
(2006). This Chapter shows that this insight is not confined to e-marketplaces, and that
it may hold under a very different set of assumptions. For example, we employ sequential
instead of simultaneous search, we use price advertising instead of nonprice advertising,
and consumers in our model are not loyal to any of the firms. Moreover, advertising in
our model is a signal of product availability, an aspect that is absent in previous models.
Since the gains of buying from an advertising firm depend on the product availability in
non-advertising firms and product availability is endogenously determined, in our model
the gains of buying from an advertising firm are endogenous. In previous models these
gains are exogenously given. Finally, in the working paper on which this Chapter is based
(Janssen and Non (2007)), we show that even if both groups of consumers have positive
search costs, the result that advertised equilibrium prices are higher than non-advertised
prices does hold.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. In
Section 3.3 we analyze a simplified version of the model where we show that the result
of high advertised prices does not depend on price uncertainty but instead is caused by
uncertainty about whether the firm carries the product. Section 3.4 formally character-
izes one equilibrium where advertised prices are higher than non-advertised prices. In
Section 3.5 we will elaborate on the existence of other equilibria and we will show that
the equilibrium with high advertised prices is unique in some parameter region. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
Consider a homogeneous goods market where (at most) two firms produce without incur-
ring production costs.7 The only cost relevant for our analysis is the opportunity cost, S,
firms face for shelving the product. The decisions firms take are modeled as a three-stage
game. In the first stage, firms decide on whether or not to carry the product. We will
7Extending the model to more than two firms does not change the results but only complicates the
analysis. Production costs can be easily introduced, but they are simply normalized to be equal to 0.
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denote the probability of a firm being active by β. If a firm decides to be inactive, it
makes no profits or losses.
In the second stage of the model, firms decide simultaneously on their advertising
strategy and price. Firms do not know the outcome of the first stage (the decision to
be active) and therefore, it is just as if firms play these two stages simultaneously. An
active firm can decide to advertise that it sells the product and at which price. Note
here that advertising is purely informative: an advertisement informs about existence
and price. Advertising is an ’all-or-nothing’ decision, that is, a firm either advertises to
the complete market or does not advertise at all.8 The cost of advertising is A. We will
denote the probability with which a firm advertises by α. The pricing strategy depends on
whether a shop advertises or not. We will therefore specify a pricing strategy conditional
on advertising and a pricing strategy conditional on not advertising. Denote by F1(p) the
price distribution conditional on advertising and let F0(p) denote the price distribution
conditional on not advertising. We use p1 to indicate the highest price and p1 to indicate
the lowest price in the support of F1(p). Similarly, p0 and p0 denote the highest and lowest
price in the support of F0(p).
9
In the third stage of the game, consumers receive the advertisements that are sent and
decide on their search strategy. There is a unit mass of consumers with unit demand.
Consumers come into two types. A fraction γ has a low valuation θL for the product and
zero search costs.10 A fraction 1− γ has a high valuation θH for the product and strictly
positive search costs c. We assume θH−c > θL. Consumers search sequentially, conditional
on the advertisements that are sent. Sequential search means that the consumers first
look at the advertisements they have received. They then decide on whether to visit one
additional firm, to buy immediately from the cheapest advertising firm, or not to buy
at all. After searching one firm they again decide on whether to visit a second firm, to
buy from the cheapest known firm or not to buy at all. Note that consumers only search
non-advertising firms, since they already know that advertising firms are active and the
ad also tells at which price the active firm sells. We assume that for the high-valuation
consumers every first visit to a firm costs c.11 Visiting an advertising firm, a consumer
has to bear the search costs, but is sure to find the product. Visiting a non-advertising
8This advertising technology may seem unrealistic at first sight, but as is shown in Chapter 2 of this
thesis it is exactly equivalent to an advertising technology where firms choose an advertising reach.
9Note that the price distributions F0(p) and F1(p) can describe randomized price strategies as well
as pure strategies. For instance, if advertising firms use the pure strategy of always setting price p∗
then F1(p) = 0 for p < p∗ and F1(p) = 1 for p ≥ p∗. It is, however, easy to see that in equilibrium
advertising firms always use a randomized price strategy. For an advertising firm there is a strictly
positive probability αβ that the competitor advertises as well and so a standard undercutting argument
can be used to show there are no atoms in F1(p).
10Note that because of the zero search costs these consumers know all active firms and prices. Firms
compete for these consumers and therefore an undercutting argument shows there are no atoms in F0(p)
for p ≤ θL. In an earlier version, we analyzed a model where the low-valuation consumers had a strictly
positive search cost. The equilibrium with high advertised prices is also an equilibrium in this modified
model, but we have not been able to prove uniqueness.
11For simplicity, we follow the search literature in assuming ”free recall”, i.e., consumers do not bear
any costs for return visits to firms they already visited once.
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firm, a consumer incurs the same search costs, but in this case is not sure to find the
product. This implies that the ’real’ search cost for searching a non-advertising firm is
higher than the search cost for searching an advertising firm.
We will solve this model for a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the standard
equilibrium notion for games with asymmetric information. Symmetry implies that all
ex ante identical players play the same strategy. Bayesian updating plays a role when
consumers form expectations about the probability a firm is active given that it did not
advertise.
3.3 Equilibrium under price certainty
For didactical purposes, and to highlight that not price uncertainty, but uncertainty
about product availability, is the key element driving the result mentioned in the intro-
duction, we first consider a version of the model where firms do not freely choose prices,
but instead choose between an exogenously given high price pH and low price pL, with
θH − c ≥ pH > θL > pL. The question we address is whether there exists an equilibrium
with the same features as the equilibrium mentioned in the introduction: the high price
is advertised, the low price is not advertised and high-valuation consumers do not search.
Such an equilibrium has price certainty for searching consumers as all firms that do not
advertise set the same price. We concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium and in this case
that means that both firms are indifferent between choosing the high price pH and adver-
tising it and choosing the low price and not advertising it. It is clear that for a symmetric
equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that the probability with which a firm is active is
strictly smaller than 1 as otherwise a consumer who did not receive any advertisements or
received only one advertisement will infer that the non-advertising firm(s) is (are) active
and charge(s) a low price, making it profitable to search. Thus, in such an equilibrium
a firm has to be indifferent between being active and not being active implying that the
equilibrium pay-off should equal 0.
We pose that there exists a symmetric equilibrium where advertising firms charge price
pH and non-advertising firms charge a price pL, where high-valuation consumers buy at
an advertising firm without searching and where high-valuation consumers who get no
advertisements do not search at all. Low-valuation consumers observe all prices and only
buy if a firm sells at pL.
We now have to check that this is indeed an equilibrium, i.e., that none of the players
has an incentive to deviate. We first look at consumer behavior and note that if it is not
optimal to search after not receiving any advertisements, then it certainly is not optimal
to search after receiving one advertisement as the utility of following the ad is positive.
We therefore concentrate on the case where high-valuation consumers did not receive any
advertisements. If their first search leads to an active firm, they will stop searching since
a lower price cannot be found. If they search once and do not find an active firm, the
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utility of a second search is −c + (1−α)β
1−αβ (θH − pL).12 If this expression is below zero, the
utility of not searching, consumers will not search a second time and the utility of the
first search also is −c+ (1−α)β
1−αβ (θH − pL) < 0. Therefore if this inequality holds, consumers
will not search at all.
Given the strategy of the high-valuation consumers, the pay-offs to a firm choosing
pH and advertising are given by
piH = pH(1− γ)(1− 1
2
βα)− A− S
and the pay-offs to a firm choosing pL and not advertising are given by
piL = pLγ(1− 1
2
β(1− α))− S.
As piH = piL = 0 in the equilibrium we are looking for, we can determine α and β
endogenously. It follows that
β = 4− 2 A+ S
(1− γ)pH − 2
S
γpL
and
α =
2
β
− 2
β
A+ S
(1− γ)pH
.
As 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1 this gives restrictions
A+ S
pH(1− γ) < 1,
S
pLγ
< 1
and
3− 2 A+ S
pH(1− γ) − 2
S
pLγ
< 0.
Firms should also not have an incentive to deviate. If a firm would set pH and not
advertise, its profits are −S, which is clearly below the equilibrium profits of zero. If it
sets a price pL and advertises this price, its profits are given by
12Note that consumers only search non-advertising firms and therefore the probability of finding an
active firm is given by (1−α)β(1−βα) .
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pL(1− γ) + pLγ(1− 1
2
β(1− α))− A− S.
Using the expressions for α and β that are given above we can rewrite these profits as
pL(1−γ)−A and so for this deviation not to be profitable it should be that pL(1−γ) < A.
It is easy to find parameter values such that all restrictions are satisfied. For example,
take θL = 1, pL = 0.9, γ = 0.5, A = 0.75, S = 0.375 and pH = 2.5. Then if we choose θH
and the search cost parameter c such that 2.5 + c < θH < 0.9 + 2.4c, all conditions are
satisfied.
3.4 Existence of an equilibrium with high advertised
prices
The previous section has shown that the result of high advertised prices is not driven by
price uncertainty but instead by uncertainty about the availability of the product. In this
section we will construct a symmetric equilibrium of the full model specified in Section 3.2
where firms are free to choose any price. In this equilibrium, again, advertising firms set
higher prices than non-advertising firms and high-valuation consumers do not search. The
equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that both firms choose the same (ex ante) strategy.
Their ex post behavior (whether or not to advertise and which price to choose) may be
different because of different realizations of the mixed strategy chosen.
Intuitively, when high-valuation consumers do not search the non-advertising firms
compete for the low-valuation consumers. Advertising firms, however, also sell to the
high-valuation consumers and therefore have an incentive to ask higher prices. Even in
such a case high-valuation consumers do not want to search for the lower non-advertised
prices as long as the probability of a firm being active, β, is low enough.
Proposition 3.4.1 If the following four conditions are satisfied
(i) (1− γ)θL < A < (1− γ)(θH − c)− S
(ii) S < γθL
(iii) 1− S
γθL
− A+S
(1−γ)(θH−c) < 0
(iv) θH(1− SγθL )− Sγ ln
γθL
S
< A+S
(1−γ)(θH−c)c,
then there exists a symmetric equilibrium with p
1
> p0. In this equilibrium consumer
search behavior is characterized by
(i) Low-valuation consumers buy at the cheapest active firm out of all firms, provided the
price is not above θL.
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(ii) High-valuation consumers who receive at least one advertisement buy immediately at
the the advertising firm with the lowest price, provided the price is not above θH − c.
(iii) High-valuation consumers who do not receive an ad do not search.
Firm behavior is characterized by
(i) Firms are active with probability β = 2− S
θLγ
− A+S
(1−γ)(θH−c) .
(ii) Active firms advertise with probability α =
1− A+S
(1−γ)(θH−c)
2− S
θLγ
− A+S
(1−γ)(θH−c)
.
(iii) Non-advertising firms choose prices according to distribution
F0(p) = 1− (θL − p)(1− β(1− α))
pβ(1− α) ,
with p0 = θL and p0 = θL(1− β(1− α)).
(iv) Advertising firms choose prices according to distribution
F1(p) = 1− (θH − c− p)(1− βα)
pβα
,
with p1 = θH − c and p1 = (θH − c)(1− βα).
The proof can be found in the appendix to this chapter and basically shows that under
the four conditions specified in the proposition no player has an incentive to deviate from
his strategy.
The interpretation of the four restrictions used in Proposition 3.4.1 is fairly straight-
forward. The first part of the first restriction tells us that the advertising costs A should
be so high that advertising a price at or below θL is not profitable. This makes sure that
advertising firms concentrate completely on the high-valuation consumers and enables
our screening result. The second part of the first restriction states that the advertising
costs A should be low enough to make advertising profitable13 while the second restriction
states that the shelving costs S should be low enough to make shelving the product a
profitable strategy. On the other hand, the third restriction states that both advertising
and shelving costs should be high enough to guarantee that firms do not always want to
be active, which in turn is needed as otherwise high-valuation consumers want to continue
searching after receiving one advertisement with a relatively high price. Finally, the last
13Note that the profits of an advertising firm are equal to (θH − c)(1 − γ)(1 − αβ) − A − S and that
when A+ S is close to (θH − c)(1− γ), α is close to 0.
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restriction basically gives a lower bound on the search costs c such that consumers do not
want to search.
The first restriction implies that θH − c > θL, which can be interpreted as that the
difference in valuations between the two types of consumers should be high enough. This
restriction is necessary for any equilibrium where advertised prices are higher. To make
this clear, suppose to the contrary that θH − c < θL. The maximum price that an
advertising firm will then ask is still θH − c . This is because if an advertising firm
sets a price between θH − c and θL it would only sell to low-valuation consumers and so
there would be no reason to advertise. For non-advertising firms it could, however, be
profitable to set a price above θH − c. There are two reasons for this. First, low-valuation
consumers are willing to pay θL and so a non-advertising firm setting a price θL has a
probability of 1 − β to be the only firm in the market and to sell to the low-valuation
consumers. Second, searching high-valuation consumers are willing to pay θH when they
find an active non-advertising firm. This difference in willingness to pay between an
advertising firm and a non-advertising firm comes from the search costs being sunk when
visiting a non-advertising firm. It can be shown that when θH−c < θL, it is indeed always
profitable for a non-advertising firm to ask a higher price than an advertising firm and so
an equilibrium where advertising firms charge higher prices than non-advertising firms is
not feasible anymore.
We now want to check whether all four restrictions can jointly hold, that is, whether
there really exists a parameter region where the above equilibrium exists. To do so we
set, without loss of generality, θL = 1.
14 It is easily checked that the four restrictions can
jointly hold when, for instance, γ = 0.1, S = 0.099, A = 1, c = 0.04 and 1.3 < θH < 2.5.
Moreover, we would like to establish the following result, arguing that the existence
conditions become easier to satisfy when both θH and c are relatively large.
Proposition 3.4.2 If for some values A∗, S∗, θ∗H , c
∗ and γ∗ the equilibrium of Proposi-
tion 3.4.1 exists, then the equilibrium also exist for values A∗, S∗, θ∗H + x, c
∗ + x and γ∗,
where x is an arbitrary positive number.
The proof can be found in the appendix to this chapter. Below we provide an intuitive
explanation for the result. The expressions for the strategy of the firms, (F0(p), F1(p), α, β),
given in Proposition 3.4.1 do not depend on θH or c in isolation, but instead only depend
on θH − c, since this is the maximum price that advertising firms can ask. As the first
three restrictions are imposed to guarantee that α and β are in between 0 and 1, these
restrictions remain unaffected as long as θH − c is unaffected.
The fourth restriction ensures that consumers do not want to search. Consumers who
do not receive any advertisement have to make a tradeoff between incurring search costs
c and having a probability of finding an active firm, which would give an uncertain payoff
14Looking at the equilibrium shows that if the parameters θL, θH , A, S and c are multiplied by a scalar
x, the same equilibrium emerges, except that the prices are multiplied by x. To ease the analysis we
decided to normalize the parameters such that θL = 1.
50 On high advertised prices and searching where to buy
of θH − p, where p is the uncertain price being found. Suppose that for some parameters
θ∗H and c
∗ it is optimal not to search, so the search costs are above the expected payoff.
Then if both c∗ and θ∗H increase by x, the expected payoff, given by
β(1−α)
1−αβ (θH − p), with
β(1−α)
1−αβ < 1, also increases but with less than x. Therefore, if both c
∗ and θ∗H increase by
x, it is still not optimal to search and the fourth restriction is still satisfied.
3.5 Other equilibria
The model we specified in Section 3.2 has many possible equilibria. It is natural to inquire
whether for some parameter values the equilibrium we have identified in the previous
section is the unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium. If the equilibrium is unique,
we can legitimately argue that there is a parameter region where advertised prices are
higher than non-advertised prices. If such a parameter region does not exist, then there
is a possibility that advertised prices are higher, but this cannot be guaranteed. In this
section, we do three things. First, we provide some observations on how the reservation
price characterizing consumer search behavior is determined. This reservation price is
needed in the remainder of this section and the exact derivation of it is in the appendix
to this chapter. Next, we illustrate by means of an example that there are parameter
values where the equilibrium described in the previous section exists, but it is not unique.
Finally, we prove that when θH and c are relatively large, the equilibrium described in
the previous section is unique.
As in any consumer search model, we can define a reservation price r by
∫ r+c
p
0
F0(p)dp =
1−αβ
(1−α)β c, where
∫ r+c
p
0
F0(p)dp is the benefit of an additional search provided the firm found
is active and did not advertise; (1−α)β
1−αβ is the probability a firm is active conditional on that
it does not advertise. When high-valuation consumers receive an advertisement, they buy
immediately when the lowest advertised price is at or below r, while for higher prices they
search until they find an active non-advertising firm asking a price at or below r + c or
until all firms have been searched. When high-valuation consumers have not received any
advertisement they search when r+c < θH , they do not search when r+c > θH , and they
are indifferent between searching and not searching if r+ c = θH . When they search, they
continue to search until they find an active firm asking a price at or below r+c or until all
firms have been searched. The derivation of this result follows the usual lines, except that
we need to take into account that consumers have to pay search costs when visiting any
firm, independent of whether it advertises or not. Moreover, there is a difference between
advertising and non-advertising firms in the sense that when a consumer observes the
price set by a non-advertising firm, its search costs are already sunk, while it still has to
make the search costs just after having observed the advertised price.
Example (Pure Consumer Search). In the previous section we noted that the equi-
librium with high advertised prices exists for γ = 0.1, S = 0.099, A = 1, c = 0.04 and
1.3 < θH < 2.5. We now show that for these very same parameter values a ‘pure search
equilibrium’ exists where firms do not advertise (α = 0) and where all firms are active
(β = 1). In this example we look at the case where r+ c < θL < θH − c, implying that all
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high-valuation consumers search. A traditional undercutting argument shows that when
p > r + c there are no atoms and so pi0(p0) = −S for any p0 > r + c. On the other hand,
p0 cannot be smaller than r + c either, since deviation to r + c would be profitable. For
any price p ≤ p0 = r + c profits are given by
pi0(p) = pγ(1− F0(p)) + p(1− γ)1
2
− S.
Equating this to pi0(r + c) =
1
2
(1− γ)(r + c)− S gives
F0(p) = 1− (1− γ)(r + c− p)
2pγ
,
and p
0
=
1
2
(1−γ)
γ+ 1
2
(1−γ)(r + c). Furthermore,
∫ r+c
p
0
F0(p)dp = c gives r = c
1−κ
κ
, with κ =
1− 12 (1−γ)
γ
ln
1
2
(1−γ)+γ
1
2
(1−γ) . This equilibrium holds whenever pi0 > 0, pi1 < pi0 and r+c < θL = 1.
Note that the first restriction holds if, and only if, pi0 =
1
2
(r+ c)(1− γ)−S > 0, while the
second holds if 1
2
(1 − γ)r < A. Substituting the parameter values that are given above
shows that these three restrictions do hold for these values. 
The intuition behind the co-existence of multiple equilibria is as follows. For the given
parameter values, S is very close to γ. In the equilibrium with high advertised prices
described in Section 3.4 the maximum profits from not advertising, realized when the
competitor advertises its high price or is not active at all, are γ−S. When γ is close to S
these maximum profits are low and to make not advertising attractive the probability of
obtaining these profits should be high. This implies that β has to be low. A low value of
β also means that high-valuation consumers have no incentives to search, even when the
search costs c are low. The equilibrium with high advertised prices can therefore also exist
for low values of c. For such low values of c it is, however, also possible to have equilibria
where consumers search (as in the above example). If consumers continue to search, it is
not profit maximizing to advertise and a standard consumer search equilibrium emerges
as discussed in the example.
We note that in the example above firm profits are strictly positive while in the equi-
librium with high advertised prices profits equal zero. The intuition behind this is the
difference in search behavior of consumers. In the example all high-valuation consumers
search and firms set prices in such a way that these consumers buy at the first firm they
find. This implies that firms have monopoly power over the high-valuation consumers
while they compete for the low-valuation consumers. Since in our numerical example
the fraction of high-valuation consumers, 1− γ, is relatively high, firms can extract high
profits from these consumers. In contrast, in the equilibrium with high advertised prices
high-valuation consumers do not search. This means that non-advertising firms only sell
to the low-valuation consumers and in the best case realize (low) profits γ − S, while
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advertising firms have to pay relative high advertising costs to be able to sell to the high-
valuation consumers, and consequently realize low profits as well. Another way to explain
the difference in profits is to note that in the equilibrium with high advertised prices,
firms are indifferent between being active and not being active. This is needed to ensure
that high-valuation consumers do not want to search. Since being inactive leads to zero
profits, firms that are active also should earn no profits at all. In the example above
high-valuation consumers search and all firms are active, which means their profits can
be strictly positive.
In the example above not only are firm profits higher than in the equilibrium with high
advertised prices, but consumer welfare is also higher. We note that there are two types of
consumers, with low valuations and with high valuations, and that for both types welfare
is higher. The reason for this is the same for both consumer types and is twofold. First,
in the example the prices are lower. In the numerical example the maximum price is 0.41
while in the equilibrium with high advertised prices the maximum non-advertised price
is 1 and the maximum advertised price varies between 1.26 and 2.46, depending on the
value of θH . The second reason for the difference in consumer welfare is the difference in
the level of activity of the firms. In the example above all firms are active and consumers
search so in the end all consumers buy. In the equilibrium with high advertised prices
firms are active with probability β and therefore there is a probability that no firm is
active at all and consumers can not buy. Furthermore, there also is a strictly positive
probability that none of the active firms advertises and in that case only the low-valuation
consumers buy. We note that in the numerical example β is fairly low15, and so the dif-
ference in consumer welfare can be quite high. To give an example, the low-valuation
consumers obtain a welfare of 0.0001 in the equilibrium with high advertised prices while
welfare is 0.64 in the example above. The welfare for high-valuation consumers depends
on θH and, e.g., for θH = 2 welfare equals 0.28 and 1.59 respectively.
These observations on firm profits and consumer welfare show that the equilibrium
with searching consumers Pareto dominates the equilibrium with high advertised prices. If
one uses Pareto dominance as an equilibrium selection criterion the equilibrium with high
advertised prices would therefore be rejected in favor of the equilibrium with searching
consumers. In the remainder of this section we will show, however, that the co-existence
argument crucially depends on the assumed small value of c. The next proposition shows
that when θH and c are relatively large, the equilibrium of Proposition 3.4.1 is unique.
Proposition 3.5.1 Fix parameter values θ∗H , c
∗, S∗, γ∗ and A∗ such that the equilibrium
described in Proposition 3.4.1 exists. Then there exists a positive real number x̂ such that
for all x > x̂ the equilibrium described in Proposition 3.4.2 exists and is unique for all
parameter values θ∗H + x, c
∗ + x, S∗, γ∗ and A∗ .
The existence part of this proposition has already been shown in Section 3.4. The
proof of the uniqueness part can be found in the appendix to this chapter. Here we will
15β is between 0.04 and 0.51, depending on the value of θH .
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provide an intuitive explanation. The equilibrium we defined in Proposition 3.4.1 has high-
valuation consumers not searching in case they did not receive an advertisement. Other
equilibria where consumers do not search are shown not to overlap with the equilibrium
with high advertised prices. This is because in these equilibria the consumers behave in
the same way and therefore there is enough continuity in the firms’ pricing and advertising
decision problem to prevent overlap in the equilibrium regions. Overlap can occur between
equilibria with different consumer behavior. For example, as we showed above, the high
advertised price equilibrium with no consumer search (partly) overlaps with an equilibrium
where high-valuation consumers do search. Therefore it is necessary to rule out the co-
existence of equilibria where consumers (partly) search, i.e., equilibria with β > 0 and
α < 1.16 We show in the proof that these equilibria, except for one equilibrium, do not
exist for x high enough. The equilibrium that does exist even when x gets infinitely large
is shown not to overlap for x high enough.
The two main arguments used to obtain this result are as follows. First, as argued
before, consumers who did not receive any advertisements need to compare the search
costs c with the possible gains from searching, β(1−α)
1−αβ (θH − p). When a constant x is
added to both the search costs and θH , the search costs generally increase more than the
gains from searching. Therefore, the higher the constant x, the more difficult it is to have
an equilibrium where consumers search. Second, when high-valuation consumers search,
non-advertising firms may decide to concentrate on high-valuation consumers and since
the costs of searching a non-advertising firm are sunk at the moment the consumer has
arrived at the shop, these firms can ask a price equal to the maximum advertised price plus
the search costs c without loosing any customers. When the search costs increase, this
option of not advertising and setting a high price becomes increasingly more attractive.
This pricing strategy is, however, detrimental for consumer search since consumers who
expect a high price will not search. So, this second argument exploits the fact that firms
that advertise are committed to the price they offer before consumers search, whereas
non-advertising firms are not committed. The two arguments together rule out other
equilibria for the case where θH and c are relatively large.
3.6 Conclusion and extensions
The core of the argument developed in this Chapter centers around the uncertainty con-
sumers face concerning the shops that carry the product they are looking for: some firms
do have the product, others do not. This uncertainty is important in explaining consumer
search behavior, but so far this type of uncertainty has not been considered in the large
literature on consumer search. An important role of advertising in such a situation is to
inform consumers that the advertising firm indeed sells the product. Advertising there-
fore can lower consumers’ expected search costs. Since visiting an advertising firm comes
with lower expected search costs than finding the product in a non-advertising firm, ad-
vertising firms have an advantage above non-advertising firms. In this Chapter we show
that advertising firms can use this advantage to set higher prices. We have argued that
the mechanism we uncover may be important in understanding recent developments in
16When β = 0 no firm is active and searching is not profitable.
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emerging markets using multi-media technologies.
We analyzed the case where advertisements contain both information on the avail-
ability of the product and on the price the advertising firm asks. As we noted in the
introduction, however, in many cases where our argument applies, advertisements may
not contain price information. It therefore would be interesting to analyze a model where
advertisements only contain information on product availability. The analysis of such a
model is not straightforward because of complications arising in consumer search behav-
ior. Without price advertisement, consumers not only have to decide on whether they will
search, but also on where to search: an advertising firm or a non-advertising firm. Another
complicating factor is that when prices are not advertised, advertising firms may exploit
the fact that search costs are sunk at the time the price is revealed to consumers. Still,
the argument used in this Chapter suggests that an equilibrium exists with high-valuation
consumers visiting and buying at an advertising firm and not searching in case they did
not receive an advertisement. Such an equilibrium with advertising firms setting high
prices could hold as long as the probability of finding an active firm is low enough. The
development of such a model is an interesting area for further research. Future research
may also relax some of the restrictive assumptions we have employed, most notably the
assumption that advertising costs are linear.
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3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
The proof consists of two parts. First, we show that the proposed strategy is indeed in the
strategy space of the players and second, we show that none of the players has an incentive to
deviate from his proposed strategy.
To show that the proposed strategy is indeed in the strategy space of the players we need
to show that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and that F0(p) and F1(p) are proper cdf’s. To show that
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we note that
α =
1− A+S(1−γ)(θH−c)
β
and so when 0 < β ≤ 1, α > 0 whenever 1 − A+S(1−γ)(θH−c) > 0, which is the second part of
restriction 1. Restriction 2 ensures that α < 1. The second part of restriction 1 and restriction
2 together also ensure that β > 0: restriction 2 gives β > 1− A+S(1−γ)(θH−c) and the second part of
restriction 1 gives 1− A+S(1−γ)(θH−c) > 0. Restriction 3 finally ensures that β < 1.
To show that F0(p) and F1(p) are proper cdf’s note that both F0(p) and F1(p) are increasing
in p, F0(p0) and F1(p1) equal 0, and F0(p0) and F1(p1) are equal to 1. We also note that for
p
1
> p0 = θL to hold, A + S should be larger than (1 − γ)θL. The first part of condition 1
ensures that this is indeed the case.
We now show that under the conditions specified, none of the players has an incentive to
deviate. We first consider the search behavior of consumers. It is clear that since low-valuation
consumers have no search costs they will search all firms and so know all active firms and their
prices. For them it is optimal to buy at the cheapest of these firms, provided the price is not
above the valuation for the product. High-valuation consumers who get two advertisements
know that both firms are active and also know both prices. Again it is optimal to buy at the
cheapest of the two firms.
Next, consider the case where a high-valuation consumer did not receive any advertisements.
Suppose such a consumer has searched already once and found an inactive firm so that the
consumer has to decide whether to search once more. He will not search for a second time when
the utility from searching is smaller than the utility from not searching, which gives
−c+ β(1− α)
1− αβ
∫ θH
p
0
(θH − p)f0(p)dp < 0. (A.1)
Integrating by parts and rearranging terms gives that searching a second time is not profitable
when
∫ θH
p
0
F0(p)dp < 1−αββ(1−α)c. This is the case if
θH(1− S
θLγ
)− S
γ
ln(θL
γ
S
) <
A+ S
(1− γ)(θH − c)c,
which is condition 4.
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Now suppose the consumer has searched once and found an active firm asking price p∗ ≤ θH .
The utility from searching a second firm is given by
−c+ β(1− α)
1− αβ
[∫ p∗
p
0
(θH − p)f0(p)dp+ (1− F0(p∗))(θH − p∗)
]
+
(1− β(1− α)
1− αβ )(θH − p
∗).
Integrating by parts and rearranging terms gives
−c+ θH − p∗ + β(1− α)1− αβ
∫ p∗
p
0
F0(p)dp.
Since the utility from not searching is θH−p∗ and p∗ ≤ θH , it is easy to see that under condition
4 searching a second time is also, in this case, not profitable.
We conclude that if a consumer searches one time, he will (under condition 4) certainly not
search a second time. However, this implies that the consideration of whether or not to search
the first time is exactly identical to the consideration of searching a second time after having
found an inactive firm. Therefore, under condition 4 it is indeed not optimal to search at all if
no advertisement was received.
If a high-valuation consumer receives a single advertisement with price p∗ ≤ θH − c, his
utility from buying at the advertising firm is θH − p∗− c (remember that a consumer who visits
an advertising firm incurs search costs c). The utility of searching the non-advertising firm is
−c+ β(1− α)
1− αβ
[∫ p∗+c
p
0
(θH − p)f0(p)dp+ (1− F0(p∗ + c))(θH − p∗ − c)
]
+
(1− β(1− α)
1− αβ )(θH − p
∗ − c).
Integrating in parts and comparing the two utilities shows that again under condition 4 search-
ing is not profitable. This shows that consumers have no incentives to deviate from the strategy
outlined in the proposition.
We next consider the behavior of firms. Let pi0(p) denote the profits from not advertising
and setting a price p and let pi1(p) denote the profits from advertising a price p. Given the
consumer behavior specified in the proposition we have for p ≤ θL,
pi0(p) = pγ(1− β(1− α)F0(p))− S.
Substituting α, β and F0(p) gives that pi0(p) = 0 for all p0 ≤ p ≤ θL. For p < p0 we have
that pi0(p) = pγ − S < p0γ − S = 0 and for p > θL the firm does not sell anything so that
pi0(p) = −S < 0. This shows that for a non-advertising firm it is indeed optimal to choose a
price between p
0
and p0.
An advertising firm setting a price between θL and θH − c makes a profit of
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pi1(p) = p(1− γ)(1− βαF1(p))− S −A.
For prices above θH − c, it does not generate any sales so that
pi1(p) = −S −A
and for prices below θL we have that
pi1(p) = pγ(1− β(1− α)F0(p)) + p(1− γ)−A− S.
When we substitute the values for α, β, F0(p) and F1(p) we see that for p1 ≤ p ≤ p1, pi1(p) = 0.
Moreover, pi1(p) < 0 for p > p1. For θL < p ≤ p1, pi1(p) = p(1−γ)−S−A ≤ p1(1−γ)−S−A = 0.
For p
0
< p ≤ θL, pi1(p) = p(1−γ)−A ≤ θL(1−γ)−A < 0 where in the last inequality we use the
first part of restriction 1. And lastly, for p ≤ p
0
, pi(p) = p−A− S ≤ p
0
−A− S = Sγ −A− S =
S( 1γ − 1) − A < θL(1 − γ) − A < 0, where the second inequality comes from restriction 2 and
the last inequality from the first part of restriction 1. We conclude that for an advertising firm
deviating from F1(p) is not profitable.
Since the profits from advertising and the profits from not advertising equal each other there
are no gains from deviating from the proposed advertising probability, α, and since both profits
equal 0 deviating from the proposed probability of being active, β, also does not lead to more
profits. We conclude that firms have no incentives to deviate from the firm strategy outlined in
the proposition.
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Assume that for A∗, S∗, θ∗H , c
∗ and γ∗ the equilibrium exists, and so all four restrictions hold.
The first three restrictions do not depend on θH or c in isolation but instead only depend on
θH − c. Since this value does not change when x is added to both θ∗H and c∗, these three
restrictions still hold. The fourth restriction depends on θH and c in isolation. When x is added
to both θ∗H and c
∗, this restriction changes to
θ∗H(1−
S∗
γ∗
) + x(1− S
∗
γ∗
)− S
∗
γ∗
ln
γ∗
S∗
<
A∗ + S∗
(1− γ∗)(θ∗H − c∗)
c∗ +
A∗ + S∗
(1− γ∗)(θ∗H − c∗)
x. (A.2)
Since (restriction 4 of Proposition 3.4.1)
θ∗H(1−
S∗
γ∗
)− S
∗
γ∗
ln
γ∗
S∗
<
A∗ + S∗
(1− γ∗)(θ∗H − c∗)
c∗
and (due to restriction 3)
x(1− S
∗
γ∗
) <
A∗ + S∗
(1− γ∗)(θ∗H − c∗)
x,
inequality (A.2) holds and so when x is added to θ∗H and c
∗, all restrictions are still satisfied and
the equilibrium exists.
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3.A.3 Derivation of the reservation price r.
In this appendix we derive the optimal consumer behavior. To ease this derivation we first note
that advertised prices never exceed θH − c. If they would, sales would be zero and profits would
be negative. For the same reason non-advertised prices never exceed θH . This implies that for
high-valuation consumers buying from an advertising firm always gives a higher utility than not
buying at all. Equivalently, if a high-valuation consumer has found an active non-advertising
firm, buying from this firm always gives a higher utility than not buying at all.
We define a reservation price r as
∫ r+c
p
0
F0(p)dp = 1−αβ(1−α)β c. Using this reservation price
optimal consumer behavior is as follows.
• Low-valuation consumers buy from the cheapest active firm provided the price is not above
θL.
Proof
Since these consumers have zero search costs they search all non-advertising firms and
consequently know all prices. The behavior stated above is therefore optimal. 2
• High-valuation consumers who receive two advertisements buy from the cheapest of these
firms.
Proof
Since there are two firms in the market these consumers know all prices and therefore the
stated behavior is optimal. 2
• High-valuation consumers who receive one advertisement with price p1 buy immediately
if p1 ≤ r. In case p1 > r it is optimal to search the second firm. If the second firm
is non-active consumers will buy from the advertising firm. If the second firm is active
consumers will buy from it if the price is at or below p1 + c; else they will buy from the
advertising firm.
Proof
The second part, on what to do after having searched the second firm is obvious once taking
into account that buying from the advertising firm bears costs c while after searching
buying from the non-advertising firm is free. To show the first part note that the utility
of buying immediately is θH − c− p1 while the utility of searching is
−c+ (1− α)β
1− αβ (
∫ p1+c
p
0
(θH − p)f0(p)dp+ (1− F0(p1 + c))(θH − p1 − c))
+(1− β(1− α)
1− βα )(θH − p1 − c).
Integrating in parts and rewriting gives
−c+ (1− α)β
1− αβ
∫ p1+c
p
0
F0(p)dp+ θH − p1 − c
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and so search is profitable if and only if
∫ p1+c
p
0
F0(p)dp >
1− αβ
(1− α)β c,
or p1 > r. 2
• When r+ c > θH high-valuation consumers who have not received any advertisements do
not search. When r + c < θH these consumers will search. If they find an active firm
asking a price at or below r + c they stop searching and buy at that firm. If the price
found is above r+ c or if the firm is inactive consumers will search the second firm as well
and buy at the cheapest active firm. When r+ c = θH consumers are indifferent between
searching and not searching. We propose that a fraction µ of the consumers searches.
If the firm is active consumers buy immediately and if it is not active consumers again
are indifferent between searching and not searching. We propose that a fraction µ of the
searching consumers also searches the second firm.
Proof
The behavior for r + c > θH has already been shown in the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Now look at r + c < θH . Suppose the first search gave an active firm asking a price p0.
Buying immediately gives a utility θH − p0 while searching further gives expected utility
−c+ (1− α)β
1− αβ (
∫ p0
p
0
(θH − p)f0(p)dp+ (1− F0(p0))(θH − p0))
+(1− β(1− α)
1− βα )(θH − p0).
Rewriting gives that buying immediately is profitable if
∫ p0
p
0
F0(p)dp ≤ 1− αβ
β(1− α)c,
or p0 ≤ r + c. Note that searching the second firm is profitable when p0 > r + c.
If the first search led to an inactive firm the utility of a second search is
−c+ (1− α)β
1− αβ
∫ θH
p
0
(θH − p)f0(p)dp. (A.3)
Rewriting gives that this utility is strictly positive for r + c < θH and so a second search
is profitable.
60 On high advertised prices and searching where to buy
This explains the second part of the behavior when r + c < θH . For the first part of
the behavior we note that in some cases, for instance when the first search leads to an
inactive firm, it is profitable to search a second time. This implies that the utility of the
first search is higher than the utility of a first search when consumers would not search a
second time at all. This utility if consumers would not search a second time is given by
(A.3), which is strictly positive for r+c < θH . Therefore also the first search is profitable.
Finally, we look at r+ c = θH . Note that since prices are never above θH prices also never
are above r + c. As in the case r + c < θH it is best to stop search if the price found
is at or below r + c, implying that if an active firm is found it is optimal to buy there
immediately. If no active firm is found the utility of a second search is given by (A.3),
which equals zero for r+c = θH . Since consumers buy immediately after finding an active
firm and are indifferent between searching and not searching after finding an inactive firm
the utility of the first search again is given by (A.3), equalling zero. 2
3.A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.5.1.
To prove Proposition 3.5.1 we need to check all possible equilibria of the model and show that
neither of these overlaps with the equilibrium of Proposition 3.4.1 for x large enough. To this end,
we classify the possible equilibria by the probabilities α and β. In the equilibrium of Proposition
3.4.1 these probabilities are strictly between 0 and 1. To save space in this appendix we only
look at equilibria for which it is easy to show that they do not overlap with the equilibrium of
Proposition 3.4.1 at all. The proof for the other equilibria can be found in the internet appendix.
(i) An equilibrium where β = 0 implies that profits of being active should be below zero.
If a firm deviates and chooses not to advertise and sets a price θL = 1, its profits are γ − S.
Hence, an equilibrium where β = 0 only holds for γ < S, while condition (2) of Proposition
3.4.1 stipulates that γ > S.
(ii) In an equilibrium with α = 1 and 0 < β < 1 we should have that pi1 = 0. First
suppose p
1
> θL. If a firm deviates to not advertising a price θL = 1, profits are at least
equal to γ − S. As deviating should not be profitable, this equilibrium only holds for γ < S.
Now suppose p
1
≤ θL. It is easy to show that in this case θL is in the support of F1(p) and so
pi1(θL) = 1−β+β(1−F1(θL))−A−S = 0, or 1−β+β(1−F1(θL)) = A+S. Deviating to not ad-
vertising a price θL gives a profit that is at least as large as pi0(θL) = γ(1−β+β(1−F1(θL)))−S =
γ(A + S) − S. As deviating should not be profitable it follows that γ(A + S) − S has to be
smaller than 0. This restriction leads to a parameter region that does not overlap with a region
defined by S < γ and A > 1− γ.
(iii) α = 1 and β = 1. In this case an equilibrium does not exist. When every firm is active
and advertises, we get Bertrand competition and equilibrium prices equalling 0. This leads to
negative profits −A− S.
Note that the equilibria that are left to analyze are equilibria with α < 1 and β > 0. For
these equilibria we cannot universally show that they do not overlap with our equilibrium and
in fact some of these equilibria partially overlap. As we show in the internet appendix these
equilibria, however, only overlap for relatively small values of θH and c.
Chapter 4
Joining forces to attract consumers:
clusters of shops in a consumer
search model
4.1 Introduction
Casual observation suggests that many shops are clustered together in main streets and
shopping centers. Since these clusters of shops allow for one stop shopping they are
popular with consumers, and this popularity of malls in turn makes it attractive for shops
to locate in a mall. There is however a drawback of locating together: clustering makes
it easy for consumers to shop around to find the best product match. This is not so
much a problem when the shops offer heterogeneous goods, but it is when the products
are (almost) homogeneous. In that case shopping around by consumers will increase
competition and lower prices. Even so, quite some shops in shopping malls sell (almost)
homogeneous goods, such as bakeries, butcher’s, drugstores, opticians, dry-cleaners and
banks.
This paper investigates why shops selling homogeneous1 goods would locate together
and in a sense would choose to compete with each other. To capture the main idea that
malls make it easy to shop around, consumers are modeled as in a sequential search model
with costly initial search (see Stahl (1989), Janssen et al. (2005)), except that the search
costs inside the mall are lower than the search costs outside the mall. In the model a
fraction γ of consumers, called shoppers, incur no search or travel costs and therefore
know all prices. The other consumers, called non-shoppers, incur costs when entering
a shop, independent of whether a shop is located in a mall or not, and non-shoppers
incur travel costs when traveling between malls or isolated2 shops. When a non-shopper
1The model used in this paper assumes that the goods sold by shops are perfectly homogeneous and
the shops compete in prices. Although examples of really homogeneous goods are hard to find, there are
many goods that are almost homogeneous. Modeling the shops as selling perfectly homogeneous goods
will clearly distinguish the different effects of locating together and if locating together is profitable under
perfectly homogeneous goods it will certainly be profitable under almost homogeneous goods as well.
2The term isolated does not necessarily imply that the shop is not located in some shopping center,
but is used to signify that the shop does not have direct competitors selling the same good in the same
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however stays in the mall where he currently is, no travel costs are incurred.
This model will offer some insight in the effects that play a role in location choice
and will show under which conditions homogeneous shops choose to locate together. The
main idea is that the increased competition caused by locating together will indeed lead
to lower prices, but these lower prices will attract more consumers to the mall. This hap-
pens in two distinct ways. First, shops in a mall attract more non-shoppers than isolated
shops and, second, lower prices can make more non-shoppers willing to leave their house
and start searching.
The second effect, more non-shoppers willing to search, only holds for relatively high
values of the search costs. When the search costs are low all non-shoppers are active,
independent of whether there is a mall or not. When the search costs are high enough,
not all non-shoppers are active and the presence of a mall makes more non-shoppers willing
to leave their house. The analysis in this paper shows that this effect is very strong. When
either all shops are isolated or all shops are located in the same mall consumers necessarily
divide evenly over all shops and so the only effect of the mall is that more non-shoppers
are active. For high enough search costs this effect is strong enough to make the profits
when all shops are in the same mall higher than the profits when all shops are isolated.
To analyze the uneven distribution of non-shoppers over mall and isolated shops and
to analyze the location choice of shops an intermediate case needs to be studied where
some shops are in a mall and some other shops are isolated. Although several results,
like the uneven distribution of consumers over shops, can be obtained analytically, the
intermediate case is too complex to completely analyze in an analytic way. Simulations
are therefore used to obtain an insight in the magnitude of the uneven distribution of
consumers and in the outcome of the location choice game.
The location choice game is analyzed under the assumption that only one mall can
be formed. One can think of a town that has one large out-of-town shopping center with
ample space for new shops and several much smaller in-town mini malls that have no space
to expand and accommodate new shops. Starting from some initial situation with k ≥ 1
shops in the mall and n− k isolated shops, a randomly chosen shop gets the opportunity
to relocate. After a possible relocation profits are realized and another randomly chosen
shop gets the opportunity to relocate. An equilibrium is reached when none of the shops
has an incentive to relocate anymore and the final outcome of this game depends on the
initial situation and on the model parameters. The simulations show that there exist
parameter values for which a situation with only isolated shops is an equilibrium. There
also are parameter values for which in equilibrium a mall with at least two shops exists.
The simulations suggest that an equilibrium with only isolated shops can only be obtained
for relatively low search costs and for an initial situation with either no mall or a mall
with two shops. Other initial situations or relatively high search costs in the simulations
always lead to an equilibrium with a mall.
This can be explained from the two effects on sales mentioned before. Recall that
the increase in active non-shoppers only holds for relatively high values of the search
shopping center.
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costs. This paper also proves that, for a given mall size, mall shops always attract more
non-shoppers than isolated shops and that this uneven distribution of non-shoppers over
shops holds for all values of the search costs. For low search costs the only effect on sales
therefore is the uneven distribution of consumers over shops and, as the simulations show,
this increase in sales is not always large enough to make a mall an equilibrium. For high
search costs both effects on sales hold and the simulations suggest that the combined
effect is strong enough to always make a mall an equilibrium outcome of the location
choice game.
The role of the initial situation can be explained from the uneven distribution of con-
sumers over mall and isolated shops. When the initial situation has only isolated shops
the consumers necessarily divide evenly over the n shops. The increase in sales from
forming a mall therefore is an increase from a fraction 1
n
of non-shoppers to some fraction
above 1
n
. When there already exists a mall, an isolated shop who decides to join the mall
increases its sales from a fraction below 1
n
to a fraction above 1
n
. This is a larger increase
in sales than when a mall is formed starting from an initial situation of only isolated shops
and apparently this increase in sales is large enough to make joining the mall a profitable
strategy.
In the general case of a mall with 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 shops finding expressions for all the
possible equilibrium price distributions is very difficult. There are however some interest-
ing properties that can be analytically derived and that hold for all equilibria. Consumers
behave as in a standard sequential search model with costly initial search (see Janssen
et al. (2005)), except that in this paper travel costs are added. These travel costs are
not incurred when a non-shopper stays in the mall and it is therefore not surprising that
the price distribution of mall shops resembles the price distribution obtained in Janssen
et al. (2005). Mall shops compete for the shoppers and have some market power over
the non-shoppers. They balance these two effects by randomizing over prices. The price
distribution has a maximum price equal to the average mall price plus the entering costs,
such that a non-shopper who finds the maximum price has no incentive to continue search-
ing in the mall. Interestingly, the price distribution of isolated shops has a different form.
Consider a non-shopper who visited an isolated shop and who has to decide on whether
to continue searching in the mall. To do this he has to travel to the mall, which is costly.
Moreover, for every visit to a shop that has not previously been visited entering costs are
incurred. The total costs of searching thus are the travel costs plus the entering costs and
searching is only profitable when the average mall price plus the entering costs plus the
travel costs is below the price found in the isolated shop. Since the maximum mall price
equals the average mall price plus the entering costs a non-shopper who currently is in an
isolated shop will only move on to the mall when the price found in the isolated shop is
above the maximum mall price plus the traveling costs. Therefore, the maximum price p
that an isolated shop can ask without making non-shoppers willing to search is the maxi-
mum mall price plus the travel costs. Note that p is relatively high and therefore attractive
to ask. If an isolated shop would however only ask price p a rational consumer expecting
this price would never search an isolated shop in the first place. Moreover, asking a low
price can be profitable as well since it attracts the shoppers. It turns out that isolated
shops randomize over setting price p or setting a price far below the maximum mall price.
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This can be interpreted as isolated shops usually being more expensive than mall shops,
but sometimes offering a large discount. An isolated shop will attract non-shoppers who
hope to be lucky enough to find a discount. But even if the non-shopper does not find a
discount he will stay at the isolated shop since to search further the non-shopper has to
incur travel and entering costs.
One of the first papers considering the location of shops is the well-known paper by
Hotelling (1929). The Hotelling model differs in important aspects from the model in this
paper. For instance, the model by Hotelling assumes a spatial structure where consumers
and shops are located along a line, consumers incur transportation costs that are linear in
the distance between consumer and shop and consumers incur no entering costs. These
assumptions ensure that along a part of the Hotelling line the price and sales effect work
in the same direction: locating closer to a competitor leads to higher prices and more
sales. It is therefore no surprise that for this part of the line shops have an incentive to
locate closer to each other.
Of the more recent research combining location choice and consumer search Dudey
(1990, 1993) are the only papers on homogeneous products. The work by Dudey differs in
two important ways from the research in this paper. First, consumers in Dudey’s model
are assumed to search only one shop. Although in the model in the current paper in
equilibrium consumers search only once as well, in principle consumers can search several
times and this threat of continued search increases competition between shops. Second,
in Dudey’s model shops do not compete in price, but in quantity. Dudey finds that a
situation where all shops locate together is an equilibrium. The main idea behind this
equilibrium is that if a shop would deviate it would set the monopoly quantity and price
and consequently no consumer would visit the deviating shop. This argument resembles
the uneven distribution of consumers over mall shops and isolated shops as found in this
paper. Dudey however shows that in his model an uneven clustering of shops cannot
be an equilibrium since the largest mall (or largest malls if there are two or more malls
with the same size) will attract all the consumers. In particular, this implies that in
Dudey’s model isolated shops cannot exist. In my model the existence of isolated shops
is possible since, as mentioned above, isolated shops randomize over prices and attract
some consumers hoping to find a low price.
There are several papers combining consumer search and location choice in a hetero-
geneous products setting, see e.g. Stahl (1982a, 1982b), Wolinsky (1983), Fischer and
Harrington (1996), Gehrig (1998) and Konishi (2005). In these models searching in a
mall is attractive, not only because mall prices are lower but also because in a mall the
probability of finding a product that closely matches the taste of the consumer is higher.
In general, the product match and pricing effect together increase the sales so much that
it is profitable to locate together. The current paper contributes by showing that even
without the product match effect locating together can be profitable. There are more
important differences between this paper and the papers mentioned above. For instance,
Wolinsky (1983) only investigates whether a situation with all shops in the same mall
can be an equilibrium. In contrast, Stahl (1982a) only investigates under which condi-
tions a situation with only isolated shops cannot be an equilibrium and Stahl (1982b)
limits the analysis to only two shops. Both papers by Stahl also assume that consumers
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only search one location (either a mall or an isolated shop). In Fischer and Harrington
(1996) and Gehrig (1998) the search costs are assumed to be so low that in equilibrium
all consumers are always active. This implies that the formation of a mall will never lead
to more active consumers and the only effect on sales is that larger malls attract more
consumers. Finally, Konishi (2005) mentions both effects on sales, but analyzes this under
the assumption that consumers can visit only one location. Moreover, Konishi analyzes
the location choice game only for some very specific cases, where e.g. there are only two
possible locations.
The next section presents the model that will be used. Section 4.3 analyzes the two
opposite cases where in one case all shops are isolated and in the other case all shops are
in the same mall. Section 4.4 concentrates on the intermediate case of 2 ≤ k ≤ n−1 mall
shops. In Section 4.4.1 some general features of the equilibria are derived and Section
4.4.2 derives one specific equilibrium. Section 4.5 analyzes the location choice of shops
and Section 4.6 concludes. The proofs are in the appendix to this chapter.
4.2 The model
The model has n > 2 shops in the market that sell a homogeneous good. Production costs
are linear and without loss of generality they are taken to be zero. The shops compete in
prices and the strategy of a firm i can therefore be denoted by a price distribution Fi(p),
where Fi(p) is the cdf, the maximum price is denoted by pi and the minimum price by
p
i
. Note that if shop i chooses a pure price strategy with price pi the price distribution
is given by Fi(p) = 0 for p < pi and Fi(p) = 1 for p ≥ pi. In the next sections it will
however become clear that there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
The shops play a location choice game. In this game there is one possible mall with
k shops and the remaining n − k shops are all isolated. At the start of game one of the
shops has the option to either join the mall at no relocation costs or to leave the mall to
be an isolated shop at no relocation costs. Fixed relocation costs can be introduced easily
without changing much of the analysis. After the shop has decided on whether or not to
relocate the pricing game is played and profits are realized. After that again a randomly
chosen shop has the option to relocate, profits are realized, again a randomly chosen shop
can relocate, profits are realized, and so on. Shops do not take future actions of com-
petitors into account when deciding on their own strategy. This is quite realistic since
in reality possibilities to relocate occur only occasionally. A model where shops discount
future expected profits and the time span between realizing profits and relocation is long
enough would approximately have the same outcome as the model where shops are not
forward-looking at all. In equilibrium, none of the shops has an incentive to relocate.
The model has a unit mass of consumers, all having unit demand and a valuation θ
for the product. The consumers are aware of all the locations of the shops, but they do
not know the prices in the shops. They however form rational price expectations and base
their decisions on these expectations.
There are two different types of consumers. A fraction γ of consumers consists of
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shoppers who have zero search costs. As a consequence shoppers know all the prices and
buy at the cheapest shop.3 A fraction 1−γ of consumers consists of consumers that incur
strictly positive search costs. These consumers are referred to as non-shoppers. Non-
shoppers incur costs ce when entering a shop. These costs are incurred whenever a not
previously visited shop is entered and do not depend on whether a shop is in a mall with
several shops or is an isolated shop. The entering costs are equivalent to the continuation
costs in a standard consumer search model. These costs reflect the time spent in the
shop, finding the product on the shelf, finding the price of the product, waiting for a shop
assistant to help you, etc. Note that positive entering costs are essential in the model.
Without entering costs non-shoppers could without additional costs search all the shops
in the mall. This would drive the mall prices to zero, and no shop would ever locate in a
mall. In addition to the entering costs, non-shoppers incur travel costs ct whenever they
travel from their house to a cluster of shops or travel between clusters of shops, where
the cluster can be either a shopping mall with several shops selling the product or an
isolated shop.4 The travel costs can be interpreted as the costs of, say, a bus ticket or
petrol costs. The travel costs ensure that searching h shops in the same mall comes at
less costs than searching h shops spread over different clusters. Finally, the analysis is
restricted to values of ce and ct for which ct + ce ≤ θ.
Non-shoppers search sequentially. This means that non-shoppers first decide on whether
to stay at home, visit a mall shop or visit an isolated shop. Let µ denote the fraction of
non-shoppers who decide to visit a shop and let 1−µ denote the fraction of non-shoppers
who decide to stay at home. The fraction µ of non-shoppers will be referred to as active
non-shoppers. Based on the price found in the first shop, an active non-shopper decides
on whether to search a second shop and whether this second search will be in the same
cluster as the first search (if possible) or in an other cluster. Then, based on the outcome
of the second search, active non-shoppers decide on whether or not to search a third time
and where the third search will be, etc.
In the analysis below I will focus on symmetric equilibria in the sense that all shops
in the same cluster choose identical price distributions and clusters of the same size
have identical price distributions as well. Note that identical price distributions does
not necessarily imply identical prices since realized prices could differ from each other.
3One could think of shoppers as consumers who obtain a strictly positive utility from the shopping
experience, even if travel expenses are taken into account. For the results it is not strictly necessary that
there are consumers with zero search costs who know all prices. The less restrictive assumption that
some fraction γ of consumers gets to know the prices of two or more random shops without incurring
search costs would be sufficient to obtain the results in this paper. For simplicity I however assume the
presence of a fraction of consumers with zero search costs.
4The travel costs are incurred every time a non-shopper travels between clusters of shops, and therefore
are also incurred when returning to a previously visited shop that is in a different cluster than the cluster
where the non-shopper currently is. These return costs are necessary to prevent arbitrage. Imagine a
situation of one mall with shops 1 and 2 and two isolated shops, 3 and 4. Now suppose a non-shopper’s
first search was in shop 1 and the second search was in shop 3. If there are no return costs and the
non-shopper would like to visit shop 2 in his third search he could go there immediately at cost ct + ce,
but he could also return to shop 1 at no costs and then visit shop 2 at cost ce. To prevent such a situation
return costs of at least ct are necessary when returning to a shop in a different cluster.
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Since price distributions are symmetric where possible and since I only consider situations
where there is at most one shopping mall I drop the shop index i in Fi(p) and in pi and
pi but instead use an index k denoting the number of firms in the shopping mall. Where
necessary I add an index m for mall or i for an isolated shop. So F1(p) is the price
distribution used by all shops when they are all isolated shops and Fn(p) is the price
distribution when all shops are in the same shopping mall. F ik(p) and F
m
k (p) are the price
distributions of an isolated shop while there also is a cluster of k shops and of a shop
located in a mall with k shops, respectively. The index k will also be added to µ, such
that µk denotes the fraction of active non-shoppers when there is a mall with k shops.
Because shops choose symmetric pricing strategies, non-shoppers a priori have no
preferences over shops that are located in the same mall. Moreover, non-shoppers a priori
have no preferences over the isolated shops. Once a non-shopper has chosen to visit the
mall he will therefore choose a random shop from this mall. In the same vein, once a
non-shopper has decided to visit an isolated shop he will choose such a shop at random.
4.3 Two opposite cases: only isolated shops and only
mall shops
4.3.1 Only isolated shops
In the model where all shops are isolated each visit to a shop comes at cost ct + ce, and
each return visit to a previously visited shop comes at cost ct. This model is equivalent
to the model in Janssen, Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2005) (henceforth JMW)
except for the return costs, which are absent in the JMW model. It is relatively easy to
show that the equilibrium derived in JMW also holds in a model with return costs and
in this section I will focus on this equilibrium.5
The equilibrium derived in JMW splits the parameter region in two non-overlapping
parts. When the search costs ct+ce are small enough, all non-shoppers are willing to search
at least one shop (µ1 = 1). This is called a full search equilibrium. When the search costs
ct + ce get too high non-shoppers are indifferent between searching and staying home
and only a fraction 0 < µ1 < 1 of the non-shoppers is active. This is called a partial
search equilibrium. Recall that in the model ct+ ce ≤ θ. This ensures that in equilibrium
µ1 > 0. If no non-shopper would be active (µ1 = 0) shops would only sell to the shoppers
and prices would be zero. But with prices equal to zero the utility of searching once is
θ − ce − ct, which is positive, a contradiction.
The equilibrium specification of the full search equilibrium in JMW uses a reservation
price r1. This reservation price is implicitly defined by∫ r1
p
1
(r1 − p)dF1(p) = ct + ce.
5Return costs complicate a full analysis considerably and could potentially lead to multiple equilibria.
See Janssen and Parakhonyak (2008) for an analysis of consumer behavior under the assumption of return
costs. Janssen and Parakhonyak currently work on shop behavior under return costs.
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When r1 < θ in JMW the full search equilibrium holds and the maximum price in the
price distribution is r1. When r1 = θ a partial search equilibrium holds with a maximum
price of θ. Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 will show that also when return costs are added
to the model a full search equilibrium with p1 = r1 holds for r1 < θ and a partial search
equilibrium with p1 = θ holds for r1 = θ. The proofs also show that these equilibria are
the only ones with p1 ≤ r1.
The role of the reservation price is fairly easy to explain if one considers a situation
where a non-shopper has only one opportunity left to search. Denote by p∗ the price found
in the current shop and denote by pmin the minimum price found in previous searches (if
the current shop is the first one searched let pmin be infinitely large). If a non-shopper
decides to stop searching he will obtain utility θ − min(p∗, pmin + ct). (Note that when
all shops are isolated, if the non-shopper decides to return to a previously visited shop he
incurs return costs ct and therefore the total expenses in that case would be p
min + ct.)
Now suppose that r1 ≤ θ and min(p∗, pmin+ ct) = r1. If a non-shopper decides to perform
one more search the expected utility gain of this search is given by the lhs of (4.3.1) and
the costs of this search are given by the rhs. Thus, for r1 ≤ θ, r1 is defined in such
a way that if min(p∗, pmin + ct) = r1 a non-shopper is indifferent between continuing
search and stopping search. If min(p∗, pmin + ct) < r1 a non-shopper will stop searching
and if min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1 the non-shopper will continue his search. The proofs of
Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 will also consider the general case where a non-shoppers has
h > 1 opportunities left to search. The proofs show that also in the general case the
reservation price has exactly the same interpretation.
In addition, the reservation price in combination with the valuation of the product
θ also affects the decision whether to search or stay at home. The definition of the
reservation price given by (4.3.1) gives r1 − Ep = ct + ce, with Ep the expected price.
Searching once gives (expected) utility θ−Ep− ct− ce and plugging in Ep gives expected
utility θ − r1. This already shows that if r1 < θ all non-shoppers want to search. The
proof of Proposition 4.3.2 also considers the general case where a non-shopper can search
more than once and shows that if r1 = θ non-shoppers are indifferent between searching
and staying at home. For r1 < θ the following is an equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3.1 (Full search equilibrium)
If ct + ce < θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy) then all non-shoppers are active and non-shoppers
will stop searching as soon as min(p∗, pmin + ct) ≤ r1, with r1 defined as
r1 =
ct + ce
1− ∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
.
Shops randomize over prices according to the price distribution
F1(p) = 1− (1− γ
γn
r1 − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
The maximum price asked by a shop is r1, the minimum price equals
1−γ
1+γ(n−1)r1 and
expected profits are given by pi1 = r1
1−γ
n
.
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In a partial search equilibrium it must be that r1 = θ to make non-shoppers indifferent
between staying home and searching. Only a fraction µ1 of the non-shoppers is active
and this fraction is determined by the condition r1 = θ, or Ep = θ − ct − ce. Note here
that µ1 determines Ep since an increase in the fraction of active non-shoppers increases
the prices.
Proposition 4.3.2 (Partial search equilibrium)
If ct+ ce > θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy) a fraction 0 < µ1 < 1 of the non-shoppers is active,
while the remaining fraction 1 − µ1 of non-shoppers stays at home and does not buy at
all. The fraction µ1 is implicitly defined by
h(µ1) ≡
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn
(1−γ)µ1y
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ
.
Active non-shoppers stop searching as soon as min(p∗, pmin+ct) ≤ θ. Shops randomize
over prices according to the price distribution
F1(p) = 1− ((1− γ)µ1
γn
θ − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
The maximum price asked by a shop is θ, the minimum price equals (1−γ)µ1
γn+(1−γ)µ1 θ and
expected profits are given by pi1 = θµ1
1−γ
n
.
In equilibrium, the pricing strategy is a mixed strategy. Because of the presence of
a fraction of shoppers who know all prices a pure pricing strategy or even an atom in
the price distribution is not possible. If shops would use a pure pricing strategy or a
price distribution with an atom, it would always be profitable to undercut the pure price
or atom slightly and attract all shoppers. Undercutting is not possible when the pure
pricing strategy or the atom is at price 0, but in that case asking a price ct+ ce keeps the
non-shoppers at the shop and leads to higher profits than a price of 0.
The mixed strategy balances two different effects: the shops have monopoly power
on their share of non-shoppers but compete for the shoppers. Asking a high price would
extract a high profit from the non-shoppers, but the probability of selling to the shoppers
is low. For a low price this is the other way around: the profits from the non-shoppers
are low, but there is a large probability of attracting the shoppers. Shops balance these
effects by randomizing over prices.
In the equilibria stated in the Propositions non-shoppers will search at most once. In
the first shop they visit they will find a price at or below r1 (θ in case of partial consumer
search) and will stop searching. In a model without return costs it is easy to see that
in equilibrium no shop would ever want to price so high that non-shoppers search on. If
the maximum price in an atomless price distribution would be so high that non-shoppers
search on, a shop asking this maximum price would make no profits, while asking a lower
price would lead to strictly positive profits. This simple idea does not hold anymore in a
model with return costs since a shop that asks the maximum price and is the last (nth)
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Figure 4.1: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops are isolated.
shop to be searched will sell to non-shoppers as long as its competitors ask a price above
p − ct. Still, in a model with return costs, as long as all competitors make sure that
non-shoppers do not search a shop will never want to let non-shoppers search since this
leads to zero profits.
Figure 4.1 shows the expected profits as a function of the search costs ct + ce. In this
figure, the number of shops n equals 10, γ = 0.1 and θ = 1. With these parameter values
the full search equilibrium holds for ct + ce < 0.073 and the partial search equilibrium
holds for 0.073 < ct + ce < 1. At first sight the full search equilibrium seems to hold
only for very small search costs but note that a search cost value of 0.073 implies that
the search costs are still 7.3% of the valuation of the product. The expected profits are
plotted for ct + ce < 0.45; for higher values of ct + ce the profits are decreasing and when
ct + ce approaches 1 the profits approach 0. In the full search equilibrium the maximum
price r1 increases linearly with ct + ce and the profits are linearly increasing in ct + ce as
well. As soon as the search costs ct+ce are above 0.073 profits however decrease in search
costs. In this case the partial search equilibrium obtains, the maximum price equals θ and
the profits depend on the fraction of consumers who search, µ1. This fraction decreases
in ct + ce, leading to decreasing profits.
4.3.2 Only mall shops
When all the shops are in the same mall non-shoppers incur costs ce + ct for the first
search, they incur costs ce for every next search and have no return costs. In such a
setup it is possible to derive a unique equilibrium, again with a parameter region where
all non-shoppers search and a parameter region where only a fraction of non-shoppers
searches.
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The analysis of this case follows the same lines as the analysis of the model where all
shops are isolated. More specifically, define a reservation price rn by∫ rn
p
n
(rn − p)dFn(p) = ce.
As in section 4.3.1, in a full search equilibrium the reservation price combined with
the prices found thus far determines whether a non-shopper wants to continue search or
wants to stop searching. Note that here the definition of the reservation price uses only
ce instead of ce + ct. This is because in the model where all shops are in the same mall
continuing search comes at cost ce, while in section 4.3.1 continuing search comes at cost
ce + ct.
The consideration whether to start searching or stay at home (which determines
whether a full search equilibrium can exist) is however different from section 4.3.1. When
all the shops are isolated the first search is as costly as all the other searches. But when
all shops are in the same mall the first search comes at cost ct+ce while continuing search
comes at cost ce. The reservation price is defined using only this continuation costs, such
that rn − Ep = ce. A consumer will only travel to the mall when the benefits, θ, are
higher than the costs, Ep + ct + ce. This can be rewritten as rn < θ − ct and so when
rn < θ − ct a full search equilibrium holds. In a partial search equilibrium rn = θ − ct.
This also has implications for the maximum prices that will be asked in equilibrium. In
a full search equilibrium the maximum price is, as before, the reservation price. This
ensures that no non-shoppers are searching more than once and, since in a model where
all the shops are in a mall there are no return costs, this also is the unique equilibrium.
In a partial search equilibrium the maximum price however is θ − ct. In a partial search
equilibrium the prices will be chosen in such a way that θ − Ep − ct − ce = 0, since this
makes non-shoppers indifferent between searching and not searching. But because the
continuation costs are only ce the utility of continuing search is at least θ−Ep−ce, which
equals ct. Buying at a price above θ− ct gives a utility below ct and for prices above θ− ct
continuing search is therefore profitable. If the maximum price would be above θ − ct a
shop setting this price would not sell anything, which cannot be an equilibrium.
The full search equilibrium has the following form.
Proposition 4.3.3 (Full search equilibrium)
If ce < (1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy)(θ− ct) all non-shoppers are active and non-shoppers will
stop searching as soon as they find a price at or below rn, with rn defined as
rn =
ce
1− ∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
.
Shops randomize over prices according to the price distribution
Fn(p) = 1− ((rn − p)(1− γ)
nγp
)
1
n−1 .
The maximum price asked by a shop is rn, the minimum price equals
1−γ
(1−γ)+γnrn and
expected profits are given by pin = rn
1−γ
n
.
72 Clusters of shops in a consumer search model
The partial search equilibrium is as follows.
Proposition 4.3.4 (Partial search equilibrium)
If ce > (1 −
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy)(θ − ct) a fraction 0 < µn < 1 of non-shoppers is active
and a fraction 1− µn of non-shoppers does not search at all, where µn is defined by
h(µn) ≡
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn
(1−γ)µny
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct .
Active non-shoppers will stop searching as soon as they find a price at or below θ− ct.
Shops randomize over prices according to price distribution
Fn(p) = 1− ((θ − ct − p)(1− γ)µn
nγp
)
1
n−1 .
The maximum price asked by a shop is θ−ct, the minimum price equals (θ−ct) µn(1−γ)γn+µn(1−γ)
and expected profits are given by pin = (θ − ct)µn(1−γ)n .
Figure 4.2 shows the expected profits as a function of the search costs ct + ce. Re-
call that the reservation value rn depends only on the continuation costs of search, ce.
Moreover, the decision whether or not to search depends on ct. Therefore, in contrast to
the model where all shops are isolated, the expected profits do not depend on total costs
ce + ct, but on ct and ce in isolation. To be able to make a plot of the expected profits
as a function of the total costs ce + ct I assume that ce and ct are related to each other
in a fixed proportion, that is, ct = β(ct + ce) and ce = (1 − β)(ct + ce), or consequently
ct =
β
1−β ce. In the figure, β = 0.8. As before, the number of firms n equals 10, γ = 0.1 and
θ = 1. The expected profits are plotted for ct + ce < 0.8. For higher values of ct + ce the
expected profits decrease to 0. The figure shows the same pattern as in the case where all
the shops are isolated. When the search costs are low enough (for the current parameter
values ct + ce should be below 0.28) the full search equilibrium holds. In this case the
expected profits increase in the search costs since the maximum price that can be asked,
rn, increases in the search costs. When the search costs are high enough (ct + ce above
0.28) the partial search equilibrium holds and the expected profits decrease in the search
costs. As before, the fraction of searching consumers, µn, decreases in the search costs
and moreover the maximum price θ − ct decreases in the search costs as well.
4.3.3 Comparing the two opposite cases
Figure 4.3 combines figures 4.1 and 4.2 by showing the expected profits as a function of
the search costs ct + ce in the case where all shops are isolated and in the case where all
shops are located in the same shopping mall. Again, the number of firms n equals 10,
γ = 0.1 and θ = 1. In the figure ct = 0.8(ct + ce) and ce = 0.2(ct + ce). The expected
profits are plotted for ct + ce < 0.5.
The figure can be split in different parts. First, when the search costs ct + ce are
small enough (for the current parameter values ct+ce < 0.073) the full search equilibrium
holds in both cases and pi1 > pin. The intuition for this result is straightforward. By
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Figure 4.2: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops are located
in the same shopping mall.
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Figure 4.3: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops are isolated
and when all shops are located in the same shopping mall.
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locating together in a single shopping mall shops decrease the costs to continue search
from ce + ct to ce, leading to stronger competition and lower prices and profits. Second,
when the search costs ct+ ce have an intermediate value (for the current parameter values
0.073 < ct + ce < 0.28) the full search equilibrium holds in the case where all shops are
located together and the partial search equilibrium holds in the case where all shops are
located separately. The intuition for this is as before: when all shops are located together
consumers expect lower prices and therefore consumers are more willing to search. This
implies that when all shops are located together all non-shoppers are active and the
expected profits increase in the search costs ct+ce. When all shops are located separately
however only a fraction of the non-shoppers is active and expected profits decrease in the
search costs ct+ce. When the search costs ct+ce are high enough the expected profits when
locating together are higher than the expected profits when locating separately. Finally,
when the search costs are high enough (for the current parameter values ct+ce > 0.28) the
partial search equilibrium holds in both cases. The fraction of active consumers is however
higher when all firms are located together and this leads to higher expected profits when
all firms are located together.
The pattern shown in Figure 3 does not depend on the specific parameter values
chosen. Name the value of ct+ ce where the full search equilibrium changes into a partial
search equilibrium the inflection value. A close look at Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 shows
that the inflection value is always higher when all shops are located together. It is also
easy to see that when in both cases a full search equilibrium holds, that is, when the
search costs ct+ ce are below the inflection value for the case when all shops are separate,
pi1 > pin. With somewhat more effort it can be shown that for ct + ce at or above the
inflection value when all shops are located together pin > pi1. This gives Proposition 4.3.5.
Proposition 4.3.5 Let ct = β(ct + ce) with 0 < β < 1. Then there exists a number c
with
θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ
1−γny
n−1dy) < c < θ
1− ∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
1− β ∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
such that for ct + ce < c pi1 > pin and for ct + ce > c pi1 < pin
Note that the total welfare (profits + consumer surplus) is given by γθ+µk(1−γ)(θ−
ct − ce), where µk = 1 in a full search equilibrium. The shoppers always buy without
incurring search costs and therefore add θ to the total welfare. Of the non-shoppers
only a fraction µk searches, and since the searching non-shoppers search only once in
equilibrium they add θ − ct − ce to the total welfare. When comparing the total welfare
when all shops are in the same mall with the total welfare when all shops are isolated
the only parameter that is important is µk. A close look at Propositions 4.3.1 - 4.3.4
shows that for all parameter values µn ≥ µ1 and therefore total welfare is higher when
all shops are located together6. Intuitively, locating together lowers prices and the lower
prices increase consumer participation.
6For ct+ce below the inflection value of the case where all shops are separate µ1 = µn = 1. For ct+ce
between the inflection value of the case where all shops are separate and the inflection value of the case
where all shops are in the same mall µn = 1 and µ1 < 1. For ct+ ce above the inflection value of the case
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4.4 The intermediate case
The previous section has shown that under some conditions it could be profitable for
shops to locate together instead of locating separately. In this section I will investigate
the situation where 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 shops are located together in a shopping mall and
the remaining n − k shops are located outside the shopping mall and separately from
each other. The analysis is restricted to a single shopping mall because a more general
case with several shopping malls complicates the consumer behavior considerably. Note
that under the restriction k ≤ n − 2 there are at least two shops outside the shopping
mall. The pricing behavior of shops partly depends on this restriction. For instance,
when there are at least two shops outside the shopping mall an isolated shop has at least
one isolated competitor. This implies that if all active non-shoppers visit the mall the
isolated shops compete for the shoppers, driving isolated prices down to zero. If there
would be only one isolated shop there is no competition with other isolated shops and
the isolated shop could make a profit even when all active non-shoppers visit the mall.
The case k = n − 1 is interesting because it shows whether all shops in the same mall
can be an equilibrium. The analysis however turns out to be prohibitively difficult, if not
impossible, and is therefore not contained in this paper.
Recall that Fmk (p) is the price distribution used by the shops that are in a shopping
mall with k shops. Denote by pimk the expected profits of such a shop and define r
m
k as∫ rmk
pm
k
(rmk − p)dFmk (p) = ce.
The same can be done for the isolated shops: F ik(p) is the price distribution used by
them, piik denotes the expected profits and r
i
k is defined as∫ rik
pi
k
(rik − p)dF ik(p) = ce + ct.
Note that the definition of rmk uses ce while the definition of r
i
k uses ct+ce. The reason
for this is that a non-shopper who is in an isolated shop and wants to continue search has
to incur a search cost ce+ ct, while a non-shopper who is in a mall can continue searching
in the mall at cost ce. As before, the reservation prices determine whether a consumer
wants to continue search and moreover determine whether a full search or a partial search
equilibrium holds. As in the previous section, I will concentrate on equilibria where
pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik.
In the previous section there was only one full search equilibrium with pk ≤ rk and
there was only one partial search equilibrium with pk ≤ rk. If 2 < k < n− 1 it cannot be
ruled out that there are several full search equilibria with pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik and there
are several partial search equilibria with pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik. Moreover, some of these
equilibria cannot be analytically solved anymore. It is however possible to analytically
show some interesting features that all these equilibria have in common. In this section
where all shops are in the same mall µ1 and µn are defined by h(µ1) = θ−ct−ceθ and h(µn) =
θ−ct−ce
θ−ct .
Since h(µ) is increasing in µ µn > µ1.
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I will first derive these common features. To compare profits in different cases and ulti-
mately analyze the location decision of shops it is needed to derive specific equilibrium
price distributions. In the second part of this section I will concentrate on one equilibrium
that exists for a large range of parameter values. Even though the ultimate analysis is
restricted to one equilibrium which is not unique, it will show that a shopping mall can
indeed exist in equilibrium. Moreover, the analysis will give some insight in the conditions
under which shopping malls are an equilibrium outcome.
4.4.1 Common features of all equilibria
Before some common features of all equilibria can be derived, the optimal consumer be-
havior should be specified. This consumer behavior is also needed in the second part of
this section where one specific equilibrium is derived. The optimal consumer behavior is
quite complex because of the wealth of options for consumers. After one or more searches
they can decide to buy at the current shop, possibly return to a previously visited shop
(incurring return costs), continue search in the mall or continue search in an isolated
shop. The complete specification of optimal consumer behavior is only used in the formal
proofs of the propositions in this section and to save space the complete specification of
consumer behavior is therefore placed in the appendix to this chapter.
A first general result that can be derived is on the relation between rik and r
m
k . When
pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik (4.4) and (4.4) can be rewritten as rmk = Epmk + ce and rik =
Epik + ct + ce, where Ep
m
k is the expected mall price, and Ep
i
k is the expected price in
an isolated shop. If Epik > Ep
m
k all active non-shoppers prefer to search in the mall and
isolated shops only attract shoppers. Since the number of isolated shops, n − k, is at or
above 2, this drives the prices in the isolated shops down to zero and Epik > Ep
m
k cannot
hold. The reverse argument holds when Epmk > Ep
i
k and so in equilibrium Ep
m
k = Ep
i
k.
Using (4.4) and (4.4) this implies that rik = r
m
k + ct.
Proposition 4.4.1 In any equilibrium with pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik, rik = rmk + ct.
A consequence of Proposition 4.4.1 is that non-shoppers who have to choose where
to search first are indifferent between searching in the mall and in isolated shops. In
equilibrium they will therefore spread randomly over mall shops and isolated shops. But
I will show later that they do not spread evenly: mall shops attract a larger share of
non-shoppers than isolated shops.
Applying Proposition 4.4.1 to the optimal consumer behavior as defined in the appen-
dix to this chapter shows that when pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik non-shoppers will stop searching
after their first search. When a mall shop deviates to a price above rmk every non-shopper
who finds this price will continue to search in the mall. Similarly, when an isolated shop
deviates to a price above rik every non-shopper who finds this price will continue to search
in some other isolated shop. Using this optimal consumer behavior it is easy to see that
indeed an equilibrium with pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik can exist. If a shop would deviate to
a higher price it would not sell anything and profits would be zero. Non-deviating shops
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obtain strictly positive profits since they at least sell to some non-shoppers. This shows
that deviating is not profitable.
A natural equilibrium would be an equilibrium where F ik(p) = F
m
k (p) = Fk(p). This is
however not possible. Note that pk = p
m
k ≤ rmk = rik− ct and that because of the shoppers
Fk(p) should be atomless. An isolated shop setting price pk would sell only to those non-
shoppers who visit the isolated shop on their first search. But raising price to rik would
not deter any of these non-shoppers from buying and profits would be higher. Note that
non-shoppers are willing to buy at price rik since to continue search they not only incur
continuation costs ce but also travel costs ct. In equilibrium therefore F
m
k (p) 6= F ik(p).
Let xk be the fraction of active non-shoppers who decide to first visit a shop in the
shopping mall and let 1− xk be the fraction of active non-shoppers who first visit an iso-
lated shop, with 0 < xk < 1. Note that xk =
k
n
means an equal division of non-shoppers
over all the shops.
Using the fact that non-shoppers stop searching after their first search the profit
functions are as follows. For p ≤ rmk ,
pimk (p) = γp(1− Fmk (p))k−1(1− F ik(p))n−k + (1− γ)µk
xk
k
p.
For p ≤ rik
piik(p) = γp(1− Fmk (p))k(1− F ik(p))n−k−1 + (1− γ)µk
1− xk
n− k p.
A standard undercutting argument shows that atoms in Fmk (p) are only possible for
those prices p∗ at which F ik(p
∗) = 1. Similarly, atoms in F ik(p) are only possible for
those prices p∗ at which Fmk (p
∗) = 1. The profit functions also show that in equilibrium
pmk = r
m
k , since for a lower maximum price it would be profitable to deviate to r
m
k .
Similarly, in equilibrium pik = r
i
k. Equilibrium expected profits are pi
m
k = r
m
k
xk
k
µk(1 − γ)
and piik = r
i
k
1−xk
n−k µk(1− γ).
Note that for p ≥ rmk
piik(p) = (1− γ)µk
1− xk
n− k p.
This shows that isolated shops will never set a price between rmk and r
i
k and that there
will be an atom at rik. F
i
k(p) should also have some probability mass below r
m
k since else
the definition of rik as given by (4.4) cannot hold. This probability mass is atomless,
as well as Fmk (p). Let zk denote the probability that an isolated shop sets a price r
i
k.
Proposition 4.4.2 summarizes.
Proposition 4.4.2 In any equilibrium, 0 < F ik(r
m
k ) < 1 and for p < r
m
k F
i
k(p) is atomless.
F ik(p) is constant for r
m
k ≤ p < rik and has an atom at p = rik. Moreover, in equilibrium
Fmk (p) is atomless and p
m
k = r
m
k .
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The intuition behind Fmk (p) is fairly standard: shops in a mall randomize over prices
to balance the effects of the shoppers and the non-shoppers. F ik(p) has a non-standard
shape, with an atom at pik and a gap below p
i
k. Moreover, p
i
k > p
m
k and the difference
between the two maximum prices is exactly ct. The maximum prices differ because of
the search costs. Once a non-shopper is in the mall he can search at a relatively low
cost ce while if a non-shopper is in an isolated shop, continuing search will cost ce + ct.
Consequently, an isolated shop has more power over the non-shoppers, which leads to
a maximum price that is higher by exactly the difference in search costs. Despite the
higher maximum price, non-shoppers are willing to search in isolated shops. This is
because isolated shops randomize over the high maximum price and much lower prices.
In this way isolated shops balance the effects of shoppers and non-shoppers. Note that
the difference in maximum price and the other prices is at least ct. Balancing the effects
of shoppers and non-shoppers therefore only is possible when the fraction of non-shoppers
who decide to search in an isolated shop, 1− xk, is relatively low, making the fraction of
shoppers more important for the shop. The next Proposition addresses this.
Proposition 4.4.3 In any equilibrium, piik < pi
m
k and
1−xk
n−k <
xk
k
or, equivalently, xk >
k
n
.
The main intuition behind this result is as argued above. When the isolated shops
have expected profits at or above the expected profits of shops in the mall then the frac-
tion of non-shoppers that isolated shops attract, 1 − xk, necessarily is relatively high7.
The proof of Proposition 4.4.3 shows that when 1−xk is that high an isolated shop makes
more profit from setting a price rik than from setting a lower price. A situation where
isolated shops ask a price rik for sure however cannot be an equilibrium situation, since in
that case consumers prefer to search in the mall and xk would be 1.
The same line of thought can be used when thinking about the minimum prices. When
an isolated shop sets a price pi
k
it competes with the mall for the shoppers. To make sure
that setting this minimum price is as profitable as setting price rik 1 − xk should be
relatively small, but also the probability of attracting the shoppers when setting price pi
k
should be high. To give an extreme example, if pi
k
= pmk , the probability of selling to the
shoppers would be zero and profits from a price pi
k
are below the profits from a price rik.
To make sure that the probability of attracting the shoppers is high enough, pi
k
cannot
be much higher than pm
k
. In fact, it can be proven that in equilibrium pi
k
≤ pm
k
.
Proposition 4.4.4 In any equilibrium, pi
k
≤ pm
k
.
4.4.2 One specific equilibrium
In the remainder of this section I will derive one specific equilibrium. Expressions (4.4.1)
and (4.4.1) show that in general both piik(p) and pi
m
k (p) depend on both F
i
k(p) and F
m
k (p)
and this makes a general analysis very difficult. When however the isolated shops either
set a price below pm
k
or set a price at rik, pi
i
k(p) only depends on F
i
k(p) and pi
m
k (p) only
7Note that it need not be the case that 1−xkn−k ≥ xkk , but xk should be such that rik 1−xkn−k ≥ rmk xkk .
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depends on Fmk (p). In this case closed form expressions for F
i
k(p) and F
m
k (p) can be
derived and therefore this section focusses on an equilibrium where the isolated shops
either set a price below pm
k
or set a price at rik.
8 Note that this is also consistent with
Propositions 4.4.2 and 4.4.4.
As before, there is a full search equilibrium with µk = 1 and r
i
k < θ and there is a
partial search equilibrium with 0 < µk < 1 and r
i
k = θ. In the full search equilibrium
pimk = r
m
k (1− γ)xkk and equating pimk (p) with pimk gives
Fmk (p) = 1− [
(rmk − p)(1− γ)xkk
γp(zk)n−k
]
1
k−1
with
pm
k
= rmk
(1− γ)xk
k
γ(zk)n−k + (1− γ)xkk
.
Isolated shops expect profits equal to piik = r
i
k(1−γ)1−xkn−k and equating this with piik(p)
gives that for p ≤ pm
k
F ik(p) = 1− [
(rik − p)(1− γ)1−xkn−k
γp
]
1
n−k−1
with
pi
k
= rik
(1− γ)1−xk
n−k
γ + (1− γ)1−xk
n−k
.
The maximum prices rmk and r
i
k are defined by∫ rmk
pm
k
(rmk − p)dFmk (p) = ce
and ∫ rik
pi
k
(rik − p)dF ik(p) = ce + ct.
Plugging in the expressions for Fmk (p) and F
i
k(p) and rewriting (details are in the
appendix to this chapter) gives
rmk =
ce∫ 1
0
1− 1
1+ γ
1−γ (zk)
n−k k
xk
yk−1dy
8Note that such an equilibrium cannot hold when k = n− 1. Since in that case the isolated shop has
no isolated competitors it will never set a price below pm
k
. Moreover, an equilibrium where the isolated
shop randomizes between a price of pm
k
and a price of rik is not possible since mall shops then have an
incentive to deviate to a price slightly below pm
k
. More in general, it can be shown that when k = n− 1
the supports of F ik(p) and F
m
k (p) overlap, pi
i
k(p) depends on F
m
k (p) and pi
m
k (p) depends on both F
m
k (p)
and F ik(p), which makes an analysis very difficult.
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and
rik =
ce + ct∫ 1
zk
1− 1
1+ γ
1−γ
n−k
1−xk
yn−k−1
dy
.
The probability that an isolated shop sets a price equal to rik, zk, is implicitly defined
by zk = 1−F ik(pmk ). Moreover, as Proposition 4.4.1 shows, rik = rmk + ct. These two equal-
ities together define xk and zk. Unfortunately, it is impossible to solve explicitly for xk
and zk, and in the next section I will use computer simulations to obtain numerical values.
The full search equilibrium can only hold when rik < θ (see the optimal consumer
behavior) and no shop has an incentive to deviate. Using the expressions for Fmk (p) and
F ik(p) given above it can be shown that an isolated shop never has an incentive to de-
viate from F ik(p). For a shop in the mall it is clear that deviation to a price above r
m
k
is never profitable. Deviating to a price below pi
k
is also not profitable, but deviating
to a price between pi
k
and pm
k
could be profitable. In that case deviating gives profits
pimk (p) = γp(1−F ik(p))n−k+(1− γ)xkk p. Plugging in F ik(p) and twice differentiating shows
that the second derivative is positive. This implies that the maximum value of pimk (p)
is obtained either at p = pi
k
or at p = pm
k
. Deviating is not profitable if and only if
pimk (p
m
k
) ≥ pimk (pik), or rmk xkk (γ + (1− γ)1−xkn−k ) ≥ rik 1−xkn−k (γ + (1− γ)xkk ).
Using the same method as before one can derive that in a partial search equilibrium
for p ≤ rmk
Fmk (p) = 1− [
(rmk − p)(1− γ)µk xkk
γp(zk)n−k
]
1
k−1
with
pm
k
= rmk
(1− γ)xk
k
µk
γ(zk)n−k + (1− γ)xkk µk
and that for p ≤ pm
k
F ik(p) = 1− [
(rik − p)(1− γ)1−xkn−k µk
γp
]
1
n−k−1
with
pi
k
= rik
(1− γ)1−xk
n−k µk
γ + (1− γ)1−xk
n−k µk
.
Since this is a partial search equilibrium, rik = θ and r
m
k = θ−ct. The three parameters
xk, zk and µk are jointly defined by zk = 1−F ik(pmk ), rmk =
∫ θ−ct
pm
k
pdFmk (p)+ce = θ−ct and
rik =
∫ θ
pi
k
pdF ik(p) + ct + ce = θ. Again, solving explicitly for xk, zk and µk is not possible
and I will resort to simulations.
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An analysis similar to the one for the full search equilibrium shows that deviating
is never profitable for isolated shops and that mall shops will not deviate if and only if
rmk
xk
k
(γ + (1− γ)1−xk
n−k µk) ≥ rik 1−xkn−k (γ + (1− γ)xkk µk).
4.5 Location choice
In this section I will use computer simulations to analyze the equilibrium that has been
derived in Section 4.4.2. With these simulations also the location choice game will be
analyzed. Let β be such that ct = β(ct+ ce), or ct =
β
1−β ce. The system of equations that
defines xk and zk in the full search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2 only depends on β, and
not on ct and ce. This implies that for a given β in the full search equilibrium of Section
4.4.2 xk and zk are constant and r
m
k , r
i
k, pi
m
k and pi
i
k are linear in ce + ct. Note that the
full search equilibrium only holds when rik < θ, or ct + ce small enough. The value of r
i
k
depends on k, but if ct + ce is chosen small enough the full search equilibrium holds for
all k with 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2. Moreover, when ct + ce is chosen small enough the full search
equilibrium also holds in the model where all shops are located in the same mall and in
the model where all shops are located separately. Therefore, when ct+ ce is small enough,
the profits in the different models are all linear in ct+ce and can be easily compared. This
is what I will do in the first part of this section. Recall that in Section 4.3 µ1, µn and the
value of ct + ce where the full search equilibrium changes in a partial search equilibrium
(the inflection value) played an important role in the comparison of the profits in the two
extreme cases. In the comparison of profits in the first part of this section µk and the
inflection value do not play any role. The fraction of non-shoppers visiting the mall, xk
k
,
and the reservation prices rmk and r
i
k are the only determinants of the relative profits. The
effects of µk and the inflection value will be discussed later in this section, when I also
consider the partial search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 give the expected profits for several values of γ, β, n and k.
For ease of notation, the profits are given relative to ct + ce. Note that the profits of
mall shops and isolated shops can only be given for k ≤ n − 2 since for k = n − 1 the
analysis of Section 4.4 does not hold. Moreover, the equilibrium that has been derived
in the previous section does not always hold. When the equilibrium does not hold this is
denoted by ’na’. The tables show that for several parameter values pi1 > pi
m
2 . This implies
that, starting from a situation with only isolated shops, if a shop would get the option to
join a competitor the shop would choose not to do so, and the situation without a mall
is an equilibrium. Starting from a situation where there is a mall with two shops two
things can happen. First, if one of the mall shops gets the option to relocate it would do
so, since pi1 > pi
m
2 . This would lead to an equilibrium situation with only isolated shops.
Second, if one of the isolated shops gets the option to join the mall it would do so, since
pim3 > pi
i
2. Note that for k ≥ 2 pimk+1 > piik and therefore in subsequent periods mall shops
would never want to leave the mall. Isolated shops however would prefer to join the mall
and this would result in an equilibrium where the mall attracts all the shops, at least until
the equilibrium from Section 4.4.2 no longer holds. When the initial situation has a mall
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Table 4.1: Expected profits in the full search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2 for different
values of n, β and k, with γ = 0.05 and θ = 1.
n=5 n=7 n=10
β = 0.8 β = 0.9 β = 0.6 β = 0.9 β = 0.7 β = 0.8 β = 0.9
pi1 4.12 4.12 3.07 3.07 2.27 2.27 2.27
pim2 2.91 2.54 2.75 3.03 2.44 2.92 3.36
pii2 2.07 1.37 2.39 0.97 1.70 1.38 0.87
pim3 na 1.70 na 1.95 2.03 2.13 2.21
pii3 na 1.07 na 0.91 1.59 1.30 0.83
pim4 na 1.38 1.71 1.55 1.62
pii4 na 0.84 1.51 1.28 0.78
pim5 na na na 1.36 1.36
pii5 na na na 1.16 0.67
pim6 na na 1.03
pii6 na na 0.65
pim7 na na 0.76
pii7 na na 0.62
pim8 na na na
pii8 na na na
with three or more shops it is clear from the analysis above that again the mall attracts all
the shops, at least until the equilibrium from Section 4.4.2 no longer holds. Thus, when
pi1 > pi
m
2 the simulations suggest that there are two equilibria possible, depending on the
initial situation and on which type of shop gets the option to relocate. As the tables show,
there are also parameter values for which pi1 < pi
m
2 . In this case, starting from a situation
where there are only isolated shops, a shop that gets the option to join a competitor would
do so, and they would form a mall with 2 shops. Note that again for k ≥ 2 pimk+1 > piik
and therefore in subsequent periods mall shops will stay in the mall and isolated shops
will join the mall, at least until the equilibrium from Section 4.4.2 no longer holds. It is
clear that the same thing happens when the initial situation has a mall with two or more
shops. Thus, when pi1 < pi
m
2 the simulations suggest that only one equilibrium is possible,
where the mall attracts all the shops, at least until the equilibrium from Section 4.4.2 no
longer holds. Note that this final equilibrium gives lower profits than the situation where
there is no mall. What drives the result is that for a small mall the mall shops have higher
profits than when there is no mall at all. Once there is a mall, joining is profitable for
isolated shops since shops in the mall attract more non-shoppers than isolated shops and
this effect is stronger than the decrease in prices. This increase in mall size is however
decreasing the profits of the existing mall shops. Every time an isolated shop joins the
mall the mall prices decrease. In addition, as more extensive simulations show, every time
an isolated shop joins the mall the fraction of non-shoppers per mall shop, xk
k
decreases.
The analysis above suggests that there are two possible outcomes in the location choice
game. There either is no mall at all or there is a mall with at least k∗ shops9, where k∗
9If piik∗ > pi
m
k∗+1 then a mall with k
∗ shops is an equilibrium. Now suppose piik∗ < pi
m
k∗+1. If pi
i
k∗+1 >
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Table 4.2: Expected profits in the full search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2 for different
values of n, β and k, with γ = 0.1 and θ = 1.
n=5 n=7 n=10 n=15
β = 0.8 β = 0.6 β = 0.9 β = 0.7 β = 0.9 β = 0.6 β = 0.8
pi1 2.09 1.60 1.60 1.23 1.23 0.93 0.93
pim2 1.45 1.40 1.73 1.37 1.80 1.09 1.23
pii2 1.11 1.27 0.52 0.92 0.52 0.81 0.70
pim3 na na 1.03 1.08 1.20 0.92 1.00
pii3 na na 0.52 0.88 0.49 0.79 0.66
pim4 na 0.71 0.90 0.88 0.82 0.85
pii4 na 0.49 0.84 0.46 0.77 0.63
pim5 na na na 0.66 na 0.75
pii5 na na na 0.43 na 0.59
pim6 na 0.53 na 0.65
pii6 na 0.39 na 0.57
pim7 na na na 0.60
pii7 na na na 0.52
pim8 na na na 0.53
pii8 na na na 0.50
pim9 na na
pii9 na na
Table 4.3: Expected profits in the full search equilibrium of section 4.4.2 for different
values of n, β and k, with γ = 0.25 and θ = 1.
n=5 n=7 n=10
β = 0.8 β = 0.9 β = 0.7 β = 0.9 β = 0.6 β = 0.7 β = 0.9
pi1 0.81 0.81 0.66 0.66 0.53 0.53 0.53
pim2 0.72 0.52 0.55 0.62 0.51 0.54 0.73
pii2 0.42 0.30 0.49 0.29 0.46 0.42 0.27
pim3 na na na 0.39 na 0.44 0.50
pii3 na na na 0.27 na 0.40 0.25
pim4 na na na na 0.36
pii4 na na na na 0.24
pim5 na na na na 0.29
pii5 na na na na 0.21
pim6 na na na
pii6 na na na
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is the maximum number of mall shops for which the equilibrium of Section 4.4.2 holds.
Which of the two possible outcomes is obtained depends on the initial situation and on
whether pi1 > pi
m
2 or pi1 < pi
m
2 . When comparing pi1 and pi
m
2 there are two forces at work.
First, when two shops are located in the mall the expected prices will be lower, which
lowers the expected profits. But at the same time the shops in the mall will attract more
searching non-shoppers: xk
k
instead of 1
n
. The relative strength of these two effects de-
pends on the values of β, n and γ. The tables suggest that for small values of n the pricing
effect is larger while for large values of n the sales effect is larger. Similarly, for small
values of β the pricing effect outweighs the sales effect, while for large values of β the
sales effect is larger. The mechanism behind the influence of n is difficult to investigate
since both pi1 and pi
m
2 depend on n. The mechanism behind the influence of β is however
quite intuitive. Recall that pi1 only depends on ct + ce and not on ct or ce. Therefore, pi1
is constant in β and β only influences pim2 . When β increases and ct + ce is kept constant
ct increases relative to ce. A relatively low value of ce increases competition inside the
mall and leads to lower prices. At the same time, the difference between mall prices and
isolated prices, which is ct, increases. This makes the mall more attractive to visit than
an isolated shop, and the fraction of non-shoppers that a mall shop attracts, xk
k
, increases.
Thus, an increase in β leads to a decrease in prices and an increase in sales for mall shops.
As the table shows, sales increase faster than prices decrease, and pim2 increases in β.
10
Another observation from the tables and from more extensive simulations is that the
equilibrium of Section 4.4.2 does not exist for γ high, β low or k high. Recall from the
previous section that mall shops can have an incentive to deviate to a price pi
k
< pm
k
since
in that way they are sure to capture all the shoppers. This deviation is only profitable
when a relatively large part of the sales of the shops in the mall will come from the shop-
pers. This happens when γ is high, explaining why the equilibrium can not hold for high
values of γ. As observed before, when β is low the sales to non-shoppers, as determined
by xk
k
, are relatively low and again a relatively large part of the sales of the shops in the
mall will come from the shoppers. Therefore the equilibrium does not exist for low values
of β. More extensive simulations than those reported in the tables show that xk
k
decreases
in k. Therefore a high value of k again increases the relative share of the shoppers and
leads to deviations.
Thus far, I have looked at the full search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2. In the remainder
of this section I will also look at the partial search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2. This
equilibrium type is more complicated to analyze, since the fraction of active non-shoppers
visiting the mall, xk, and the probability that an isolated shop sets a price r
i
k, zk, now
not only depend on β, but also on ct and ce. Therefore, instead of tables, I will give
several plots of expected profits as a function of ct + ce. Simulations show that the plots
pimk∗+2 then a mall with k
∗ + 1 shops is an equilibrium. If piik∗+1 < pi
m
k∗+2 and pi
i
k∗+2 > pi
m
k∗+3 then a mall
with k∗ + 2 shops is an equilibrium. This can be continued until a mall with k∗ + h shops is found to be
an equilibrium or piin−1 < pi
m
n , in which case a mall with n shops is an equilibrium.
10Exactly the same mechanism explains the effect of β on pimk for k > 2. Note however from the table
that for k > 2 it could be that pimk decreases in β. In that case prices decrease faster in β than sales
increase in β.
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Figure 4.4: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops are located
separately, when all shops are located in the same shopping mall and when there is a mall
of two shops.
of the combined full and partial search equilibrium with 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 have the same
pattern as in the extreme cases analyzed in Section 4.3. Again, there is a value of ct+ ce,
called the inflection value, such that for ct+ce below this value the full search equilibrium
holds and above this value the partial search equilibrium holds. The fraction of searching
non-shoppers, µk, is decreasing in ct + ce and as a consequence the profits in the partial
search equilibrium decrease in ct + ce.
Recall that the equilibrium derived in Section 4.4.2 does not always hold, since for
some parameter values the mall shops have an incentive to deviate to a price pi
k
< pm
k
.
This incentive is larger when the fraction of shoppers is more important. The simulations
suggest that if for some parameter values the full search equilibrium does not hold, also
the partial search equilibrium does not hold. But as the plots in this section show, the
existence of the full search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2 is however no guarantee that the
partial search equilibrium of Section 4.4.2 holds for all values of ct + ce above the inflec-
tion value. This is caused by µk. In a partial search equilibrium µk decreases in ct + ce,
decreasing the fraction of active non-shoppers and increasing the importance of the shop-
pers. When ct + ce is large enough, and consequently µk is low enough, the shoppers are
important enough to make deviation to pi
k
profitable for the mall shops, even when the
full search equilibrium (with µk = 1) does hold.
Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the expected profits for several values of k. In these
figures γ is set at 0.05, n = 5, β = 0.9 and θ = 1. Figure 4.4 depicts pi1, pi
m
2 and pi
i
2 and
figure 4.5 depicts pii2, pi
m
3 and pi
i
3. A first observation is that the inflection point shifts to
the right when k increases. This is intuitively clear. Expected prices will be lower when
86 Clusters of shops in a consumer search model
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
c
e
+ct
pr
of
its
pi2
i
pi3
m
pi3
i
Figure 4.5: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when there is a mall of two
shops and when there is a mall of three shops.
more shops are located in the mall.11 Therefore, when more shops are located in the mall
more non-shoppers will be tempted to search, shifting the inflection point to the right. A
consequence of this is that for k ≥ 2 µk ≥ µk−1. Comparing pi1 and pim2 there are three
regions of interest. As in Section 4.3, there is a region of low search costs where there is
a full search equilibrium for both k = 1 and k = 2, there is a region of high search costs
where there is a partial search equilibrium for both k = 1 and k = 2 and there is a region
of intermediate search costs where for k = 1 there is a partial search equilibrium while
for k = 2 there is a full search equilibrium. The region with low search costs has been
analyzed in the first part of this section. In the region with intermediate search costs pi1 is
decreasing in the search costs while pim2 is increasing in search costs. Note that the decrease
in pi1 is caused by the decrease in µ1. When k = 2 there is a full search equilibrium and the
increase in pim2 is caused by an increase in prices. For search costs equal to the inflection
value for k = 2, that is, for the maximum value of search costs such that for k = 2 a full
search equilibrium exists, pim2 > pi1. In the region with high search costs pi
m
2 > pi1. There
are three effects that together explain why pim2 > pi1. Two effects also played a role when
comparing the full search equilibria: when k = 2 the prices are lower but the fraction of
active non-shoppers visiting the mall (xk
k
) is above 1
n
. When comparing the full search
equilibria the pricing effect is stronger than the sales effect. But when comparing the
partial search equilibria the fraction of active non-shoppers, µk, also plays a role. Since
µ2 > µ1 the effect of this fraction of active non-shoppers enforces the positive effect of the
fraction of active non-shoppers visiting the mall and the combined positive effect on sales
can outweigh the negative effect of lower prices. When this happens, a situation with
only isolated shops cannot be an equilibrium. If such a situation occurs and one of the
isolated shops would get the opportunity to join a competitor the isolated shop would do
11Simulations not reported here show that also the inflection point for k = 3 is to the left of the
inflection point for k = 5
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Figure 4.6: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when there is a mall of three
shops, when all shops are isolated and when all shops are in the same mall.
so. Note that also the remaining isolated shops can profit from the formation of a mall.
The formation of a mall leads to lower prices and a loss of active non-shoppers visiting
an isolated shop (1−xk
n−k <
1
n
) but also to an increase in active non-shoppers and this can
offset the previous two effects.
To save space only the plots for γ = 0.05, n = 5, β = 0.9 and θ = 1 are included in
this paper. Plots for other parameter values show the same pattern. When the search
costs ct + ce are high enough, pi1 < pi
m
2 and a situation with only isolated shops cannot
be an equilibrium. Recall from the tables in the first part of this section that for some
parameter values pi1 < pi
m
2 in the full search equilibrium. In the plots for these parameter
values pi1 < pi
m
2 for all values of ct + ce and a situation with only isolated shops can never
be an equilibrium.
To complete the analysis, Figure 4.5 depicts pii2, pi
m
3 and pi
i
3. The figure shows that
for all values of ct + ce pi
m
3 is above pi
i
2 and therefore shops have an incentive to join the
mall. For an isolated shop joining the mall means lower prices but a larger fraction of
active non-shoppers visiting the shop (xk+1
k
instead of 1−xk
n−k ) and for high enough search
costs it also means a higher fraction of active non-shoppers (µk+1 > µk). Note that for
low search costs the remaining isolated shops lose profits when one isolated shop joins
the mall because of the lower prices. For high search costs the remaining isolated shops
however again profit from the increase in µk. Plots for other parameter values show ex-
actly the same pattern and if relevant also show that piik < pi
m
k+1 for k > 2. This suggests
that the location choice game has exactly the same outcome as in the first part of this
section. An equilibrium either has only isolated shops or has a mall with at least k∗ shops,
where k∗ is the maximum number of mall shops for which the equilibrium of Section 4.4.2
holds. Which equilibrium holds depends on whether pi1 < pi
m
2 or pi1 > pi
m
2 and on the
initial situation. Note that in the simulations for high enough search costs pi1 < pi
m
2 and
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therefore for high enough search costs the only possible equilibrium is an equilibrium with
a mall with at least k∗ shops. Figure 4.6 compares the profits when k = 3 with the profits
when all shops are isolated. Recall that in the analysis in the first part of the paper
an equilibrium with a mall with at least k∗ shops in the end makes all shops worse off
than when all shops would be isolated. This is not necessarily the case when search costs
are high enough. As the figure shows, for high enough search costs pim3 > pi1 and even
pii3 > pi1. This is again caused by the fraction of searching non-shoppers, µk. Apparently
the difference between µ3 and µ1 is high enough to offset the negative pricing effect of
a mall and even the negative effect of the fraction of active non-shoppers who visit an
isolated shop, 1−xk
n−k .
4.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the incentives of a shop to locate together with similar shops in a
shopping mall. As in a standard sequential consumer search model, the consumers incur
costs when entering a shop, independent of where the shop is located. Consumers also
incur travel costs when traveling between shops that are not in the same mall, a novel
feature in a sequential search setting. The addition of travel costs implies that searching
in a shopping mall is more attractive than searching isolated shops. This has several
implications for the profitability of shops. First, the lower search costs in a shopping
mall reduce the prices. Second, because mall prices are lower, the shopping mall attracts
more consumers than the isolated shops. And, third, because the existence of a shopping
mall leads to lower prices, the fraction of active consumers is increasing in the size of the
shopping mall.
Simulations suggest that because of the positive second and third effect a shopping
mall always is an equilibrium outcome of the location choice game analyzed in this paper.
If a shop would leave the shopping mall the drop in sales would be so large that profits
would decrease. This shopping mall equilibrium is, however, not necessarily the unique
equilibrium. When the search costs are low enough simulations show that an equilibrium
with only isolated shops can exist. For low enough search costs the third effect is absent
since for low enough search costs all consumers are active, independent of the size of
the shopping mall. The second effect alone is not always strong enough to counter the
negative pricing effect and in this case an equilibrium exists with only isolated shops.
Even in this case however an equilibrium with a shopping mall of at least three shops
exists. The reason for this is that the second effect is stronger when a mall already exists
than when an isolated shop joins another isolated shop to form a mall with two shops.
When all shops are isolated the consumers divide evenly over the shops and the increase
in sales when forming a mall with two shops is not as high as when an isolated shop with
less than an even share of consumers joins an existing mall.
An interesting feature of the equilibria in this model is that the profits of mall shops
are always above the profits of isolated shops. This has two causes. First, as mentioned
before, mall shops attract more consumers than isolated shops. Second, even though
isolated shops can set prices above the mall prices, the increase in prices is limited since
Conclusion 89
if isolated shops would set a price that is too high all consumers would go to the mall.
Consumers in an isolated shop are willing to buy at a slightly higher price since to continue
search they not only incur the entering costs from the standard model but also the travel
costs. When the price difference between mall shops and isolated shops is however above
the travel costs consumers in an isolated shop continue their search in the mall. An
interesting simulation result is that isolated shops not necessarily loose profits when a
mall is formed. Even though isolated shops loose customers who go to the mall, the
fraction of active consumers increases and the isolated shops get some share of these
consumers. When the search costs are high enough the increase in active consumers is
high enough to offset the decrease in sales caused by consumers visiting the mall instead
of an isolated shop.
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4.A Proofs of Section 4.3
4.A.1 Proof of Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2
To prove Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 first note that in an equilibrium where some non-shoppers
search a shop will never ask a price above θ. If a shop would ask a price above θ it would not
make any sales and profits would be 0. Asking a price ct+ce however prevents non-shoppers from
searching further and guarantees a strictly positive profit. This implies that if a non-shopper is
in a shop he can always obtain a non-negative utility by buying from this shop.
To prove the optimality of the consumer behavior stated in the Propositions an induction
argument will be used. Consider a non-shopper who expects the shops to price according to
some price distribution F1(p) with p ≤ min(θ, r1), where r1 is defined by∫ r1
p
(r1 − p)dF1(p) = ce + ct.
Denote by p∗ the price the non-shopper found in his last search and denote by pmin the minimum
price he found in previous searches, with pmin infinite when there are no previous searches. Let
q denote min(p∗+ ct, pmin+ ct). If the non-shopper has already searched n− 1 shops the utility
from buying is θ−min(p∗, pmin + ct). If the non-shopper decides to search the nth shop as well
and he finds a price below q he will buy in the nth shop. Else he will return to a previously
visited shop. The expected utility from searching is given by
U(search) = −ct − ce +
∫ q
p
1
(θ − p)dF1(p) + (1− F1(q))(θ − q).
Note that the utility above holds even when q > θ. For p > θ F1(p) = 1 and therefore when
q > θ the utility above reduces to −ct − ce +
∫ θ
p
1
(θ − p)dF1(p), which is exactly the expected
utility of search in case q > θ. The utility from searching can be rewritten as
U(search) = −ct − ce + θ − q +
∫ q
p
1
(q − p)dF1(p).
If min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1 it must be that q > r1. Using that p ≤ r1,
∫ q
p
1
(q − p)dF1(p) =∫ r1
p
1
(q − p)dF1(p) = q − r1 +
∫ r1
p
1
(r1 − p)dF1(p) = q − r1 + ct + ce. This gives that the utility
of searching equals θ − r1 and since the utility of buying immediately is θ −min(p∗, pmin + ct)
searching is profitable for min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1.
If min(p∗, pmin+ct) ≤ r1 both q > r1 and q ≤ r1 are possible. For q > r1 the utility of search
equals θ − r1 (see previous paragraph) and U(buy) ≥ θ − r1. Search therefore is not profitable.
For q ≤ r1,
∫ q
p
1
(q − p)dF1(p) < ct + ce and U(search) < θ − q. Since U(buy) ≥ θ − r1 ≥ θ − q
search is not profitable. So for min(p∗, pmin+ ct) ≤ r1 the non-shopper will stop searching while
for min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1 he will continue to search.
This shows that the consumer behavior stated in the Propositions is indeed optimal when a
consumer has searched n−1 shops. Now suppose that he has searched h ≥ 1 shops and that the
stated consumer behavior holds whenever he has searched h+ 1 or more shops. Since the con-
sumer expects p to be at or below r1 the optimal consumer behavior tells him to stop searching
after searching the h+1th shop. Therefore, after searching the hth shop, the consumer expects
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to search only one more shop and the utilities of continuing search and of stopping search are
the same as before. After searching the hth shop the non-shopper will therefore continue his
search if and only if min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1 and the stated consumer behavior also holds in the
case h ≥ 1 shops have been searched.
This leaves the case where no shops have been searched yet. Again, given the optimal
consumer behavior for h ≥ 1, the non-shopper expects to search only once and the utility of
search equals
U(search) = −ct − ce +
∫ min(θ,r1)
p
(θ − p)dF1(p).
When r1 < θ this reduces to −ct − ce +
∫ r1
p (θ − p)dF1(p) = −ct − ce + θ − r1 +
∫ min(θ,r1)
p (r1 −
p)dF1(p) = θ − r1 > 0, so for r1 < θ all non-shoppers will search. When r1 = θ the expression
above can be rewritten as −ct − ce +
∫ r1
p (r1 − p)dF1(p) = 0 and so non-shoppers are indifferent
between searching and staying home.
Before deriving an explicit expression for r1, consider the pricing behavior of shops. First
look at the full search case with r1 < θ. A standard undercutting argument shows that the price
distribution has no atoms. For p ≤ r1 profits are given by
pi1(p) = pγ(1− F1(p))n−1 + p(1− γ) 1
n
Under the assumption p ≤ r1 it must be that p = r1. If p < r1 deviation to a price r1 would be
profitable. This gives that in equilibrium profits equal pi1(r1) = r1(1 − γ) 1n and equating this
with pi1(p) gives
F1(p) = 1− (1− γ
γn
r1 − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
Finally, the minimum price is the price p such that F1(p) = 0. This gives p = r1 1−γγn+1−γ . Note
that deviation to a price below p is not profitable and that deviation to a price above r1 gives
zero profits and therefore is not profitable as well.
Given F1(p) the reservation price r1 can be derived. Rewriting the definition of r1 gives
r1 −
∫ r1
p pdF1(p) = ct + ce. Rewriting F1(p) gives
p =
r1
1 + γn1−γ (1− F1(p))n−1
and therefore ∫ r1
p
pdF1(p) =
∫ 1
0
r1
1 + γn1−γ (1− y)n−1
dy.
This can be rewritten as ∫ r1
p
pdF1(p) =
∫ 1
0
r1
1 + γn1−γ y
n−1dy.
The definition of r1 then finally gives
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r1 =
ct + ce
1− ∫ 10 11+ γn
1−γ y
n−1dy
.
Now look at the partial search case with r1 = θ. A standard undercutting argument shows that
the price distribution has no atoms. For p ≤ r1 profits are given by
pi1(p) = pγ(1− F1(p))n−1 + p(1− γ)µ1
n
It must be that p = r1 = θ. If p < θ deviation to a price θ would be profitable. This gives that
in equilibrium profits equal pi1(θ) = θ(1− γ)µ1n and equating this with pi1(p) gives
F1(p) = 1− ((1− γ)µ1
γn
r1 − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
Finally, the minimum price is the price p such that F1(p) = 0. This gives p = r1
(1−γ)µ1
γn+(1−γ)µ1 .
Note that deviation to a price below p is not profitable.
The condition r1 = θ defines µ1 and the condition 0 < µ1 < 1 defines the parameter region
for which the equilibrium holds. The definition of r1 and r1 = θ gives θ −
∫ θ
p pdF1(p) = ct + ce.
Using the same method as before, this can be rewritten as
θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µ1 y
n−1dy) = ct + ce
or,
h(µ1) =
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µ1 y
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ
,
defining µ1. Note that h(µ1) is increasing in µ1, with h(0) = 0 and h(1) =
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γn
(1−γ)y
n−1dy.
The condition 0 < µ1 < 1 therefore gives
0 <
θ − ct − ce
θ
<
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)y
n−1dy.
Recall that by assumption θ−ct−ce > 0 and so the only relevant part is θ−ct−ceθ <
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γn
(1−γ)y
n−1dy,
or ct + ce > θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γn
(1−γ)y
n−1dy).
4.A.2 Proof of Propositions 4.3.3 and 4.3.4
Once a non-shopper has searched one shop he is in the situation described by Stahl (1989) with
search costs ce and so he will stop searching as soon as he finds a price at or below rn, with rn
defined by ∫ rn
p
(rn − p)dFn(p) = ce.
Stahl (1989) also shows that the maximum price is at or below rn. This implies that non-shoppers
search at most once. The expected utility of the first search therefore is
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−ct − ce +
∫ rn
p
(θ − p)dFn(p).
For rn ≤ θ this can be rewritten as
−ct − ce + θ − rn +
∫ rn
p
(rn − p)dFn(p),
which equals θ−rn−ct. Therefore, for rn < θ−ct all non-shoppers will search and for rn = θ−ct
non-shoppers are indifferent between searching and staying home. For θ− ct < rn ≤ θ searching
clearly is not profitable and for rn > θ
∫ rn
p (θ − p)dFn(p) < ce and so the utility of searching is
strictly negative as well.
In a full search equilibrium rn < θ − ct and the profits for p ≤ rn are given by
pin(p) = p
1− γ
n
+ pγ(1− Fn(p))n−1).
This expression shows that p = rn since else deviation to rn would be profitable. Equilibrium
profits are therefore pin(rn) = rn 1−γn and equating pin(p) and pin(rn) gives
Fn(p) = 1− ((rn − p)(1− γ)
nγp
)
1
n−1
with p
n
= rn 1−γγn+(1−γ) . It is clear that deviation to a price below pn is not profitable. The same
argument as in the proof of Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 finally shows that
rn =
ce
1− ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
.
In a partial search equilibrium rn = θ − ct and a fraction µn of the non-shoppers searches. For
p ≤ rn the profits are
pin(p) = p
µn(1− γ)
n
+ pγ(1− Fn(p))n−1).
This expression shows that pn = rn and equilibrium profits are pin(rn) = rn
µn(1−γ)
n . Equating
pin(p) with pin(rn) gives
Fn(p) = 1− ((rn − p)(1− γ)µn
nγp
)
1
n−1
with p
n
= rn
µn(1−γ)
γn+µn(1−γ) . It is clear that deviating to a price below pn is not profitable. The
fraction of searching non-shoppers, µn, is defined by the condition rn = θ − ct. The same
procedure as in the proof of Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 gives
h(µn) ≡
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µn y
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct .
Finally, because h(µn) is increasing in µn the condition 0 < µn < 1 gives
0 <
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct <
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ1−γny
n−1dy
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where the first part, θ−ct−ceθ−ct > 0, is automatically satisfied because of the assumption θ−ct−ce >
0.
4.A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3.5
For ease of notation, let q denote
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy.
For ct + ce < θ(1 − q) the full search equilibrium holds both when all shops are located
together and when all shops are isolated. Therefore pi1 = 1−γn
ct+ce
1−q >
1−γ
n
ce
1−q = pin.
Next, I show that for ct + ce > θ 1−q1−βq pi1 < pin. In this case the partial search equilibrium
holds both when all shops are located together and when all shops are isolated. Define the
function g(µ) ≡ ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ
n
µ
yn−1dy and note that µ1 is defined by g(µ1) =
θ−ct−ce
θ and that µn is
defined by g(µn) = θ−ct−ceθ−ct . Expected profits are given by pi1 = θµ1
1−γ
n and pin = (θ− ct)µn 1−γn
and therefore pi1 < pin holds if and only if µn > θθ−ctµ1. Using that g(µ) is strictly increasing in
µ this can be rewritten as g(µn) > g( θθ−ctµ1) or
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct >
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ1−γ
n
µ1
θ−ct
θ y
n−1dy.
Since
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ
n
µ1
θ−ct
θ
yn−1
dy = θθ−ct
∫ 1
0
1
θ
θ−ct+
γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy, pi1 < pin if and only if∫ 1
0
1
θ
θ−ct +
γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy <
θ − ct − ce
θ
.
The definition of µ1 gives θ−ct−ceθ =
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1dy and so pi1 < pin if and only if∫ 1
0
1
θ
θ−ct +
γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy <
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy
and this holds always since θθ−ct > 1.
For θ(1 − q) < ct + ce < θ 1−q1−βq a full search equilibrium holds when all shops are located
together. This implies that pin =
(1−β)(ct+ce)
1−q
1−γ
n is linearly increasing in ct+ ce. When all shops
are located separately a partial search equilibrium holds with pi1 = θµ1 1−γn and g(µ1) =
θ−ct−ce
θ .
Since g(µ) is strictly increasing in µ and θ−ct−ceθ decreases in ct+ ce, µ1 decreases in ct+ ce and
therefore pi1 decreases in ct + ce. Since for ct + ce < θ(1 − q) pi1 > pin and for ct + ce > θ 1−q1−βq
pi1 < pin this implies that there exists a unique value c with θ(1−q) < c < θ 1−q1−βq where pi1 = pin,
with pi1 > pin for ct + ce < c and pi1 < pin for ct + ce > c.
4.B Optimal consumer behavior
A first useful result is the following.
Proposition 4.B.1 In equilibrium pimk > 0 and pi
i
k > 0. Consequently, p
m
k ≤ θ and pik ≤ θ.
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Proof
Suppose to the contrary that pimk = 0 and pi
i
k > 0. This implies that p
i
k
> 0 since for pi
k
= 0
piik = pi
i
k(p
i
k
) = 0. If some of the non-shoppers visit the shopping mall in their first search then
for a shop in the mall setting a price ce will prevent the non-shoppers from continuing search,
leading to positive profits, a contradiction. If none of the non-shoppers search in the shopping
mall shops in the mall compete for the shoppers, leading to a maximum price of 0. But then
non-shoppers would prefer to search in the shopping mall, a contradiction.
The case pimk > 0 and pi
i
k = 0 is the same as above, reversing the roles of the shops inside
and outside the mall.
This leaves the case pimk = 0 and pi
i
k = 0. If non-shoppers would search then the shops
attracting some non-shoppers could set a price ce and make a strictly positive profit. If non-
shoppers do not search the firms compete for the shoppers and all set a price 0. But in that
case non-shoppers would find it optimal to search, a contradiction.
Since a price above θ would not lead to any sales, the profits of setting such a price are 0,
which contradicts the fact that in equilibrium profits are strictly positive.
2
Using Proposition 4.B.1 and assuming that pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik the behavior of non-
shoppers can be derived. This behavior depends on the prices found in previous searches and on
whether the consumer currently is in a shop inside the shopping mall or whether he currently
is in a shop outside the shopping mall. First consider the case where the consumer currently is
in the shopping mall and let p˜mk denote the lowest price found on current and previous searches
in the shopping mall. Let p˜ik denote the lowest price found on previous searches outside the
shopping mall, with p˜ik = ∞ when on previous searches no shops outside the mall have been
visited. Note that if the non-shopper decides to stop searching and p˜mk ≤ p˜ik + ct then he will
buy from the cheapest shop in the shopping mall, at price p˜mk (note that p˜
m
k ≤ θ and therefore
buying at p˜mk is a better strategy than not buying at all). If the non-shopper decides to stop
searching and p˜mk > p˜
i
k + ct then he will buy from the cheapest shop outside the shopping mall,
incurring return costs ct and buying at price p˜ik. In the proposition that follows I will use the
term ’buy from the cheapest option’ to denote this behavior.
Proposition 4.B.2 Consider a non-shopper who expects pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik and who cur-
rently is in a shop in the shopping mall.
When rmk ≤ rik (rmk > rik) his optimal behavior is as follows. When min(p˜mk , p˜ik + ct) ≤ rmk
(min(p˜mk , p˜
i
k+ct) ≤ rik) stop search and buy from the cheapest option. When min(p˜mk , p˜ik+ct) > rmk
(min(p˜mk , p˜
i
k+ ct) > r
i
k) search further in (outside) the shopping mall, if possible. If there are no
shops left to search in (outside) the shopping mall and min(p˜mk , p˜
i
k+ ct) ≤ rik (min(p˜mk , p˜ik+ ct) ≤
rmk ) buy from the cheapest option. If there are no shops left to search in (outside) the shopping
mall and min(p˜mk , p˜
i
k + ct) > r
i
k (min(p˜
m
k , p˜
i
k + ct) > r
m
k ) search further outside (in) the shopping
mall, if possible. If there also are no shops left to search outside (in) the shopping mall buy from
the cheapest option.
Now consider the case where the consumer currently is outside the shopping mall and let p˘ik
denote the price found in the current shop. Let p˜ik denote the lowest price found on previous
searches outside the shopping mall, with p˜ik = ∞ when on previous searches no shops outside
the mall have been visited. Let p˜mk denote the lowest price found on previous searches inside
the shopping mall, with p˜mk =∞ when on previous searches no shops inside the mall have been
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visited. Note that if the non-shopper decides to stop searching and to buy and min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k +
ct, p˜
m
k + ct) = p˘
i
k then he will buy from the shop he currently is, at price p˘
i
k. If min(p˘
i
k, p˜
i
k +
ct, p˜
m
k + ct) = p˜
i
k + ct then he will buy from the cheapest shop outside the shopping mall visited
before, incurring return costs ct and buying at price p˜ik. If min(p˘
i
k, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) = p˜
m
k + ct
then he will buy from the cheapest shop inside the shopping mall, incurring return costs ct and
buying at price p˜mk . In the proposition that follows I will use the term ’buy from the cheapest
option’ to denote this behavior.
Proposition 4.B.3 Consider a non-shopper who expects pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik and who cur-
rently is in a shop outside the shopping mall.
When rik ≤ rmk + ct (rik > rmk + ct) his optimal behavior is as follows. When min(p˘ik, p˜ik +
ct, p˜
m
k + ct) ≤ rik (min(p˘ik, p˜ik + ct, p˜mk + ct) ≤ rmk + ct) stop search and buy from the cheapest
option. When min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
i
k (min(p˘
i
k, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
m
k + ct) search further
outside (in) the shopping mall, if possible. If there are no shops left to search outside (in) the
shopping mall and min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) ≤ rmk + ct (min(p˘ik, p˜ik + ct, p˜mk + ct) ≤ rik) buy from
the cheapest option. If there are no shops left to search outside (in) the shopping mall and
min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
m
k + ct (min(p˘
i
k, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
i
k) search further in (outside)
the shopping mall, if possible. If there also are no shops left to search in (outside) the shopping
mall buy from the cheapest option.
Proof
A complete proof of Propositions 4.B.2 and 4.B.3 is available on request. Here I only give a
short sketch of the proof.
Let h denote the number of shops that have not yet been searched, let hm denote the number
of shops in the mall that have not yet been searched and let hi denote the number of isolated
shops that have not yet been searched, with h = hm + hi. The proof uses several induction
arguments. First, it is easy to see that both propositions hold when h = 0. A second step is
to prove that both propositions hold when hm = 1 and hi = 0. Using a standard induction
argument it can then be shown that both propositions also hold for hi = 0 and hm > 1. A
third step is to prove that both propositions also hold when hm = 0 and hi = 1. Again using a
standard induction argument it can then be shown that both propositions also hold for hm = 0
and hi > 1.
These three steps together prove Propositions 4.B.2 and 4.B.3 for some corner cases. These
cases together form the basis of one final induction step. This final step shows the following. If
the propositions hold for h = x− 2 and for h = x− 1 then the propositions also hold for h = x,
with hm ≥ 1 and hi ≥ 1. Since the propositions hold for h = 0 and h = 1, they will also hold
for h > 1, hm ≥ 1 and hi ≥ 1. Note that steps two and three have already shown that the
propositions hold for hm = 0, hi > 1 and for hi = 0, hm > 1.
2
Propositions 4.B.2 and 4.B.3 specify the optimal behavior of non-shoppers when they have
searched at least one shop under the conditions pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik. Proposition 4.B.4 specifies
the optimal behavior of non-shoppers when they have not yet searched any shop.
Proposition 4.B.4 Let shops price according to pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik.
If rik < r
m
k + ct (r
i
k > r
m
k + ct) non-shoppers prefer to first search an isolated shop (shop in
the mall) above first searching a shop in the mall (an isolated shop). If rik < θ (r
m
k + ct < θ) all
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non-shoppers will search, if rik = θ (r
m
k + ct = θ) non-shoppers are indifferent between staying
at home and searching an isolated shop (shop in the mall) and if rik > θ (r
m
k + ct > θ) all
non-shoppers prefer to stay at home.
If rik = r
m
k + ct non-shoppers are indifferent between searching in an isolated shop or in a
shop in the mall. When rik < θ all non-shoppers will search, when r
i
k = θ non-shoppers are
indifferent between searching and staying at home and when rik > θ all non-shoppers prefer to
stay at home.
Proof
First look at the case rik = r
m
k + ct. If a non-shopper would start his search in a shop in the
mall he expects to find a price at or below rmk and as Proposition 4.B.2 shows the non-shopper
thus expects to stop searching after the first search. Expected utility of searching in the mall is
U(mall) = −ct − ce +
∫ rmk
pm
k
(θ − p)dFmk (p),
which can be rewritten as
U(mall) = −ct − ce + θ − rmk +
∫ rmk
pm
k
(rmk − p)dFmk (p) = θ − rmk − ct.
A non-shopper who starts his search in an isolated shop expects to find a price at or below rik
and as Proposition 4.B.3 shows he expects to stop searching after the first search. Expected
utility is
U(isolated) = −ct − ce +
∫ rik
pi
k
(θ − p)dF ik(p),
which can be rewritten as
U(isolated) = −ct − ce + θ − rik +
∫ rik
pi
k
(rik − p)dF ik(p) = θ − rik.
Since rik = r
m
k + ct, U(mall) = U(isolated) and non-shoppers are indifferent between searching
in an isolated shop or in a shop in the mall. When rik < θ U(isolated) > 0 and all non-shoppers
will search. When rik = θ U(isolated) = 0 and non-shoppers are indifferent between searching
and staying at home. When rik > θ U(isolated) < 0 and all non-shoppers prefer to stay at home.
The proof for the cases rik > r
m
k + ct and r
i
k < r
m
k + ct follows the same arguments, but is
mathematically slightly more complicated since non-shoppers sometimes expect to search twice
instead of once. Details are available on request.
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4.C Proofs of Section 4.4
4.C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
Recall that in the model ct + ce < θ and therefore at least some non-shoppers will search. First
assume that rik < r
m
k +ct. Proposition 4.B.4 shows that under this assumption all searching non-
shoppers will first search in an isolated shop. Using Proposition 4.B.3 and using that pik ≤ rik
it is easy to see that the searching non-shoppers will stop searching after their first search and
will buy from the isolated shop they visited. Consequently, shops in the mall will compete for
the shoppers and mall prices will be zero. The definition of rmk in that case gives r
m
k = ce,
a contradiction of the initial assumption that rik < r
m
k + ct. For r
i
k > r
m
k + ct all searching
non-shoppers will first search in the mall, and because pmk ≤ rmk they will stop searching after
their first search and buy from the mall shop they visited. But in that case, using that there
are n− k ≥ 2 isolated shops, the isolated shops would compete for the shoppers, isolated prices
would be zero and rik = ct + ce, a contradiction of r
i
k > r
m
k + ct. The only possibility is that in
equilibrium rik = r
m
k + ct and as Proposition 4.B.4 shows non-shoppers are indifferent between
first searching in the mall or first searching in an isolated shop.
4.C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.4.3
First note that
piik = pi
i
k(p
i
k
) = γpi
k
(1− Fmk (pik))k + (1− γ)
1− xk
n− k p
i
k
µk
and
pimk ≥ pimk (pik) = γpik(1− Fmk (pik))k−1 + (1− γ)
xk
k
pi
k
µk.
Suppose contrary to the proposition that pimk = pi
i
k, implying that r
m
k
xk
k = r
i
k
1−xk
n−k , or, using
Proposition 4.4.1, xkk >
1−xk
n−k . This gives pi
i
k = pi
i
k(p
i
k
) < pimk (p
i
k
) ≤ pimk , a contradiction to the
assumption pimk = pi
i
k.
Now suppose contrary to the proposition that pimk < pi
i
k. Note that pi
m
k < pi
i
k implies pi
i
k(p
i
k
) >
pimk (p
i
k
) and therefore 1−xkn−k >
xk
k . Moreover, pi
m
k = pi
m
k (r
m
k ) ≥ pimk (pik) gives (rmk −pik)(1−γ)
xk
k µk ≥
γpi
k
(1− Fmk (pik))k−1. Combining these two inequalities gives
piik(p
i
k
) ≤ γpi
k
(1− Fmk (pik))k−1 + (1− γ)
1− xk
n− k p
i
k
µk
≤ (rmk − pik)(1− γ)
xk
k
µk + (1− γ)1− xk
n− k p
i
k
µk
< rmk (1− γ)
1− xk
n− k µk
< rik(1− γ)
1− xk
n− k µk = pi
i
k(r
i
k),
a contradiction.
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Since both pimk = pi
i
k and pi
m
k < pi
i
k are not feasible, it should be that pi
m
k > pi
i
k, or
rmk
xk
k > r
i
k
1−xk
n−k . Proposition 4.4.1 then gives that
xk
k >
1−xk
n−k .
4.C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.4.4
Suppose to the contrary that pm
k
< pi
k
. I will show that in that case isolated shops have an
incentive to deviate to a price pm
k
.
For p ≤ pi
k
pimk (p) = γp(1− Fmk (p))k−1 + (1− γ)
xk
k
p.
Proposition 4.4.2 shows that for p ≤ pi
k
there will not be any atoms in Fmk (p). Moreover, for
p ≤ pi
k
a gap in Fmk (p) is not possible. To prove this, suppose F
m
k (p) would be constant for all
prices in (p∗1, p∗2), with p∗2 ≤ pik. Then pimk (p∗1) < pimk (p∗2), a contradiction. If Fmk (p) would be
constant for all prices in (p∗1, p∗2), with p∗2 > pik then pi
m
k (p
∗
1) < pi
m
k (p
i
k
), again a contradiction.
Given that there are no atoms or gaps for p ≤ pi
k
, in equilibrium pimk (p
m
k
) = pimk (p
i
k
). This
gives
1− Fmk (pik) =
[
γpm
k
+ (1− γ)xkk (pmk − pik)
γpi
k
] 1
k−1
.
Note that piik(p
i
k
) = γpi
k
(1− Fmk (pik))k + (1− γ)
1−xk
n−k p
i
k
. Plugging in the expression given above
gives
piik(p
i
k
) = (1− Fmk (pik))(γpmk + (1− γ)
xk
k
(pm
k
− pi
k
)) + (1− γ)1− xk
n− k p
i
k
.
Note that piik(p
m
k
) = γpm
k
+(1− γ)1−xkn−k pmk and that deviation to pmk is profitable when piik(pmk ) >
piik(p
i
k
). This can be rewritten as
γpm
k
+ (1− γ)1− xk
n− k (p
m
k
− pi
k
) > (1− Fmk (pik))(γpmk + (1− γ)
xk
k
(pm
k
− pi
k
)).
I will show that this inequality always holds. First note that 1 − Fmk (pik) ≥ 0 implies that
γpm
k
+ (1− γ)xkk (pmk − pik) ≥ 0.
Now if 0 < 1−Fmk (pik) ≤ 1, (1−Fmk (pik))(γpmk +(1−γ)
xk
k (p
m
k
−pi
k
)) ≤ γpm
k
+(1−γ)xkk (pmk −pik).
Since xkk >
1−xk
n−k (Proposition 4.4.3) and p
m
k
− pi
k
< 0, γpm
k
+ (1− γ)xkk (pmk − pik) < γpmk + (1−
γ)1−xkn−k (p
m
k
− pi
k
). Combining gives (1 − Fmk (pik))(γpmk + (1 − γ)
xk
k (p
m
k
− pi
k
)) < γpm
k
+ (1 −
γ)1−xkn−k (p
m
k
− pi
k
)t.
If 1 − Fmk (pik) = 0, the inequality reduces to γpmk + (1 − γ)
1−xk
n−k (p
m
k
− pi
k
) > 0. Since
γpm
k
+ (1− γ)1−xkn−k (pmk − pik) > γpmk + (1− γ)
xk
k (p
m
k
− pi
k
) ≥ 0 this inequality always holds.
4.C.4 Details on the derivation of the equilibrium of Section
4.4.2
In the full search equilibrium rmk is defined by
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∫ rmk
pm
k
(rmk − p)dFmk (p) = ce.
Rewriting gives
rmk −
∫ rmk
pm
k
pdFmk (p) = ce.
Note that
p =
rmk
1 + γ1−γ (zk)
n−k k
xk
(1− Fmk (p))k−1
.
Therefore, ∫ rmk
pm
k
pdFmk (p) =
∫ 1
0
rmk
1 + γ1−γ (zk)
n−k k
xk
yk−1
dy
and so the definition of rmk gives
rmk −
∫ 1
0
rmk
1 + γ1−γ (zk)
n−k k
xk
yk−1
dy = ce,
or
rmk (
∫ 1
0
1− 1
1 + γ1−γ (zk)
n−k k
xk
yk−1
dy) = ce.
In the full search equilibrium rik is defined by∫ rik
pi
k
(rik − p)dF ik(p) = ce + ct.
Since F ik(p) is constant for r
m
k ≤ p < rik and since for p = rik rik − p = 0 the definition can be
rewritten as ∫ rmk
pi
k
(rik − p)dF ik(p) = ce + ct.
Rewriting gives
rikF
i
k(r
m
k )−
∫ rmk
pi
k
pdF ik(p) = ce + ct,
or, using that F ik(r
m
k ) = 1− zk by definition of zk,
rik(1− zk)−
∫ rmk
pi
k
pdF ik(p) = ce + ct.
Note that
p =
rik
1 + γ1−γ
n−k
1−xk (1− F ik(p))n−k−1
.
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Therefore, ∫ rmk
pi
k
pdF ik(p) =
∫ 1−zk
0
rik
1 + γ1−γ
n−k
1−xk (1− y)n−k−1
dy.
A change of variables gives∫ rmk
pi
k
pdF ik(p) =
∫ 1
zk
rik
1 + γ1−γ
n−k
1−xk y
n−k−1dy.
The definition of rmk now gives
rik(1− zk)−
∫ 1
zk
rik
1 + γ1−γ
n−k
1−xk y
n−k−1dy = ce + ct,
or
rik(
∫ 1
zk
1− 1
1 + γ1−γ
n−k
1−xk y
n−k−1dy) = ce.

Part II
Director ties

Chapter 5
Interlocking boards and firm
performance: evidence from a new
panel database
5.1 Introduction
A director can hold several directorships in different firms. Such a director constitutes
a link between the firms he serves. Firms that are linked in this way are said to be
interlocked. There is much research on interlocks, ranging from a description of what the
network of interlocked firms looks like to studies on the influence of interlocks on firm
strategy and performance. We address this last topic by analyzing a new large and unique
panel data set concerning firms in The Netherlands.
There are several views on the origin and effect of interlocks, see Mizruchi (1996) for
an extensive review. To mention a few views, Dooley (1969) and Mizruchi and Stearns
(1994) have argued that interlocks are a way for firms to coopt and/or monitor each other.
For example, an interlock between a financial institution and a nonfinancial firm enables
the financial institution to monitor the nonfinancial firm and it reduces the risk for the
financial firm to provide capital to the nonfinancial firm. In this view, interlocks would
have a positive effect on firm performance. Another favorable view on interlocks states
that interlocks provide firms with information on business practice (see e.g. Davis, 1991).
For example, a director who encountered a new practice in one of the firms where he
serves could bring this practice to the other firms where he serves as well.
Apart from favorable views on interlocks, there also are some hypotheses on possible
negative effects of interlocks. One of the most well-known views is the busyness hypothesis
of Ferris et al. (2003). This hypothesis states that multiple directorships place an excessive
burden on directors, resulting in bad governance and diminishing firm performance (see
also Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Another explanation of why having many interlocks
could diminish firm performance is that interlocks reflect upper-class cohesion (Useem,
1984). If this is indeed true, the board members of a firm with many interlocks per director
form a cohesive upper-class group. It has been shown (see Janis, 1982, and Mullen et al.,
1994) that cohesive groups perform worse in decision making, as they strive for unanimity
and often suffer from a reduction in independent critical thinking. Moreover, the members
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of a cohesive upper class mostly have the same background and hence such a board is
less diverse, while it is precisely such diversity that has been shown to improve firm
performance (see Carter et al., 2003).
Given these different views, it is not surprising that much empirical research on the
effect of interlocks on performance has been carried out. Results of these studies are mixed,
see for example Bunting (1976), Pennings (1980), Burt (1983), Fligstein and Brantley
(1992), and Phan et al. (2003). Most research is based on US data. We are aware of
only two studies which concern The Netherlands, and these are Meeusen and Cuyvers
(1985) and Van Ees et al. (2003). The first study documents a positive relation between
interlocks within financial firms and their performance. The second study mentions a
negative effect of the percentage share of outsiders on firm performance, where outsiders
are defined as directors who have at least two directorships.
In this chapter we again take up the issue of interlocks and performance by presenting
empirical results based on a newly created large panel database for The Netherlands.
In contrast to previous studies, the database we use constitutes a panel for many years,
instead of the commonly used cross section. Hence, we can also examine the dynamic
effects of interlocks, which, as we will document, are quite prominent. Besides this, a panel
allows us to correct for both firm and time effects, which can be important in explaining
firm performance.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. First, in Section 5.2 we will put forward three
main hypotheses on the effect of interlocks on firm performance in The Netherlands. Next,
in Section 5.3, we give a description of the data. Then in Section 5.4 we will describe the
method we will use to test the hypotheses. The hypothesis testing results are presented
in Section 5.5 and in Section 5.6 we summarize our findings.
5.2 Hypotheses
In the previous section we mentioned some views on the relation between interlocks and
firm performance. In this section we will argue which views are most relevant for The
Netherlands and based on this we will outline our hypotheses.
Practically all of the views that predict a positive effect of interlocks are based on an
information transmission or a monitoring argument. However, as Haunschild and Beck-
man (1998) argue, interlocks are not the only way of information transmission. They show
that alternative information sources, like CEO membership in the Business Roundtable,
reduce the impact of interlocks. In The Netherlands we expect these alternative informa-
tion sources to play an important role. The number of large firms in The Netherlands is
limited and therefore the number of people that serve on the boards of these firms is lim-
ited as well. Furthermore, the boards of Dutch firms currently predominantly consist of
Dutch citizens. These directors seem to form a cohesive group (see Stokman et al., 1988,
and Van Hezewijk, 1986, 1988) and meet each other regularly outside the boardroom in
selective informal meetings.
We propose that not only the effect of interlocks on information transmission is lim-
ited but also that interlocks do not play an important role in monitoring other firms in
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The Netherlands. The reason for this is as mentioned before. Even without interlocks
the Dutch directors form a dense network of friendship ties. We acknowledge that inter-
locks could formalize these relations and make monitoring easier, but in the absence of
interlocks, monitoring could still take place via informal networks.
The views that predict a negative effect of interlocks thus seem to have more relevance
for The Netherlands. The busyness hypothesis seems to have a universal scope. Around
the world articles appear in the popular press about directors attracting many director-
ships and being ’too busy to mind the business’ and The Netherlands is no exception. In
2004 the code Tabaksblat became effective. This is a Dutch corporate governance code
that, among other things, advised to limit the number of directorships to five, with a
chair position counting as double. This code Tabaksblat partly was a reaction to soci-
etal concerns about directors amassing directorships. The upper class cohesion view also
seems to be relevant for The Netherlands. As argued before, the Dutch directors seem to
form a cohesive group, which could hamper decision making.
We are now ready to state our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a) The immediate effect of interlocks between Dutch firms on
firm performance is negative.
Moreover, as we use a panel data set it is possible to look at the lagged effects of
interlocks. One of the important tasks of the board of directors is to make strategic
decisions that have a long-term impact on firm performance. We therefore expect that
there is a lagged effect of interlocks as well. For the same reasons why we expect the
immediate effect of interlocks to be negative we expect the lagged effect to be negative
as well. Furthermore, as the main task of the board of directors is to make long-term
strategic decisions we expect that the effect of interlocks shows off more strongly when
looking at future realized results instead of immediate results. We thus state the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b) The lagged effect of interlocks between Dutch firms on firm
performance is negative and it is stronger than the immediate effect.
Hypotheses 1a and 1b concern the general effect of interlocks. Theory leads us to
suppose that this effect, if existent, will be partly caused by the busyness of directors. We
would like to test this and therefore propose the following four hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a) The fraction of busy directors in the board has a negative
immediate effect on performance.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b) When the fraction of busy directors is taken into account the
immediate effect of interlocks diminishes.
Hypothesis 2c (H2c) The fraction of busy directors in the board has a negative
lagged effect on performance, and this effect is stronger than the immediate effect.
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Hypothesis 2d (H2d) When the fraction of busy directors is taken into account the
lagged effect of interlocks diminishes.
Further, we expect upper class cohesion to play a role in the effect of interlocks in
The Netherlands. We will look at the fraction of upper class directors. The effect of this
fraction of upper class directors however is not likely to be linear. Having one or two
upper class directors in the board increases the diversity of information and expertise in
the board while at the same time the risk of group think does not play a role as long as
the fraction of upper class directors in the board is small. Therefore, for small fractions
of upper class directors we expect their effect to be positive. On the other hand, when
the majority of the board already consists of upper class directors adding an extra upper
class director would not provide much more information. And, at the same time, the risk
of group think increases and diversity will be lacking. So, for high fractions of upper class
directors we expect their effect to be negative. We therefore hypothesize the following
effects.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a) The fraction of upper class directors in the board has a
quadratic immediate effect on performance and the quadratic effect takes the form of
an inverse u.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b) When the fraction of upper class directors is taken into ac-
count the immediate effect of interlocks diminishes.
Hypothesis 3c (H3c) The fraction of upper class directors in the board has a
quadratic lagged effect on performance and the quadratic effect takes the form of an
inverse u. This effect is stronger than the immediate effect.
Hypothesis 3d (H3d) When the fraction of upper class directors is taken into ac-
count the lagged effect of interlocks diminishes.
5.3 A new panel database
In The Netherlands virtually all firms have a two-tier board structure. There is an exec-
utive board, which consists of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a Chief Financial officer
(CFO) and of other executive directors. Additional to this executive board, there also is
a supervisory board. The main task of this board is to monitor the executive board itself
and to monitor the major business decisions taken by the executive board. The super-
visory board largely consists of retired executive directors. Almost all of the interlocks
of a firm are formed by members of the supervisory board who also serve as supervisory
director for other firms. It is not uncommon for a high-profile director to have four or five
supervisory directorships. As interlocks are mainly formed by the supervisory board, we
focus on these directors.
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5.3.1 Defining interlocks
We gathered data on supervisory boards of 101 large, listed, Dutch firms in the period
1994 to 2004, using annual reports and the REACH database. The annual reports give
us, for each firm, the directors in the supervisory board by the end of July in each year.
Using this information, we count the number of interlocks of a firm with other firms in
the database. For example, suppose firm A has two directors, X and Y. X also sits on
the supervisory boards of firms B and C, and Y also sits on the board of firm D. As such,
firm A then has three interlocks. Multiple interlocks are counted as one. Suppose Y is on
the boards of A, D and also B, like X. Then, firm A still has only three interlocks, as the
multiple interlock with firm B is counted as one interlock.
We divide the number of interlocks by the number of directors to correct for the size
of the board1. In our database there are a few firms with very large boards (15 or more
members) as well as firms with smaller (3 or less members) boards. Clearly, large boards
can have much more interlocks than small boards.
Since we expect that the effect of interlocks in The Netherlands is driven by busyness
and upper class cohesion the number of interlocks corrected by board size is a more
relevant measure than the mere number of interlocks. It is clear that a board with 10
interlocks and 3 directors is more busy than a board with 10 interlocks and 7 directors.
In the same vein, the previous board will employ more upper class directors than the
second board. We acknowledge that the number of interlocks without correction for
board size is the best variable to measure the amount of information the firm gets about
its environment. Therefore using the correction for board size could bias our results
towards H1a. To exclude this possibility we did the same analysis as reported below
using the number of interlocks instead of the number of interlocks divided by the size of
the board, and the results are qualitatively the same. In what follows we will therefore
use the term ’interlocks’ for the number of interlocks divided by the size of the board.
Figure 5.1 shows the network of interlocks for the year 1998. For other years the
network looks roughly the same (although of course various little changes occur over
time). We see one giant component of firms that are linked to each other and several
fringe firms that have no links or are only linked to another fringe firm.
Next to a measure of interlocks we need to have a measure of board busyness. For
each director in our database we count his or her number of directorships. In line with
the code Tabaksblat, we define a director as being busy when he has more than four
directorships. The reason not to use five as a threshold is that the number of directors
with more than five directorships is very limited. In addition, we have no information on
chair positions and therefore cannot count these positions twice. Another reason to use
four directorships as a threshold instead of five is that we capture only the 101 largest
firms in The Netherlands. There are of course other firms either in The Netherlands or
abroad that a director could serve, and we do not count these directorships. Furthermore,
some directors are also active in government organizations, like the Dutch central bank.
This information is however not available, and so we can only use the 101 firms in our
dataset. For each firm and year we count the number of supervisory directors in the board,
1In the rare case a firm has no supervisory directors (in one or two cases it happened that the entire
supervisory board steps down by the end of July) we deleted the observation.
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Figure 5.1: Interlock network in 1998. Dots denote firms and lines denote interlocks
between firms.
and the number of these directors who are busy (at least, according to our definition).
Division of these numbers gives the fraction of busy directors in the board.
Concerning upper class membership, we define a director as belonging to the upper
class when he has more than two directorships in the 101 firms in the dataset. The
threshold of two directorships is not based on previous evidence. Therefore, we also
estimated the models using a threshold of one directorship and using a threshold three
directorships, but it turns out that the model based on a threshold of two directorships
gives easily interpretable and partly significant results. Hence, we stick to the threshold
of two directorships.
5.3.2 Performance measures
Additional to information on the supervisory boards, we also gathered data on the per-
formance of the firms during 1994 to 2004 using the REACH database. We gathered data
on stock returns, the price-earnings ratio and the price-to-book ratio, the return on assets
and the return on equity. Furthermore, for each firm we store the BIK codes2 (four-digit
level), the turnover and the growth of the turnover.
Some of the dependent variables (stock returns, the price-earnings ratio and the price-
to-book ratio) show serious skewness and excess kurtosis. To accommodate this, we
transform the stock return by taking the log of (1 + return/100). For the price-earnings
ratio we delete all observations on firms that make losses, as the price-earnings ratio is not
2BIK codes are the Dutch equivalent of SIC codes.
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Table 5.1: Description of BIK codes.
category description number of firms
C oil and mineral mining 1
D manufacturers 43
F construction 6
G trade 12
I transport and communication 8
J financials 12
K provision of services and renting 19
Table 5.2: Statistics per year.
year stock p/e ratio p/b ratio roa roe turnover board size interlock
1994 2.67 11.11 1.53 6.05 7.99 NA 6.18 0.69
1995 7.26 14.14 2.83 11.32 12.18 3.06 5.98 0.70
1996 45.38 17.54 3.61 9.90 22.42 3.34 5.77 0.66
1997 27.56 22.03 4.62 9.83 28.83 3.85 5.64 0.67
1998 1.02 25.82 5.56 10.27 26.09 3.57 5.63 0.79
1999 16.66 29.15 4.52 8.19 21.91 4.18 5.46 0.77
2000 1.65 25.65 3.50 5.91 18.59 5.52 5.59 0.73
2001 -13.97 20.86 2.40 3.73 6.05 5.61 5.60 0.72
2002 -27.72 12.23 1.69 1.12 -3.38 5.66 5.60 0.72
2003 36.32 19.32 2.00 2.84 8.97 5.42 5.49 0.69
2004 21.95 28.54 2.16 5.87 9.26 5.82 5.36 0.60
defined for these firms. We then transform the resulting price-earnings ratios by taking
natural logs. Finally, the price-to-book ratio is also taken in natural logs.
We have the BIK codes of the firms in the sample at the four-digit level. Most firms
have several BIK codes as our database concerns large firms active in several related areas.
For each firm we take the main sector in which it is active and reduce the corresponding
BIK code to the one-digit level. This way, firms are divided in seven different groups,
like finance, transport and communication, industry, and construction. In Table 5.1 these
categories are summarized.
In Table 5.10 in the Appendix we give some statistics for each of the firms in our panel
database. We report the BIK code of the firm and the average values (over the years) of
the untransformed performance measures, the turnover in billions of euros, the board size
and the number of interlocks per director. From this table it is clear that the firms differ
widely on these features.
In Table 5.2 we give statistics per year, now averaged over all 101 firms. The first
column gives the year. Columns 2 to 6 give the average untransformed performance
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Table 5.3: Sample sizes for the five performance measures.
stock return 734
price-earnings ratio 616
price-to-book ratio 722
return on assets 716
return on equity 734
Table 5.4: Summary statistics for each of the performance measure samples.
stock return p/e ratio p/b ratio roa roe
mean -0.018 2.667 0.731 6.047 14.379
dependent s.d. 0.438 0.794 0.859 13.361 31.166
median 0.001 2.550 0.642 7.225 15.735
mean 0.638 0.668 0.638 0.638 0.638
interlock s.d. 0.552 0.560 0.554 0.555 0.551
median 0.500 0.571 0.536 0.500 0.571
mean 5.347 5.665 5.295 5.420 5.400
turnover s.d. 17.140 18.189 17.192 17.336 17.143
median 0.849 0.917 0.821 0.903 0.900
mean 10.527 11.927 10.925 10.427 10.614
growth turnover s.d. 33.980 28.160 33.899 34.267 33.709
median 5.950 8.060 6.210 5.850 5.940
measures in each year. ’Stock’ denotes the percentage growth of the stock price (stock
return), ’p/e ratio’ is the price-earnings ratio (stock price divided by earnings per share),
’p/b ratio’ is the price-to-book ratio (stock price divided by equity per share), ’roa’ denotes
the return on assets (in percentages) and ’roe’ denotes return on equity (in percentages).
The seventh column gives the average turnover in billions of euros. The last two columns
give board characteristics: the size of the board (average number of board members) and
the average number of interlocks per director. For the number of interlocks per director we
exclude all firms that started only after 1994. These firms have somewhat less interlocks
per director and, consequently, when these firms are included the number of interlocks per
director decreases over time. As one can see from the last column of Table 5.2, the number
of interlocks per director does not have a clear upward or downward trend. Interestingly,
the size of the board declines over time, also when the firms that start after 1994 are
excluded. As expected, we see that the average firm performance is lower during 2001
and 2002 and we also note that the turnover increases over time.
For Tables 5.10 and 5.2 we used all available observations for the computations. How-
ever, for the regressions below we need to delete all firm-year observations that have either
a missing value on one of the performance measures or on turnover or growth of turnover.
We also removed some outliers. In Table 5.3 we report the available sample sizes for the
five performance measures. The sample size clearly differs between performance measures.
Methodology 113
In Table 5.4 we give some statistics of the (transformed) data, using the samples of Table
5.3. Each column in Table 5.4 corresponds to the sample of one of the (transformed)
performance measures: the log of (1+ stock return/100), the logs of the price-earnings
and price-to-book ratios, the return on assets (in percentages, no transformation applied)
and the return on equity (in percentages, no transformation applied). The first panel in
Table 5.4 gives the mean, the standard deviation (s.d.) and the median of the (trans-
formed) performance measures itself. The second panel gives the same statistics on the
number of interlocks per director. Panel three gives the same statistics on the turnover
(in billions of euros) and the last panel gives the same statistics on the percentage growth
of the turnover. Note that the columns of the panels concern different sample sizes. From
Table 5.4 one can see that the statistics in panels two, three and four differ only slightly
between the different performance measures.
5.4 Methodology
We have five different financial performance measures and we analyze each of these sep-
arately. For each performance measure we first choose the panel data model that best
fits the data. The (panel data) models we choose from are a fixed effects (FE) model, a
random effects (RE) model and a model based on the BIK codes. We will denote this last
model as the BIK model. We use the AIC for model selection as, in contrast to the BIC,
this criterion yields plausible final models. This AIC-based selected model is used to test
the hypotheses. We will now first give a description of the three panel data models we
choose from.
5.4.1 Models
The FE model is given by
yit = αi + xitβ + γt + εit, (5.1)
with εit iid and normally distributed, yit the dependent variable, where xit collects the
independent variables and γt measures developments over time
3. Note that the constant
αi depends on the firm i. The estimator of β is the within-estimator, as it is based on
differences over time within a firm, and not on differences between firms.
The RE model is written as
yit = α+ xitβ + γt + αi + εit, (5.2)
with both εit and αi iid and normally distributed. Again, yit is the dependent variable,
xit summarizes the independent variables and γt concerns time. Note that here α does
not depend on the firm i. Instead, correlation over time in the data of the same firm is
3Note that γt contains parameters that need to be estimated. Thus we allow for a flexible pattern
over time. This is especially important for stock returns, as our database contains both years of boom
and years of decline of the stock market.
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captured by a random variable αi, which is the same over time for one firm, but potentially
differs across firms. The error term ζit = αi + εit is not iid and normally distributed as
ζit and ζi,t−1 are correlated. The resulting estimator of β is based on differences within a
firm over time as well as on differences between firms.
For the BIK model, let BIKi denote the BIK code of firm i. The BIK model is given
by
yit = αBIKit + xitβ + εit, (5.3)
with εit iid and normally distributed. The idea of including αBIKit is that firms in the
same sector might have the same performance over time. For example, over time the
patterns in stock returns might be the same for firms in the same sector. Note that with
the BIK model we allow for different patterns over time. For instance, the model allows
the performance in sector 1 to increase while at the same time the performance in sector
2 decreases. Note that this is not possible with the time dummies in the FE and RE
models.
5.4.2 Variables
As control variables we include in every regression turnover, squared turnover, turnover
one year lagged, squared turnover one year lagged, growth of turnover (in short: growth),
squared growth, growth one year lagged and squared growth one year lagged. With the
squared variables we allow for a potential nonlinear effect of the control variables on
performance. Note that turnover serves as a measure of the size of the firm.
To test the hypotheses we include several other independent variables. First, to test
H1a we include the number of interlocks corrected for board size. We estimate three
different specifications, one with interlock included linearly, one with interlock included
quadratically and one with only the square root of interlock included. We do this as the
effect of interlock could be nonlinear. For instance, suppose the busyness hypothesis holds
true. In that case one or two interlocks per director will not have that much of a negative
effect since supervisory directors should be able to handle two or three positions. More
interlocks per director however would have a larger negative impact. If H1a holds true
the estimate on interlock would be negative and significant.
To test H1b we estimate the same equations as for H1a, except that interlock is now
included with a one year lag. If H1b holds true the estimate on interlock again would be
negative and significant. Furthermore when the estimates for H1a and H1b are compared
the model fit as measured by AIC should be better for H1b, the estimates should be larger
in size and and the p-values should be lower.
To test H2a - H2d we not only include the number of interlocks corrected for board
size in the equation but also include the fraction of busy directors in the board. We
include this variable in a linear fashion while for comparison we still include interlock in
the three different specifications mentioned before. If H2a holds true the estimate on the
fraction of busy directors is negative and significant. When H2b holds true the estimate
on interlock decreases in size when the fraction of busy directors is included and the p-
value for interlock increases. Furthermore, when the effect of interlocks is indeed caused
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by the busyness of directors the model fit as measured by AIC should improve when the
fraction of busy directors is included.4 After all, the fraction of busy directors is a better
measure of busyness than the number of interlocks, which is just an indirect measure of
busyness. The procedure to test H2c and H2d is similar to the procedure used for H2a
and H2b, except that the variables interlock and fraction of busy directors are now lagged.
To test H3a-H3d we include the number of interlocks corrected for board size in the
equation and also include the fraction of upper class directors in the board. As posed by
H3a and H3c we will include this variable in the model in a quadratic way. For comparison
we again include interlock in the three different specifications mentioned before. If H3a
holds true the estimates on the fraction of upper class directors and the squared fraction
of upper class directors are jointly significant. Furthermore the estimate on the squared
fraction of upper class directors will be negative so that the estimated parabola has an
inverse u form. Furthermore, to test H3b we follow the same procedure as for H2b and to
test H3c and H3d we follow the same procedure as the one to test H3a and H3b except
that the variables interlock and fraction of upper class directors (squared) are now lagged.
Previous research on interlocks and firm performance has mentioned the possibility of
reverse causality. Not only will the number of interlocks influence performance, but good
performing firms could attract more interlocking directors. In the database we use, the
number of interlocks is based on the directorships halfway the year, while performance
is measured over the complete year, and is quite volatile over years. Hence, reverse
causality is unlikely to happen. Moreover, note that all hypotheses concerning lagged
effects completely circumvent the possibility of reverse causality.
5.5 Test results
We start our analysis by choosing for each performance measure the panel data model
(FE, RE or BIK) that best suits the data. To do this we estimate for each performance
measure all equations concerning H1a and H1b using the FE, the RE and the BIK model.
Table 5.5 gives for each combination of performance measure and panel data model the
lowest and highest obtained AIC’s of the six different equations. From the table it becomes
clear that for the stock returns the BIK model provides the best fit, while for all other
performance measures the FE model is preferred. It is not surprising that the BIK model
is favored for stock returns. In the sample there is both a boom (before 2000) and a
decline (after 2000) of stock prices. It is well known that stock prices in some sectors lead
booms and declines, while others sectors follow. Allowing for different patterns over time
for different sectors seems to be reasonable here, and hence the favorable AIC values for
the BIK model. In what follows we only report the estimation results based on the best
fitting panel data model.
In Table 5.6 we report the estimation results concerning H1a and H1b. Each panel
of the table has a different performance measure as the dependent variable in the panel
model. The p-value are reported in parentheses. The column ’model’ denotes which
model is used (FE, RE or BIK model), which transformation of interlock is used (linear,
4The AIC corrects for the number of variables included in the regression and so is a proper measure
to compare two different model specifications
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Table 5.5: AIC’s of the different models.
model lowest AIC highest AIC
FE 1.041 1.052
growth of stock price RE 1.177 1.206
BIK 0.895 0.898
FE 2.057 2.068
price-earnings ratio RE 2.123 2.135
BIK 2.402 2.403
FE 1.265 1.295
price to book ratio RE 1.515 1.542
BIK 2.299 2.310
FE 7.474 7.478
return on assets RE 7.532 7.537
BIK 7.531 7.547
FE 9.428 9.440
return on equity RE 9.458 9.470
BIK 9.639 9.650
quadratic or square root) and whether interlock is lagged. The column ’F-test’ gives the
p-value of the F-test of joint significance of interlock and interlock-squared. In each model
we also included the control variables mentioned in the previous section but estimation
results are not reported to save space.
When looking at the results, we note that the effect of the number of interlocks on
stock returns and the return on assets is not significant, neither for current interlocks
nor for lagged interlocks. For the price-earnings ratio only the non-lagged quadratic
specification gives significant results. The estimates give a parabola of inverse u form
with its top at 0.66 interlocks per director. On the other hand, the effect on the price-
to-book ratio and the return on equity is (partly) significant. For the price-to-book
ratio, all parameters for current interlocks are significant at the 5% or 10% level and
the parameters for lagged interlocks are significant at the 1% level. For return on equity
only the lagged variables are relevant. The significant estimates in the linear and square
root specifications are all negative. The estimated quadratic specification has a U-shape
with minimum at approximately 3.9 interlocks per director for the price-to-book ratio and
an inverted U-shape with maximum at -0.4 interlocks per director for return on equity
(lagged specification). As the number of interlocks per director is a positive variable
with a mean of approximately 0.65 and a standard deviation around 0.55, the significant
quadratic specifications also suggest a negative effect. We note that for the price-to-book
ratio and the return on equity the lagged specification gives a better AIC, while for stock
returns, the price-earnings ratio and the return on assets the evidence is mixed.
Concerning the hypotheses we draw the following conclusions. First, we find limited
support for H1a. This hypothesis is supported by the price-to-book ratio but not by the
other four performance measures. Second, we find somewhat more support for the first
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Table 5.6: Estimation results concerning H1a and H1b.
measure model interlock interlock2 F-test AIC
stock BIK, linear -0.004 (0.888) - - 0.896
BIK, quadr. -0.007 (0.930) 0.002 (0.968) 0.989 0.898
BIK, sq.root 0.000 (0.999) - - 0.896
BIK, linear, lag -0.009 (0.757) - - 0.896
BIK, quadr., lag -0.089 (0.268) 0.048 (0.285) 0.538 0.897
BIK, sq.root, lag -0.016 (0.653) - - 0.895
p/e ratio FE, linear -0.134 (0.200) - - 2.064
FE, quadr. 0.353 (0.137) -0.268 (0.023) 0.033 2.057
FE, sq. root -0.028 (0.839) - - 2.067
FE, linear, lag 0.038 (0.719) - - 2.067
FE, quadr., lag 0.285 (0.227) -0.134 (0.241) 0.471 2.068
FE, sq.root, lag 0.156 (0.257) - - 2.065
p/b ratio FE, linear -0.158 (0.016) - - 1.292
FE, quadr. -0.200 (0.169) 0.025 (0.743) 0.053 1.295
FE, sq. root -0.201 (0.014) - - 1.292
FE, linear, lag -0.311 (0.000) - - 1.265
FE, quadr., lag -0.401 (0.004) 0.053 (0.466) 0.000 1.267
FE, sq.root, lag -0.351 (0.000) - - 1.270
roa FE, linear -1.035 (0.465) - - 7.476
FE, quadr. -0.403 (0.899) -0.365 (0.824) 0.747 7.478
FE, sq. root -1.410 (0.428) - - 7.475
FE, linear, lag -1.033 (0.465) - - 7.476
FE, quadr., lag 3.450 (0.265) -2.572 (0.104) 0.203 7.474
FE, sq.root, lag 0.544 (0.755) - - 7.476
roe FE, linear -4.193 (0.268) - - 9.439
FE, quadr. 2.797 (0.741) -4.033 (0.356) 0.353 9.440
FE, sq. root -2.294 (0.629) - - 9.440
FE, linear, lag -10.483 (0.005) - - 9.428
FE, quadr., lag -3.286 (0.689) -4.145 (0.325) 0.013 9.429
FE, sq.root, lag -9.071 (0.051) - - 9.435
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part of H1b. The lagged effect of interlocks is negative for both the price-to-book ratio
and the return on equity, while it is not significant for the other performance measures.
The second part of H1b is supported as well by the price-to-book ratio and return on
equity. For both performance measures the lagged specification gives a better AIC, lower
p-values and overall stronger effects.
We now turn to the estimation results on H2a-H2d, which are reported in Table 5.7.
We report parameter estimates and p-values on interlock (possibly lagged) and the ratio
of busy directors (possibly lagged), as well as the AIC and for the quadratic models the
p-value of an F-test testing the joint significance of the linear and quadratic term.
The first outcome we note from the table is that almost all estimates on the ratio
of busy directors have the expected negative sign. The estimates are significant in the
non-lagged specification concerning the price-earnings and price-to-book ratios while for
all other specifications and performance measures the estimates are non-significant. H2a
is therefore supported by two out of five performance measures. H2b also is supported by
the price-earnings and price-to-book ratios. When the ratio of busy directors is included
in the model the AIC improves, the estimates on interlock that were significant now turn
insignificant and also the size of the estimates on interlock decreases. We also note that
the size of the estimated effect of busyness on the price-earnings and price-to-book ratios
is economically quite significant. Finally, H2c is not supported by the data. Although the
estimated effect is negative it is not significant for any of the performance measures. As
a consequence, H2d is also not supported.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 give the estimation results on H3a-H3d. Again we report parameter
estimates and p-values, this time on interlock (possibly lagged) and the ratio of upper
class directors (possibly lagged), as well as the AIC and for the quadratic models the p-
value of an F-test testing the joint significance of the linear and quadratic term. Note that
the first column ’F-test’ gives the p-value of the F-test of joint significance of ’interlock’
and ’interlock-squared’ and that the second column ’F-test’ does the same for the ratio
non-upper class. Table 5.8 contains the estimation results on the performance measures
log(stock return/100 + 1), log(price-earnings ratio) and log(price-to-book ratio) and Table
5.9 shows the estimation results on the performance measures return on assets and return
on equity.
From the tables we see that H3a is supported by the return on assets and the return on
equity, but not by the other performance measures. For the return on assets and return
on equity the fraction of upper class directors and the squared fraction of upper class
directors jointly are significant and the effect takes the inverse u form we hypothesized.
For the other three performance measures the estimates are nonsignificant and sometimes
take the wrong form as well. H3b is not completely supported by the data. Although
for the return on assets and the return on equity the AIC improves, the estimates on
interlock generally increase in size and in one case even turn significant. The return on
assets and return on equity for a large part also support H3c. The estimates on the ratio
of upper class directors are significant and the effect is of the hypothesized form. For the
return on equity the lagged effect is indeed stronger than the immediate effect, but for
the return on assets the lagged effect is less strong than the immediate effect. Also for
H3d the results on the return on assets are mixed while the return on equity indeed has
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Table 5.7: Estimation results concerning H2a-H2d.
measure model interlock interlock2 F-test ratio busy AIC
stock BIK, linear -0.011 (0.760) - - -0.192 (0.488) 0.898
BIK, quadr. -0.021 (0.794) 0.023 (0.662) 0.868 -0.261 (0.414) 0.900
BIK, sq.root 0.013 (0.742) - - -0.179 (0.473) 0.898
BIK, linear, lag -0.017 (0.641) - - 0.096 (0.718) 0.898
BIK, quadr., lag -0.091 (0.263) 0.052 (0.308) 0.533 -0.051 (0.866) 0.899
BIK, sq.root, lag -0.023 (0.577) - - 0.082 (0.731) 0.898
p/e ratio FE, linear -0.011 (0.923) - - -1.594 (0.030) 2.058
FE, quadr. 0.334 (0.159) -0.208 (0.094) 0.244 -1.185 (0.124) 2.056
FE, sq.root 0.101 (0.486) - - -1.790 (0.009) 2.057
FE, linear, lag 0.094 (0.427) - - -0.747 (0.294) 2.068
FE, quadr., lag 0.270 (0.253) 0.105 (0.390) 0.504 -0.520 (0.494) 2.070
FE, sq.root, lag 0.208 (0.149) - - -0.789 (0.237) 2.065
p/b ratio FE, linear -0.100 (0.178) - - -0.770 (0.107) 1.291
FE, quadr. -0.210 (0.149) 0.069 (0.380) 0.275 -0.909 (0.071) 1.292
FE, sq.root -0.147 (0.089) - - -0.827 (0.063) 1.289
FE, linear, lag -0.283 (0.000) - - -0.380 (0.403) 1.266
FE, quadr., lag -0.412 (0.004) 0.083 (0.281) 0.000 -0.557 (0.249) 1.267
FE, sq.root, lag -0.309 (0.000) - - -0.691 (0.105) 1.269
roa FE, linear -0.494 (0.763) - - -6.850 (0.508) 7.478
FE, quadr. -0.472 (0.882) -0.014 (0.994) 0.956 -6.821 (0.534) 7.480
FE, sq.root -0.947 (0.617) - - -6.760 (0.479) 7.477
FE, linear, lag -0.214 (0.895) - - -10.340 (0.301) 7.477
FE, quadr., lag 3.354 (0.278) -2.279 (0.176) 0.397 -5.362 (0.614) 7.476
FE, sq.root, lag 1.450 (0.434) - - -13.426 (0.147) 7.476
roe FE, linear -1.963 (0.652) - - -28.150 (0.303) 9.440
FE, quadr. 2.565 (0.762) -2.879 (0.533) 0.744 -22.330 (0.439) 9.442
FE, sq.root 0.062 (0.990) - - -34.356 (0.174) 9.440
FE, linear, lag -9.069 (0.035) - - -17.785 (0.498) 9.430
FE, quadr., lag -3.460 (0.674) -3.585 (0.425) 0.079 -10.036 (0.720) 9.432
FE, sq.root, lag -6.825 (0.166) - - -33.391 (0.171) 9.434
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that the estimates on interlock turn insignificant and are smaller in size.
From the estimates on the return on equity and return on assets one can infer an
optimal ratio of upper class directors. For the return on assets the estimated parabola
peaks at approximately a ratio of 0.4 (current) and 0.2 (lagged) upper class directors,
which implies that it is optimal to have a board which consists of 20% to 40% of upper
class directors. For the return on equity the peak is at approximately a ratio of 0 (non-
lagged) and 0.1 (lagged), and so the estimated effect of upper class directors is negative
almost everywhere. We again note that the estimated effects are quite sizable.
5.6 Conclusion
In this study we used a new and detailed panel database to investigate the effect of
interlocks in the Netherlands during 1994 to 2004. Our hypothesis that interlocks have
a negative effect is partly supported by the data and we find that interlocks indeed have
a stronger effect in the medium run than in the short run. There are two theories that
can explain the negative effect of interlocks in The Netherlands. The first is the busyness
hypothesis of Ferris et al. (2003). We find support for the hypothesis that busyness causes
the immediate negative effect of interlocks, but in the medium run busyness does not play
a significant role. The other theory that can explain the negative effect of interlocks is
the upper class hypothesis. Again, we find support for the hypothesis that upper class
effects cause the immediate negative effect of interlocks and this time we also find weak
support that upper class effects are stronger in the medium run than in the short run.
For none of our hypotheses the support is overwhelming. One research question we
were not able to answer and which thus deserves further attention is why some per-
formance measures give significant results only on the busyness hypothesis while other
performance measures give significant results only on the upper class hypothesis. Another
puzzling result is that busyness has an effect in the short run but not in the medium run.
Nevertheless, we think that our findings do have managerial implications. Our results on
the busyness hypothesis further strengthen the results of Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and
extend these results to firms outside the US. The results in both this chapter and the
paper of Fich and Shivdasani advise not to appoint directors that are already busy serv-
ing other firms. Also, it would be good to be cautious in appointing high profile (upper
class) directors since a too large fraction of these directors in the board could harm firm
performance.
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5.A Statistics per firm
Table 5.10: Statistics per firm.
p/e p/b turn- board inter-
firm BIK stock ratio ratio roa roe over size lock
Aalberts D 24.06 15.38 4.47 10.55 31.88 0.49 3.91 0.72
ABN Amro J 13.65 11.99 2.42 0.77 20.74 14.90 13.36 1.41
Acomo G 12.08 9.16 1.96 13.49 25.72 0.19 3.73 0.00
Aegon J 20.84 22.51 3.14 1.06 14.36 22.51 10.91 1.12
Ahold G 5.51 0.27 7.34 3.71 16.58 37.88 6.73 1.39
Akzo Nobel D 6.07 20.04 4.34 10.03 25.83 12.63 9.73 1.02
Alanheri G -5.00 53.02 0.75 0.31 1.33 0.13 3.00 0.15
AM F 7.07 11.05 1.79 9.45 16.64 1.56 5.36 0.43
Arcadis K 11.22 9.94 1.80 10.03 19.18 0.68 6.55 0.37
ASM International D 49.82 79.22 6.12 6.05 -3.66 0.50 4.36 0.92
ASML D 42.11 27.50 8.39 11.51 11.57 1.38 6.30 0.46
Athlon K 20.37 11.80 2.16 2.95 20.53 0.80 3.91 0.55
Ballast Nedam F 3.93 7.89 1.08 0.88 2.49 1.87 6.18 0.70
BAM F 16.72 5.31 1.52 5.26 19.46 2.74 6.55 0.55
Batenburg beheer F 4.38 8.69 1.54 13.85 18.54 0.11 2.91 0.24
Beterbed G 12.15 13.61 10.34 18.96 52.31 0.20 3.25 0.44
Boskalis F 8.78 10.77 1.76 8.54 19.06 0.86 5.45 1.26
Brunel K -0.76 32.10 2.63 14.69 16.04 0.23 3.25 0.31
Buhrmann G 0.62 58.29 1.12 2.29 4.57 7.56 7.55 1.56
Ten Cate D 7.34 5.32 1.07 6.00 7.53 0.62 5.55 0.84
LogicaCMG K 60.93 15.92 14.82 1.03 0.43 1.75 4.22 0.24
Coberco D 0.20 7.61 NA 6.50 12.94 4.32 11.43 0.21
Corio J 8.43 NA 1.03 5.19 9.76 0.19 5.91 0.73
Corus D -16.66 2.39 0.69 5.61 8.10 9.09 8.64 1.27
Crown van Gelder D 2.29 2.25 0.59 9.41 7.49 0.13 4.00 0.05
Crucell D 24.42 -7.59 2.08 -29.37 -39.54 0.01 6.00 0.00
CSM D 4.98 14.15 4.59 13.06 41.37 2.57 6.36 1.19
CTAC K -11.12 22.64 5.91 17.00 33.80 0.02 2.71 0.43
Delft Instruments D 5.89 11.83 1.43 4.68 4.61 0.20 5.27 0.53
Dico international D -11.11 1.65 0.58 -13.70 -25.55 0.03 2.82 0.33
DOCdata D -9.25 11.60 1.35 4.39 5.35 0.09 3.13 0.44
Draka D 10.82 18.27 2.22 6.71 17.65 1.20 5.55 1.08
DSM D 9.87 10.34 1.09 7.68 17.17 6.49 7.82 0.57
Econosto D -10.28 21.83 2.50 1.60 -4.14 0.29 4.00 0.11
Elsevier D 3.76 -98.96 5.21 13.62 11.35 5.90 7.55 0.99
Eriks group G 6.63 24.15 1.57 12.52 17.34 0.30 3.00 0.00
Eurocommercial
properties J 8.19 15.38 1.00 3.57 6.35 0.07 4.00 0.00
EVC International D 5.52 -2.09 0.49 -2.32 -18.10 1.06 4.10 0.13
Exact K -4.23 25.57 8.70 25.19 35.42 0.18 4.29 0.12
Exendis D -5.12 9.19 2.25 5.41 2.27 0.02 3.36 0.30
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Table 5.10 – continued from previous page
p/e p/b turn- board inter-
Firm BIK stock ratio ratio roa roe over size lock
de Porceleyne Fles D 8.18 10.00 1.73 5.85 13.02 0.00 3.18 0.24
Fornix D 37.76 6.72 5.19 16.98 24.65 0.04 3.18 0.00
Fortis J 13.95 -147.55 2.81 9.09 11.55 1.79 10.80 0.16
Frans Maas I 2.11 9.38 1.67 5.74 12.00 0.82 4.55 0.50
Fugro K 27.57 13.24 3.60 10.68 32.41 0.67 5.73 0.61
Gamma Holding D 0.78 9.85 1.36 8.73 15.33 0.82 6.09 1.49
Getronics K 32.28 28.15 10.20 5.24 13.67 2.52 4.82 0.67
Grolsch D 0.30 16.69 2.96 14.87 17.61 0.24 6.00 1.07
Grontmij K 10.20 13.13 1.23 6.04 13.56 0.39 6.18 0.38
Hagemeijer G -9.37 16.12 3.43 4.90 11.60 6.17 5.91 0.85
Heijmans F 19.30 9.90 1.93 9.32 21.85 1.61 4.82 0.79
Heineken D 7.18 23.70 4.83 12.38 22.02 6.85 7.36 1.59
Hunter Douglas D 9.87 10.27 1.93 12.59 19.38 1.44 7.00 0.20
Imtech K 14.87 9.23 2.39 9.40 34.26 2.10 6.18 1.41
ING J 16.31 11.88 1.82 NA 18.37 9.29 11.45 1.06
Kas bank J 15.01 10.36 1.17 NA 14.17 0.10 7.09 0.06
Kendrion D -11.25 6.98 3.42 2.72 -3.68 0.73 3.64 0.17
KLM I 1.17 70.17 0.74 0.32 6.70 6.10 9.36 0.95
KPN I 7.27 14.54 2.68 1.73 -3.37 10.73 7.55 0.92
Van Lansschot J 4.81 13.43 2.27 NA 18.21 0.35 8.43 0.74
Macintosh Retail G 6.55 16.26 1.39 7.74 13.48 0.69 5.00 0.62
Magnus K -22.05 35.62 5.39 5.35 4.89 0.03 2.33 0.00
Van der Molen J 22.55 6.63 4.11 10.09 62.13 0.20 4.64 0.18
Nedap D 20.58 16.38 3.36 16.63 21.36 0.10 3.91 0.26
Nedschroef D 16.11 5.62 0.94 7.32 10.77 0.25 5.00 0.18
Neways D 6.77 7.63 1.79 3.46 -2.15 0.15 2.64 0.06
Numico D 25.23 20.88 7.44 1.05 48.25 2.52 6.18 1.05
Nutreco D 9.21 12.31 2.09 4.55 11.78 2.95 3.73 0.46
Nyloplast D -6.27 23.39 1.44 8.70 10.61 0.02 3.09 0.11
OCE D 8.52 27.58 1.93 5.42 11.50 2.64 5.82 1.10
Opg groep D 9.97 9.85 1.94 10.57 24.73 1.65 7.00 0.23
Ordina K 31.21 22.45 18.20 29.11 83.72 0.27 3.27 0.52
P&O Nedlloyd I 19.26 18.34 0.56 -0.26 6.78 2.37 5.73 1.44
Philips D 22.11 3.74 2.05 4.40 14.58 32.29 7.82 0.68
Randstad K 27.69 25.28 8.85 13.44 38.44 4.63 5.73 0.99
Reesink G -0.27 10.38 1.13 9.23 10.51 0.12 4.00 0.41
De Vries Robbe K -12.16 9.02 0.97 -30.97 -57.34 0.01 2.43 0.07
Rodamco Europe J 8.32 12.69 0.96 5.20 13.12 0.47 6.40 0.28
SBM D 14.85 24.17 3.50 6.09 17.06 1.16 5.55 1.65
Schuitema G 16.30 16.76 4.55 11.54 28.01 2.25 4.45 0.27
Shell C 9.73 51.07 2.81 14.45 15.36 130.77 7.27 1.85
Simac K 31.67 30.42 5.12 -3.90 -33.07 0.19 3.82 0.08
Sligro food group G 24.79 15.27 4.54 13.80 32.92 0.88 4.00 0.05
Smit International I 17.82 8.64 1.09 5.22 18.31 0.32 5.64 0.87
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Table 5.10 – continued from previous page
p/e p/b turn- board inter-
Firm BIK stock ratio ratio roa roe over size lock
Nieuwe Steen
investments J 3.58 11.27 1.18 5.22 11.36 0.06 4.29 0.00
Stork D 14.83 3.66 1.29 5.36 10.84 2.19 7.00 1.02
Telegraaf D 6.07 -8.25 2.23 8.35 6.53 0.68 6.27 0.32
TNT I -3.36 23.99 4.57 10.91 22.86 10.48 8.57 0.82
Twentsche kabel D 14.53 9.70 1.44 8.78 10.45 0.45 5.91 0.73
Unilever D 10.66 26.93 6.15 10.81 35.58 43.06 10.00 0.43
Unit 4 Agresso K 17.65 23.19 12.61 25.57 69.78 0.16 3.43 0.00
Univar I 126.57 11.30 0.72 3.38 5.87 3.93 4.33 1.15
United Services K 33.15 15.87 6.78 20.21 55.63 0.81 4.29 0.93
Vedior K 9.43 -8.21 2.09 -2.60 -2.54 5.44 3.88 0.33
Vendex G -0.83 31.72 3.32 9.21 28.89 4.52 6.00 0.82
Versatel I 57.13 -13.96 1.37 -34.02 -30.34 0.31 5.67 0.00
VHS onroerend goed K 16.23 8.32 1.65 4.54 19.88 0.04 3.00 0.00
VNU D 15.65 28.05 4.98 8.40 23.53 3.01 6.18 1.46
Wereldhave J 7.08 11.81 0.99 5.39 9.35 0.14 4.45 0.46
Wessanen D -2.21 53.32 1.77 6.75 16.21 2.78 5.18 0.89
Wolters-Kluwer D 4.39 22.24 7.88 9.70 24.28 3.01 6.36 1.35

Chapter 6
Summary and directions for further
research
6.1 Summary
In this thesis I consider the provision of information in two very different settings. In the
first part of this thesis, consisting of chapters 2, 3 and 4, micro-economic models are used
to analyze the search behavior of consumers. The second part of this thesis, chapter 5,
empirically analyzes the effect of director interlocks on firm performance. In this section
I will give a short summary of each chapter.
In Chapter 2 a duopoly model is considered where ex ante consumers are uninformed
about prices. Price information can come from two different sides. First, firms can
decide to advertise and, second, consumers can (sequentially) search for information.
Both mechanisms are costly, and the relative costs determine which side takes the burden
of information provision. When the search costs are relatively low, or the advertising
costs are relatively high, firms do not advertise, but consumers do search. On the other
hand, when the search costs are high consumers do not search, but firms do advertise. For
intermediate costs, both advertising and search are used and it is shown that advertising
and search are ’substitutes’ in the sense that if advertising decreases (e.g. because of
increasing advertising costs) consumers will search more. Likewise, when consumer search
decreases (e.g. because of increasing search costs) firms will advertise more. Despite this
substitution result, consumers in general do not know all market prices, and as a result
prices are above marginal costs.
One of the novelties in Chapter 2 is that we assume that search costs are only in-
curred when visiting a non-advertising firm. Visiting a firm that has advertised comes
at no costs. This assumption has an interesting effect on the pricing behavior of firms:
for some parameter values advertised prices are higher than non-advertised prices. In-
tuitively, advertising firms have an advantage over non-advertising firms. A consumer
incurs search costs when visiting a non-advertising firm and he may be willing to pay a
higher price in order to avoid these search costs.
In Chapter 3 we further examine this mechanism. Instead of assuming that visiting
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a non-advertising firm comes at no cost, we endogenize the difference between the costs
of visiting an advertising and a non-advertising firm by adding an initial phase to the
model. In this phase, firms decide on whether or not they want to shelve the product.
The costs of visiting an advertising firm are assumed to be equal to the costs of visiting
a non-advertising firm, but consumers are sure that an advertising firm has shelved the
product. When visiting a non-advertising firm, there is a probability this firm has not
shelved the product at all and the consumer would have to continue his search. This
makes buying the product in an advertising shop less costly than buying the product in
a non-advertising shop, and consequently advertising shops have an advantage. The size
of this advantage depends on the probability that a firm decides to shelve the product. If
this probability is small, an advertising shop has a large advantage, while a large shelving
probability will only lead to a small advantage for the advertising firms. In Chapter 3 it
is shown that the model parameters can be chosen in such a way that the advantage for
advertising firms is large enough to make advertising a high price an equilibrium strategy.
Chapter 4 presents a model combining sequential consumer search and the location
choice of shops. The search costs in this model consist of two elements. Consumers in-
cur costs when traveling between malls and they incur costs when entering a shop. This
search costs structure ensures that visiting two or more shops in the same mall comes
at less costs than visiting the same number of shops dispersed over different malls. It is
assumed that the shops sell homogenous products, allowing to focus on the role of prices.
Three roles of prices are found. First, the existence of a mall containing two or more
competing shops lowers the prices. Since a mall containing two or more competing shops
lowers the consumer search costs, this result is quite intuitive. Second, these lower prices
make more consumers active, that is, they make more consumers willing to leave their
home and start searching. And, third, malls that contain two or more competing shops
attract more consumers per shop than malls where a shop has no direct competitors.
Simulations show that the second and third effect can outweigh the first effect, making
locating together a profitable strategy.
The topic of Chapter 5 is director interlocks. A director interlock between two firms
occurs when the firms share one or more directors in their boards. In Chapter 5 we use
a unique panel dataset on Dutch directors to investigate the effect director interlocks
have on firm performance. Although interlocks could provide firms with information and
interlocking directors generally are more experienced, we find weak evidence of a negative
relation between interlocks and performance. Further investigations suggest that this
negative effect has two causes. First, interlocking directors tend to be too busy to give
full attention to all of their directorships and second, in The Netherlands interlocking
directors form a homogenous, cohesive group, potentially suffering from a lack of critical
thinking. We conclude that the common practice of interlocking in The Netherlands has
no foundation in increased performance and that firms should be careful in appointing
suitable board members.
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6.2 Directions for further research
There are several possibilities to extend the research contained in this thesis. In this last
part of the thesis I will outline some directions for further research in the areas of search
and advertising, search and location choice and director interlocks.
The models in this thesis concerning search and advertising are of a theoretical nature.
A first direction for further research would be to estimate the parameters of these models.
There currently is an emerging literature trying to estimate consumer search costs and
using those estimates for a welfare analysis, see e.g. Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest
(forthcoming). The models used in this literature are pure search models, without any
advertising. Including advertising in the empirical analysis would enhance the realism of
those models. Estimating the models in Chapters 2 and 3, however, will not be easy. The
main complication is the multiplicity of equilibria in the models containing advertising.
Models with only consumer search generally have a unique (symmetric) equilibrium, and
data on prices is sufficient to identify the model parameters. Intuitively, there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the model parameters and equilibrium pricing behavior and
therefore an observed price distribution is sufficient to estimate the model parameters.
When there are multiple equilibria, it is likely that there is no one-to-one correspondence
between model parameters and equilibrium pricing behavior. In every equilibrium type
the price distribution takes a different form and it is very well possible that two different
sets of parameter values, entered into their respective equilibrium price distributions,
give the same final price distribution. If in a search and advertising model with multiple
equilibria there still is a one-to-one correspondence between the model parameters and the
equilibrium pricing behavior, then price data would be sufficient to identify the parameters
of such a model and it would be relatively easy to estimate the parameters by using the
same methods as outlined in Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (forthcoming). If there
is no one-to-one correspondence between the model parameters and equilibrium pricing
behavior, price data is not sufficient for identification. The only solution then is to
gather data on either advertising costs or on advertising intensity. Data on pricing and
advertising together should be sufficient to identify the model parameters, but this data is
much more difficult to obtain than data on only prices. Once again, the methods outlined
in Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (forthcoming) could be used, although the actual
estimation would be more complex.
As a theoretical extension of the models one could think of a model with different con-
sumer segments and targeted advertising, where the consumer segments differ in search
costs. In the models in this thesis there are two consumer segments, with one segment
having zero search costs and the other segment having strictly positive search costs. If
targeted advertising would have been possible, the outcome most likely would be that all
firms ignore the zero search cost segment. But if there are two or more consumer seg-
ments with strictly positive search costs, the analysis gets more complicated. An intuitive
outcome would be that the firms concentrate more on the high search costs segment, but
whether this result really can be obtained is an interesting topic for future research.
Future research should also complete the analysis of the model in Chapter 4. The
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analysis of the model in this chapter consists of two parts. First, the pricing behavior is
determined while the location of shops is fixed. Once this has been done, the location
choice of shops is considered. In the first part of the analysis one ideally considers all
location possibilities, but several location possibilities, especially the ones with a relatively
large mall, turned out to be quite complex to analyze and are missing in the analysis.
This hampers the analysis in the second part. The results obtained thus far in the first
part are sufficient to show that a mall can be formed and indicate what factors play a
role in this, but it would be very interesting to make a complete analysis of the game.
One important location possibility that has not yet been analyzed is the case where there
is one isolated shop and one mall containing all the other shops. Once this case has
been analyzed, it is possible to show whether one large mall is a Nash equilibrium or not.
To show whether one large mall is a unique Nash equilibrium, one would also need to
analyze the other location possibilities. The main problem with such an analysis is that
the pricing behavior can be quite complex. One way to work around this problem would
be to focus on profits instead of pricing behavior, since profits are all that is needed in
the second part of the analysis. Probably computer simulations could also help to find
the equilibrium profits.
The model in Chapter 4 assumes that there is only one mall that has enough space for
several competitors. Although in some situations this is realistic, it would be interesting
to extend the model by assuming that there is more than one mall with enough space for
several competitors. A question that would arise in such a setting is whether shops prefer
to spread evenly over several malls, or whether they prefer to locate all together in one
mall.
Concerning the analysis in Chapter 5, one avenue for further research would be to
gather data on 2005 - 2008. A panel data set like we already have on 1994-2004 can be
used to estimate lagged effects. This is important in the case of interlocks because of a
causality problem: it could be that interlocks increase performance, but it could as well
be that good performing firms attract more interlocks. Estimating the lagged effect of
interlocks circumvents this problem. The current dataset allows a one-year lag, but there
is not enough data to estimate longer lags. Data on more years will solve this and allow
for two- and three-year lags. One possible complication here is the code Tabaksblat, that
became effective at the end of 2004. This code Tabaksblat is a Dutch corporate governance
code of good conduct and, among other things, it limited the number of board positions
a director might have. Even though the code Tabaksblat is not compulsory, the popular
press suggests that virtually all directors indeed comply to it. This implies that after
2004 almost no director in the dataset will be busy and that estimating a fixed effects
model on busyness is impossible. The models estimating the effect of interlocks on firm
performance and the effect of a homogenous group can still be estimated, but the effect
of interlocks on firm performance can change when busyness plays no role anymore. A
model with a structural break is necessary to investigate this, complicating the analysis.
One of the conclusions of Chapter 5 was that the negative effect of interlocks is partly
caused by a cohesive group effect. It would be interesting to investigate this further
by comparing different countries. In The Netherlands there is a relatively small group
of directors, who often meet each other in an informal setting. Not all countries have
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such a cohesive group of directors, and this could be visible in the estimation results.
For instance, we find that in The Netherlands the effect of the percentage of high profile
directors in the board takes the form of an inverse u. In countries where the directors form
a less cohesive group, the top of the inverse u shaped curve could lie at a higher percentage
of high profile directors, or the effect could be completely linear (with a positive slope).
As a final remark, the data on directors used in Chapter 5 could also be coupled
with other data than firm performance. One interesting avenue would be to investigate
whether the interlock network has any effect on the compensation of executives. It is
regularly suggested in the popular press that interlocking directors earn higher salaries
because their network shields them. An investigation on this topic would only require
additional data on compensation, which is relatively easy to gather.

Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Inleiding
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen, die beide een ander aspect van de rol van informatie
in de economie belichten. Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift, bestaande uit de hoofd-
stukken 2, 3 en 4, analyseert met behulp van theoretische micro-economische modellen
de informatiestromen tussen winkels en consumenten. In dit deel van het proefschrift
wordt er van uitgegaan dat consumenten niet (volledig) ge¨ınformeerd zijn over producten
en/of prijzen. Om ge¨ınformeerd te raken kunnen consumenten zoeken naar informatie,
maar iedere zoekactie brengt kosten met zich mee, hetzij in termen van geld, hetzij in ter-
men van tijd. Winkels kunnen deze kosten be¨ınvloeden, onder andere door te adverteren
of zich bij elkaar in de buurt te vestigen. In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift wordt
geanalyseerd of het voor winkels aantrekkelijk is om de zoekkosten van consumenten te
be¨ınvloeden en wat dit voor invloed heeft op de prijzen en op de hoeveelheid informatie
die consumenten uiteindelijk hebben.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift heeft informatiestromen tussen bedrijven als on-
derwerp. Veel leden van de raad van commissarissen hebben meerdere commissariaten.
Deze dubbelcommissarissen vormen een brug tussen de bedrijven waarin ze commissaris
zijn, en zijn een manier om informatie uit te wisselen tussen bedrijven. Dubbelcommis-
sariaten hebben echter ook schaduwzijden. Een deel van de dubbelcommissarissen heeft
het zo druk dat de kwaliteit van hun toezicht en advies eronder lijdt. In Hoofdstuk 5 van
dit proefschrift wordt het uiteindelijke effect dat dubbelcommissarissen hebben geschat
met behulp van data over Nederlandse beursgenoteerde bedrijven.
Deel I. Zoekgedrag van consumenten
De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 van dit proefschrift hebben het zoekgedrag van consumenten en
het advertentiegedrag van winkels als onderwerp. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt aangenomen dat
consumenten niet op de hoogte zijn van de prijzen in de verschillende winkels. Winkels
kunnen consumenten informeren door te adverteren, maar consumenten kunnen ook zelf
zoeken naar informatie. De belangrijkste conclusies van dit hoofdstuk zijn als volgt.
Ten eerste blijken adverteren en zoeken substituten te zijn. Wanneer winkels meer ad-
verteren gaan consumenten minder zoeken en wanneer consumenten meer zoeken gaan
winkels minder adverteren. Ten tweede blijkt er geen eenduidig verband te zijn tussen
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zoekkosten en prijzen. Gewoonlijk leiden hogere zoekkosten tot hogere prijzen. Als de
zoekkosten hoog zijn, zoeken consumenten minder. Hierdoor zijn consumenten minder
goed ge¨ınformeerd en is de concurrentie tussen winkels kleiner. Maar als winkels de mo-
gelijkheid hebben om te adverteren, leiden hoge zoekkosten (en minder zoekactiviteit van
consumenten) ook tot meer advertenties, wat weer tot meer concurrentie en lagere prijzen
leidt. De analyse in Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat het uiteindelijke effect op de prijs van een
stijging in de zoekkosten beide kanten op kan vallen. De laatste interessante conclusie is
dat geadverteerde prijzen hoger kunnen zijn dan niet geadverteerde prijzen. Een van de
aannames in Hoofdstuk 2 is dat een consument geen zoekkosten hoeft te maken om in
een adverterende winkel te kopen. Om in een niet adverterende winkel te kopen moeten
wel zoekkosten worden gemaakt. Dit zorgt ervoor dat consumenten bereid zijn meer te
betalen in adverterende winkels.
Hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift werkt de laatste conclusie van Hoofdstuk 2 verder
uit. In plaats van eenvoudigweg aan te nemen dat een consument geen zoekkosten hoeft
te maken om in een adverterende winkel te kopen, wordt in Hoofdstuk 3 aangenomen
dat consumenten niet weten waar een bepaald product te koop is. Als een consument
een advertentie ontvangt, weet hij dat de adverterende winkel het product verkoopt. De
consument moet dan nog steeds zoekkosten maken om het product te kopen in de ad-
verterende winkel, maar als hij (voor dezelfde zoekkosten) een niet adverterende winkel
bezoekt, loopt hij het risico dat die winkel het product niet verkoopt en dat hij verder
moet zoeken. Zolang niet elke winkel het product verkoopt is een bezoek aan een advert-
erende winkel gemiddeld genomen dus goedkoper. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangetoond dat
in bepaalde gevallen inderdaad niet in alle winkels het product verkocht wordt. Verder
wordt aangetoond dat in deze gevallen adverterende winkels een hogere prijs kunnen vra-
gen dan niet adverterende winkels.
In Hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift wordt een model behandeld waarin winkels de
zoekkosten van consumenten kunnen be¨ınvloeden door hun locatiekeuze. De zoekkosten
van consumenten vallen in dit model uiteen in twee onderdelen. Consumenten maken
kosten om naar een winkelcentrum te reizen, en als ze eenmaal in een winkelcentrum
zijn, maken ze kosten om een individuele winkel te bezoeken. Winkels kunnen ervoor
kiezen om zich te vestigen in een winkelcentrum waar nog geen concurrenten zijn (waar
concurrent gedefinieerd is als een winkel die dezelfde producten verkoopt), maar ze kunnen
zich ook vestigen in een winkelcentrum waar al wel concurrenten zijn. Als twee of meer
concurrenten zich in hetzelfde winkelcentrum vestigen reduceert dit de reiskosten van
consumenten. Het gevolg is meer concurrentie en lagere prijzen dan wanneer een winkel
geen directe concurrenten heeft. Tegelijkertijd trekken de lagere prijzen meer consumenten
naar het winkelcentrum met twee of meer concurrerende winkels. De analyse in Hoofdstuk
4 toont aan dat dit laatste effect vaak sterker is dan de reductie in prijzen: uiteindelijk
maken winkels meer winst als ze zich in hetzelfde winkelcentrum vestigen.
Een ander interessant resultaat betreft de prijzen in winkels die geen directe concurrent
hebben. Deze winkels kiezen vaak voor een prijs die hoger ligt dan de maximum prijs van
concurrerende winkels, maar kiezen er soms ook voor om een prijs te vragen die onder de
minimum prijs van concurrerende winkels ligt. Een interpretatie hiervan is dat ge¨ısoleerde
winkels gewoonlijk een hoge prijs vragen, maar daarnaast ook regelmatig aanbiedingen
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tegen zeer lage prijzen hebben.
Deel II. Dubbelcommissariaten
Hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift betreft dubbelcommissariaten in Nederland. Iemand die
in meerdere bedrijven de functie van commissaris vervult heeft een potentieel positief effect
op het bedrijfsresultaat: een dubbelcommissaris heeft meer informatie en ervaring tot zijn
beschikking dan iemand die slechts e´e´n commissarispositie bekleedt. Daar staat tegen-
over dat een dubbelcommissaris het drukker heeft. Bovendien is er een ’homogene groep
effect’ mogelijk. Dubbelcommissarissen horen vaak bij het ’old boys netwerk’, een groep
commissarissen die vrijwel allemaal dezelfde achtergrond hebben en elkaar regelmatig
bij informele gelegenheden tegenkomen. Een raad van commissarissen die voornamelijk
bestaat uit ’old boys’ loopt een verhoogd risico op groepsdenken.
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt met behulp van een unieke dataset onderzocht wat de effecten
van dubbelcommissariaten zijn op de uiteindelijke prestatie van bedrijven. De dataset
bestaat uit gegevens van 101 Nederlandse beursgenoteerde bedrijven, over de periode van
1994 tot en met 2004. Een eerste analyse betreft het effect van het aantal verbindingen
dat een bedrijf via zijn commissarissen met andere bedrijven heeft (in het vervolg het
aantal interlocks genoemd). Uit de analyse blijkt dat het aantal interlocks een zwak
negatief effect heeft op de prestaties van een bedrijf. Verdere analyse betreft het effect van
het tekort aan tijd waarmee dubbelcommissarissen te maken hebben en het ’homogene
groep effect’. Het effect van drukke commissarissen is zoals verwacht negatief: meer
drukke commissarissen in de raad van commissarissen leidt tot slechtere prestaties. Het
’homogene groep effect’ is iets gecompliceerder. Een beperkt aantal ’old boys’ in de raad
van commissarissen heeft een positief effect op bedrijfsprestaties. Als ’old boys’ echter de
meerderheid gaan vormen in de raad van commissarissen verslechteren de resultaten.
Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat dubbelcommissarissen een licht negatief effect
op de bedrijfsprestaties hebben. Dit wordt met name veroorzaakt door drukke commis-
sarissen en een ’homogene groep effect’. Deze twee effecten zijn sterker dan het positieve
informatie effect dat dubbelcommissariaten met zich meebrengen.
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